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CHAPTER 1:
UNDERSTANDING MILITARY RESPONSES DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS
How should militaries respond to mass political protests that threaten the stability of
the ruling regime? This was a central question several militaries across the Middle East and
North Africa (MENA) wrestled with during the political protests of 2010 - 2011 that are
often popularly referred to as the "Arab Spring," but are described to in this project as the
"Arab uprisings."1 In some instances militaries defended the incumbent regime and used
violence to subdue protesters (e.g. Bahrain), in other instances militaries defected from the
incumbent regime and refrained from using high levels of violence against demonstrators
(e.g. Egypt and Tunisia), and in other circumstances militaries fractured as the military was
divided between regime loyalty and regime defection. What explains the variation in Arab
military behavior during the Arab uprisings? Why did some MENA militaries defend the
regime whereas others defected from the regime?
Recent research identifies numerous variables and conditions to explain varying
military responses during the Arab uprisings. Some researchers argue MENA military
behavior was influenced by institutional factors inherent within the configuration of the
1

This project uses the term "Arab uprisings" rather than "Arab Spring" primarily because the term "Arab
Spring" is overly optimistic and does not accurately represent the majority of MENA countries that did not
experience regime change or experience an increase in democratization as a result of the protests. The name
"Arab Spring" was given to the protests due to the initial success in Tunisia, where the incumbent autocrat,
President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, fled the country and was replaced by a civilian transitional government. The
term "spring" has historical significance and evokes earlier protests such as the "Spring of Nations of 1848,"
and the "Prague Spring." The former refers to the wave of economic, political, and social protests that swept
across Europe in the mid-eighteenth century and challenged the existing monarchical structures. The latter
refers to the 1968 democratic protests in Czechoslovakia where citizens challenged the Soviet's economic and
political influence over the country. Overall, the term "Arab uprisings" is more neutral than "Arab Spring" and
better describes the protests that gripped the region from 2010 - 2011.

1
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military. This research explores the level of military autonomy (Sayigh 2011a; Stepan and
Linz 2013), the level of military coherence (Droz-Vincent 2014b, 5), the organizational
interests of the military (Brooks 2013), the rivalry between military and internal security
forces (Sayigh 2011b, 404), and the level of military professionalization (Gause 2011; Sayigh
2011a, 391; Sayigh 2011b; Bellin 2012; Lutterbeck 2012; Stepan and Linz 2013, 29).
A second group of scholars examines political factors and claims Arab military
behavior during the Arab uprisings was caused by regime factors rather than institutional
factors within the military. These arguments examine coup-proofing tactics of the regime
(Gaub 2013a; Makara 2013; Bou-Nassif 2015), how well the ruling leaders coerced the
military (Silverman 2012), whether the military was closely integrated to the regime (DrozVincent 2011, 7; Ryan 2012; Volpi 2013), whether the military was politically removed from
the regime (Droz-Vincent 2011, 7; Sharqieh 2013), the level of resentment the military had
towards the regime (Goldstone 2011), and the regime's level of petroleum production, which
could be used to "buy-off" military support (Ross 2011).
Another set of scholars explains Arab military behavior as cost-benefit analyses
where officers made decisions that provided them with the largest economic gains. These
arguments include militaries protecting the economic interests of the armed forces (Nepstad
2011, 489; Stepan and Linz 2013, 28; Frisch 2013, 188) and the economic benefits and
incentives individual officers receive from the regime (Barany 2011, 25; Silverman 2012;
Nepstad 2013). A fourth group of scholars examines the societal factors that influence
military behavior by exploring the communal configuration of the country and the nature of
the protest movements. One of the most salient arguments explores the communal
affiliations between military personnel and citizens. Scholars argue either sectarian
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differences (Droz Vincent 2011, 7; Gause 2011; Nepstad 2011, 489; Sayigh 2011a;
Heydemann 2013, 66; Louër 2013; Droz-Vincent 2014a, 39) or tribal differences (Knights
2013) between military personnel and citizens influence how militaries responded to mass
political protests. Research on societal factors also explores the nature of the protest
movements. Zunes (2011) argues the Egyptian military defected from the regime since the
demonstrations in Egypt were nonviolent in nature. Scholars also postulate the size and
strength of the opposition protest movements forced the military to defect from the regime
(Droz-Vincent 2011, 7; Goldstone 2011, 459; Shehata 2011, 31).
Lastly, some scholars argue international factors, rather than domestic factors, best
explain Arab military behavior. Researchers point to the significance of direct military
intervention, such as the effect Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) soldiers had on
encouraging the Bahraini military to support the ruling al-Khalifa regime (Goldstone 2011,
5), and the impact of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) aerial attacks influencing
Libyan officers and soldiers to abandon their posts and defect from the Qaddafi regime
(Gaub 2013b). Other researchers indicate political pressure from global leaders, such as the
United States (U.S.) and Europe, convinced Arab militaries to respond in certain ways.
Nepstad (2011) argues Egypt's military was influenced by the American diplomatic corps to
defect from President Hosni Mubarak to ensure political stability in the country and to
maintain the continuation of Egyptian policies that were perceived as vital to U.S. strategic
interests.2
Overall, the recent wave of research exploring Arab military responses to the Arab
uprisings has been illuminating and has provided beneficial knowledge to the complex issue
2

For more see Brownlee (2012).
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of MENA civil-military and regime-military relations. But existing research also has
numerous shortcomings and in some regards fail to fully explain military behavior from a
comparative perspective. The general shortcoming is none of the research employs a
comprehensive analysis that tests the contending variables in a quantitative and region-wide
comparison. Rather, the majority of current research on MENA military responses to the
Arab uprisings relies on single case studies and small-n comparative case studies that only
examine a few salient variables that happen to be present in the observed cases.
To provide an example, some scholars argue professionalized militaries (e.g. Egypt
and Tunisia) were more willing to defect from ruling regimes and side with protesters,
whereas non-professionalized militaries (e.g. Bahrain and Syria) were more willing to defend
the ruling regimes and use violence against protesters.3 However this example can be
challenged considering the Tunisian military has been professionalized ever since the country
gained independence in 1956. Tunisia had numerous political protests that challenged the
incumbent regime such as in 1978, 1984, and 2008,4 but in these prior protests the Tunisian
military defended the ruling regime and used violence against protesters. Therefore, how
could the variable of military professionalization have causal significance in 2011 but not in
previous years?
The second issue is the research fails to have significant external validity outside of
the observed cases since it does not rigorously test the causal variables in a comparative
perspective. To continue with the example above, if military professionalization was one of

3

For more see Gause 2011; Sayigh 2011a, 391; Sayigh 2011b; Bellin 2012; Lutterbeck 2012; Stepan and Linz
2013, 29.
4

For more on these protests see Brooks (2013) and Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
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the leading factors that caused the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries to defect from the ruling
regime, then how does one explain Libya and Yemen – countries where the militaries are not
professionalized yet fracturing occurred where large segments of the military defected from
the ruling regimes? Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen all experienced forms of military
defection (either complete military defection or military fracturing) but the independent
variable of military professionalization varies across these countries. How can one account
for this and entrust the independent variable of military professionalization truly has causal
significance from a regional perspective? The recent literature on MENA military behavior
during the Arab uprisings does very little to untangle such issues and tends to observe
military behavior narrowly through single cases (or a few cases) and concentrates on causal
variables that existed within the observed cases without generally testing those variables in a
comparative perspective.
In addition to these two primary shortcomings, existing research also suffers from
three other limitations. First, the discipline employs minimal, if any, quantitative measures to
explain MENA military behavior during the Arab uprisings. Second, recent research
disregards the entirety of the MENA region and has not explored the "non-cases" of the
Arab uprisings. For instance, even though substantial research examines dynamics of civilmilitary relations in Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen, significantly less
research explores the civil-military dynamics in countries where protests were not as large
(e.g. Saudi Arabia), where internal security forces were able to successfully control the
protest movements and avoid the need for military assistance (e.g. Algeria), or where the role
of the military was less documented (e.g. Oman). Third, the recent research fails to include
the entire population of cases from the MENA region into a single analysis.

6
The goal of this dissertation is to alleviate these shortcomings and to contribute to
the recent literature in two distinct ways. First, this dissertation examines MENA military
behavior during the Arab uprisings comprehensively and tests twenty variables of civilmilitary relations across twenty-one MENA countries. Second, this project creates a unique
and original dataset, called the MENA Military Index, which quantitatively measures military
responses during the Arab uprisings through a numerical index score. The underlying
argument of this project is there is no single variable that neatly explains military responses
to the uprisings across the region. Most of the preexisting literature tends to examine one
variable or a handful of variables, but the MENA Military Index aggregates these variables
into a single dataset and provides a comprehensive and systematic approach to the question
of what explains MENA military behavior during the uprisings.
Theoretical Questions, Empirical Puzzles, and Normative Issues
This project addresses several theoretical questions. First, how do militaries respond
when facing mass political protests that challenge the incumbent regime? Will the military
defend the regime and use violence against protesters? Will the military defect from the
incumbent regime and support protesters? Will the military remain on the sidelines?5
To better understand military responses during mass political protests it is crucial to
explore a second theoretical question: what is the primary role of the military within the
country? In the classic civil-military relations literature, the traditional role of the military is
to concentrate solely on external security, including the defense of the country from foreign
threats, and (if necessary) engaging in warfare against other militaries (see Huntington 1957,

5

Pion-Berlin et al. (2014) recently discuss this phenomenon, which they refer to as militaries "staying
quartered." This concept will be explored later in this chapter and also in more detail in Chapter 2.
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1; Finer 1962, 27; Nordlinger 1977, 55). In this traditional view, since the military is
responsible for external security, the police and other internal security forces are responsible
for the internal security of a country and militaries should not have a role in internal security
functions. Nordlinger (1977, 55) states in the traditional model of militaries, officers and
soldiers find internal security functions as dishonorable since
Officers see themselves as professional and heroic managers of violence.
They are ready and willing to use force against similarly trained and armed
soldiers... [but] to do so against their "own people"... [would be] an
unpalatable task.
Finer (1962, 27) adds the military "sees itself as a fighting force, not as a body of policemen."
Even though the traditional model highlights the stark division between external
security and internal security, in many countries the role of the military and police overlap
and differences between the two are blurred and indistinguishable.6 Kohn (1997, 141) notes
militaries in authoritarian regimes are more prone to focus on internal security with the
military preying on society rather than protecting citizens. Svolik (2012, chp. 5) observes
authoritarian leaders strategically incorporate militaries into internal security and the everyday
functions of repression to sustain the longevity of the regime and to quell internal dissenters.
The level of the military's internal security functions is relevant to this project
because mass political protests are internal security issues. If a regime orders the military to
intervene against domestic protesters, then by definition the military is engaging in internal
security functions. If the armed forces primary responsibility is external security, then the
military might be less willing to contradict the institutional mission and violently engage

6

For an extensive examination on this topic see Janowitz (1977) who explores the growth of internal security
missions for militaries in developing countries. In addition, other scholars explore this phenomenon across
different regions, such as Latin America (Cassman 2007), Europe (Weiss 2011), and Africa (Frazer 1994, 92).
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demonstrators. In contrast, if the armed forces are accustomed to internal security functions,
then the military might be more willing to intervene against protesters when called upon by
an executive.
Understanding the role of the military is an important theoretical question, but it also
leads to a third issue: who does the military serve? Does the military serve the regime? Does
it serve civilians? Does it serve a specific segment of society or a specific institution? Does it
serve certain ideologies or political systems? A general guideline in the civil-military literature
is that in democratic systems militaries more frequently serve civilians since democratic
political institutions increase civilian oversight over the military (see Kohn 1997). In contrast,
in authoritarian systems civilians have less oversight over militaries and militaries more often
serve the ruling interests of the ruler rather than the country. If the armed forces serve the
regime rather than citizens then it is more likely the military would be willing to use violence
against mass political protesters. In contrast, if the armed forces serve the people then it is
less likely the military will turn their weapons on civilians to protect a ruling leader.
This project explores these three theoretical questions broadly by focusing on Arab
military responses during the Arab uprisings. By selecting the Arab uprisings this project
examines a political phenomenon that affected numerous countries across a shared
geographic region where wide variation of military responses occurred. In addition to the
broader theoretical questions there are a few empirical puzzles that must be examined in
regards to military responses specifically during the Arab uprisings. The main empirical
puzzle regarding military responses during the Arab uprisings is that prior to 2011 the
authoritarian regimes across the MENA region were perceived as overwhelmingly resilient
and unlikely to experience significant political change or mass political protest. Scholars

9
provide numerous arguments as to why the authoritarian regimes across the MENA region
were so resilient including the coercive nature of internal security forces and the tendency
for militaries to protect the ruling regimes from internal dissent (see Bellin 2004; Brownlee
2005; Cook 2007; Droz-Vincent 2007; Erdle 2010). 7 If militaries and coercive security forces
were critical to maintaining authoritarian stability across the region, then why did some
militaries defect from the incumbent regime when facing mass political protests during the
Arab uprisings? Either there were unique characteristics of the Arab uprisings that
compelled some militaries to sever their relationships with authoritarian leaders and side with
mass protesters, or the previous literature overestimated the significance military coercion
had upon regime longevity.
This leads to another empirical puzzle: why now? After decades of regime stability,
authoritarian rule, and military involvement in internal security, why did some militaries
defect during the Arab uprisings of 2011 as supposed to decades' prior? Authoritarian
regimes across the MENA region have experienced political protests and varying degrees of
internal political dissent before, so what was it about the movements in 2011 that triggered
political change in some countries?
In addition to the theoretical questions and empirical puzzles, this dissertation
addresses larger normative issues. By examining military responses during mass political
protests this projects aims to better understand civil-military relations, especially the
relationship between the military, the ruling government, and civilians. This dissertation

Such arguments include the region’s proclivity towards violence (Solingen 2007), Arab cultural factors
(Huntington 1996), Islam’s incompatibility with democracy (Fish 2002; Rowley and Smith 2009), oil rents (Ross
2001), strength of dominant single parties (Angrist 1999; Brownlee 2007), and effective distribution of
patronage (Lust 2009; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009).
7

10
argues the military is an influential political institution that has the ability to alter political and
social life within a country. The reason militaries have such an impactful role is because they
possess the majority of weaponry within a country and can easily use physical force to
dominate other domestic groups and institutions. For this reason it is relevant for civilians to
understand the factors and variables that influence military responses to mass political
protests. Part of this significance is drawn from the fact civil uprisings are more likely to
succeed if they gain the support of the security forces (Russell 1974). If civilians better
understand the factors that influence military behavior, then social movements can better
anticipate whether a military will respond with violence, remain neutral, or side with
demonstrators. This knowledge can inform social movements and provide individuals with
tactics to decrease the likelihood of violent state response during protests.8 By exploring the
conditions and variables that influence military responses to mass political protest, this
projects hopes to contribute to civilians’ knowledge of state security responses and provide
protesters with better strategies and tactics that can decrease the likelihood of violent state
responses.
Classifications and Definitions
This section classifies and defines several of the project's central concepts. First, it is
necessary to define and classify the countries that comprise the MENA region. There is no
universally accepted definition of the MENA region but the United Nations (UN) refers to
the region as the areas of North Africa, the Levant, and the Arabian Peninsula. In total, the
UN categorizes the MENA region as eighteen countries (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq,
8

Many researchers in political science and sociology argue non-violent protests decrease the likelihood the
military will use weapons against demonstrators. For more on this literature see Sharp (1973), Binnendijk and
Marovic (2006), and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011).
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Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen) and two territories (Palestine and Western
Sahara).9 This project builds off of the UN's classification of MENA countries with a few
minor adjustments.
First, this project omits Western Sahara because of the uncertain sovereign status of
the territory in regards to its relationship with Morocco and since Western Sahara does not
possess many of the institutional state structures that are necessary to examine for this
particular project.10 It should be noted however that Palestine, also a territory, is examined
within this project for three primary reasons: the geographic centrality of the Palestinian
territories in the MENA region, the political significance of Palestine in regards to the larger
Arab identity, and the presence of formal political institutions in the territories, including a
robust security sector. .11
A second adjustment to the classification of the MENA region within this project is
including two countries not in the UN list: Iran and Turkey. One could justifiably question
the addition of Iran and Turkey since the central aim of this project is to examine MENA
military responses during the Arab uprisings and Iran and Turkey are not Arab countries.
Yet despite the ethnic and linguistic differences both Iran and Turkey are significant to the
9

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/MENARegion/Pages/MenaRegionIndex.aspx
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Even though the Polisario Front retains some territorial and political control over eastern portions of the
Western Sahara, Moroccan control over the majority of the territory results in limited or no traditional state
institutions across the territory. For more information on Western Sahara, see Stephen Zunes and Jacob
Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010).
11

The Palestinian National Security Force is a paramilitary security force that straddles the line between internal
and external security. For more on the role of the Palestinian National Security Force and the numerous other
forces in the Palestinian security apparatus see Hillel Frisch, The Palestinian Military Between Militaries and Armies,
(London, UK: Routledge, 2008), and Alaa Tartir, “The Evolution and Reform of Palestinian Security Forces
1993-2013,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development. (2015), 4, 1: p. Art. 46.

12
MENA region and are closely associated culturally, economically, historically, and politically
to the Arab world.
Table 1. Countries/Territories of the MENA Military Index
Algeria
Bahrain

Kuwait
Lebanon

Qatar
Saudi Arabia

Egypt
Iran

Libya
Mauritania

Syria
Tunisia

Iraq
Israel
Jordan

Morocco
Oman
Palestine

Turkey
UAE
Yemen

It should be noted the Arab uprisings directly affected Iran as thousands of Iranians
were influenced by the success of mass political protests from Tunisia and Egypt and staged
demonstrations across Iran.12 Protests in Turkey were admittedly limited or non-existent
during the Arab uprisings but the inclusion of Turkey into the MENA Military Index is
informative for several comparative reasons. One, Turkey has been a regional political power
over the last few decades, its democratic political system has been cited as a potential model
for the rest of the region, and the Turkish military has been actively involved in domestic
politics during the last fifty years.13 After including Iran and Turkey, and omitting Western
Sahara, there are a total of twenty-one countries/territories examined in this project.

12 Predating the Arab uprisings, Iran experienced mass political protests after the country’s 2009 presidential
elections, which are commonly referred to as the “green movement.” For more on the 2009 Iranian green
movement see Charles Kurzman, “The Arab Spring: Ideals of the Iranian Green Movement, Methods of the
Iranian Revolution,” International Journal of Middle East Studies. (2012) 44, 1: 162-165. For an example of protests
in Iran during the 2011 Arab uprisings see Saeed Kamali Dehghan, "Iran protests see reinvigorated activists
take to the streets in thousands," The Guardian February 14, 2011. For an inventory of all protests in Iran during
2011 see J. Craig Jenkins and Andrew Herrick. 2012. “Protest in the Arab Awakening, 2006-2011.” Department
of Sociology and Mershon Center for International Security Studies, Ohio State University.

For a review of Turkey’s increased political role in the Middle East see F. Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey
Rediscovers the Middle East,” Foreign Affairs. (2007) 86, 4: 103- 114. For a better understanding of Turkey's
13

13
The second concept is to define "military behavior" and specifically address how
militaries acted in the face of mass political protests during the Arab uprisings. In the civilmilitary literature most scholars define military behavior in terms of actions vis-a-vis the
regime rather than actions against citizens. For example, Finer (1962, 140) categorizes
military behavior as one of four "modes of interventions" against the regime including:
influence, blackmail, displacement, and supplantment. Recent literature expands the
definition of military behavior to include actions against civilians in addition to actions
against regimes. Davenport (2007, 487) defines military behavior as a wide variety of actions
including domestic spying, verbal and physical harassment, arrests, banning, enforcing
curfews and censorship, torturing, kidnapping, and killing. When regimes order militaries to
intervene violently against mass political protests, soldiers are employing many of these
tactics on civilians. Another useful definition of military behavior for this project is militaries
can remain neutral or stay on the sidelines. Pion-Berlin et al. (2014, 231) refer to this term as
militaries "staying quartered," which occurs when ruling leaders give orders for the military
to intervene against political protests, but the military disobeys these orders and chooses to
stay on the sidelines. This dissertation incorporates all three of these concepts and defines
"military behavior" as a wide-range of activities, both violent and non-violent, the military as
an institution, and also the individual officer and soldier, can exhibit to either the regime or
civilians.
role as a possible democratic model for the region see, Meliha Benli Altunisk, “The Turkish Model and
Democratization in the Middle East,” Arab Studies Quarterly, (2005) 27, 1/2: 45 – 63. As for Turkish military
intervention the Turkish military intervened in domestic politics and ushered in "democratic" coups in 1960,
1971, and 1980. Furthermore, the Turkish military maneuvered the Prime Minister’s removal in 1997, was
publically outspoken of the government in 2007, and several officers were suspected of plotting a coup against
the government in 2010. During the writing of this dissertation, a group of mid-level officers initiated a failed
coup attempt during the summer of 2016.
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A third concept to define is the term “military” and how this concept relates to and
differs from the terms “security sector” and “security apparatus.” It is important to
emphasize this dissertation examines the role of MENA militaries during the Arab uprisings
-- not the behavior of MENA police or MENA internal security forces. When discussing the
“military” this project refers to the behaviors of the entire military institution and behaviors
from officers and soldiers. Throughout this project the term “military” is used
interchangeably with the term “armed forces” and these two concepts specifically refer to a
country’s air force, army, navy, and in some instances coast guard. However, the reality is
that in most MENA militaries the army is the primary branch and therefore when addressing
MENA military behavior during the Arab uprisings this typically means the actions of the
army. This project also uses the terms “security sector” and “security apparatus,” which
broadly refer to all security forces in a country including the military and internal security
forces such as anti-terrorism units, internal intelligence organizations, paramilitary
organizations, police, presidential guards, and riot control units. A country’s military is
included within the larger “security sector” and “security apparatus,” but “security sector”
and “security apparatus” do not solely refer to the military. Again, the project explores
MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings rather than MENA “security sector”
responses. This concept of the military in regards to a country's larger security apparatus will
be highlighted and discussed further in the comparative case study portion of this
dissertation in chapters 4, 5, and 6.
The fourth concept to discuss is the definitions and differences between "senior
officers," "junior officers," "soldiers," and "conscripts" in MENA militaries. It is important
to note the twenty-one MENA countries examined in this study have varying military
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structures with different ranks, hierarchies, and titles. In this project, senior officers refer to
the executive leadership such as generals, whereas junior officers refer to ranks such as
colonels, lieutenants, etc. During the Arab uprisings, the primary actors in the militaries were
typically senior officers such as General Rachid Ammar in Tunisia (see chapter 4), and
General Abdel Fatteh al-Sisi and Lieutenant General Sami Anan in Egypt (see chapter 5). In
contrast, soldiers refer to the low-level, rank-and-file of the military. During the Arab
uprisings there are some instances of soldiers defecting from the military and abandoning
their barracks such as the case in the Syrian military (Heydemann 2013, 64 - 66). In addition,
this project discusses conscripts, which specifically refer to the low-level, rank-and-file of the
military in countries where there is a system of military conscription in place. Lastly, the term
"military personnel" is used in this dissertation as a default term and to also describe senior
officers, junior officers, soldiers, and conscripts in the general sense.
The fifth concept to discuss and define is mass political protests. Scholars use the
terms "contentious politics," "mass political protest," "mobilization," "revolution," and
"social movements" interchangeably when discussing the Arab uprisings of 2011. Scholars
are comfortable using the term "revolution" to describe the events that occurred during the
Arab uprisings but previous definitions would question whether "revolution" truly describes
what occurred during the region in 2010 - 2011.14 In one of the seminal studies of
revolutions, Skocpol (1978, 4) defines social revolutions as "basic transformations of a
society's state and class structures...[that were] carried through by class-based revolts from
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Several scholars use the term "Arab Revolutions" to describe the events, see Filali-Ansary (2011), and Bishara
(2013). Other scholars use country-specific terms such as the "Tunisian Revolution" (Mabrouk 2011; AleyaSghaier 2012; Kaboub 2013), "Jasmine Revolution" (Schraeder 2012), and "Egyptian Revolution" (Khalil 2012;
Badran 2014).
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below.” This definition describes the class-based revolutions of the 18th, 19th, and 20th
century (France 1789, China 1911, and Russia 1917) better than it characterizes the Arab
uprisings of 2011. DeFronzo provides a definition of revolution that removes Skocpol's
element of class structures and defines revolutions more broadly as events where
"participants attempt to drastically alter or replace existing social, economic, or political
institutions within a country (2011, 10)." The lack of a class element in the Arab uprisings
has resonated with some scholars including el-Din Shahin (2013, 54) who observes the
uprising in Egypt was a classless revolution since it did not represent one particular class but
rather incorporated numerous sectors from Egyptian society. Goldstone (2011) provides a
similar observation and argues protests were more successful during the Arab uprisings
when the movements represented a cross-class coalition of disparate groups, backgrounds,
and ideologies.
In addition to a revolution, the Arab uprisings are also referred to as a collection of
"social movements,"15 which DeFronzo (2011, 9) defines as "persistent and organized efforts
on the part of a relatively large number of people either to bring about or to resist social
change." Lynch (2014) claims the recent Arab uprisings are a form of "contentious politics,"
a term coined by McAdam et al. (2001) that generally refers to collective political struggles.
Even though the Arab uprisings represent a type of contentious political event, the uprisings
were something in-between a revolution and a social movement. In many cases the Arab
uprisings fall short of the "classic revolution" definition since protesters were not calling for
the absolute upheaval and paradigmatic replacement of pre-existing social structures. The
"classic" revolutions of France, Russia, and China (as examined by Skocpol) consisted of
15
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extensive movements to entirely replace the economic, political, and ideological structures of
the country. Most of the Arab uprisings protests were more modest in their aims and did not
promote such drastic reforms. Rather, the majority of Arab uprisings protesters addressed
issues regarding corruption, authoritarian political structures, and economic stagnation.
While the Arab uprisings fall short of the classic definition of social revolutions, they
contain characteristics that are more extensive than social movements. In general, protesters
during the Arab uprisings broadly demonstrated against the entire political system rather
than protesting against specific policies and because of this a more appropriate term for the
Arab uprisings, and the term broadly used in this project, is "mass political protests." The
word "mass" simply refers to the large number of citizens that participated in the uprisings,16
and “political protests” signifies demonstrators were primarily politically motivated. It
should be noted many protesters were also economically motivated (e.g. concerned with
unemployment, underemployment, rising costs of basic items, etc.) but the term "mass
political protests" encapsulates economic concerns since in most instances economic
grievances were politically based and addressed overall failures by the ruling regimes.
Exploring the Comparative Case Studies
In this project I introduce a quantifiable metric, the MENA Military Index, to
measure MENA military behavior during the Arab uprisings. In addition, I employ a
comparative case study analysis of three countries: Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia. Earlier
research has primarily employed single case studies or comparative case analyses but none
have utilized a systematic examination of military behavior across the entire MENA region.
16
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MENA Military Index employs metrics to measure the size of protests to determine whether the Arab
uprisings in specific countries qualified as "large."
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A strength of this project is the comparative case study analysis reinforces and complements
the quantitative MENA Military Index dataset. In this regards the case study chapters (4 – 6)
provide insightful narrative discussion of the Bahraini, Egyptian, and Tunisian militaries, and
the unique roles each had during the uprisings. The comparative case study analysis provides
useful context to better understand the quantitative results of the MENA Military Index
presented in Chapter 3, and to also identify the causal mechanisms that influenced MENA
military responses during the uprisings.
Out of the twenty-one MENA countries, Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia were selected
for the comparative case study analysis for four reasons. First, all three countries experienced
high levels of protests that threatened the ruling regime. It is important to recognize that
during the Arab uprisings the level of protests varied from country to country (see Chapter
3) and not all countries experienced large-scale demonstrations like Bahrain, Egypt, and
Tunisia. Second, not only were the protests large in Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia, but in each
country the regime ordered the military to intervene and to confront protesters. This second
shared characteristic is also important since in many countries across the MENA region
internal security forces were able to successfully ward off demonstrations and thus it was
unnecessary for militaries to intervene. Third, Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia faced an identical
political phenomenon but the militaries responded differently in each country. In Bahrain,
the military defended the regime and willingly used high levels of violence against protesters.
In Egypt and Tunisia the militaries defected from the ruling regimes, but in Tunisia the
military immediately transferred political power over to a transitional civilian government
after President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fled the country, whereas in Egypt the military
retained political power for approximately one-year under the auspices of the Supreme
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Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) after President Mubarak was forced out of office. Since
the militaries of Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia experienced an identical political phenomenon
yet behaved differently, the comparative case study chapters provide an ideal comparison of
discovering the different causal variables and conditions that led to three different military
behaviors and outcomes. Fourth, Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia are empirically compatible
since the duration of the uprising in each country was approximately identical (one month in
each country), and since military behavior during the uprisings are well documented with
plenty of primary (unclassified government documents, government archives,
nongovernmental organization archives, etc.) and secondary (journalistic accounts, prior
articles and books, etc.) sources available.
Overview of the Project
The following project is divided into six additional chapters. Chapter 2 examines the
previous civil-military relations literature to understand how prior scholars explained military
responses to mass political protests. Chapter 3 discusses the MENA Military Index and
summarizes how I developed the dataset, operationalized the variables, constructed the
questionnaire, and present the significant findings from the dataset. The examinations of the
Bahraini, Egyptian, and Tunisian militaries are explored in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Chapter 4
examines Tunisia since the Arab uprisings began in Tunisia as the country experienced mass
protests starting in mid-December 2010 and ultimately resulted in President Ben Ali fleeing
the country in mid-January 2011. Chapter 5 then examines the case of Egypt, which
experienced protests beginning in late January and ended with President Mubarak leaving
office in mid-February 2011. Chapter 6 examines Bahrain, which experienced protests
beginning in mid-February 2011 until mid-March 2011 when the regime and state security
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forces stifled the protest movements. The case study chapters provide an overview of each
country's military, outlines the historical development of the military, includes a detailed
narrative of the Arab uprisings within each country, explains the military's involvement
during the uprisings, and explores the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index in-depth
in each country. Chapter 7 summarizes the key findings, discusses some limitations of the
research, and notes the current state of civil-military and regime-military relations across the
region and how scholars and policymakers can better understand MENA militaries in the
decades to come.
Overall, this project argues that to better understand MENA military responses in
the Arab uprisings it is beneficial to examine all MENA countries and to explore a
combination of institutional, regime, societal, and international variables. This project also
endorses the advancement of quantitative studies and methods into a field that has been
primarily driven by qualitative and small-n case studies. As this project reveals in the
upcoming chapters, quantitative measurements can explain MENA military responses during
the Arab uprisings and with the assistance of case study analysis, can illuminate the factors
and variables that influenced militaries to either defend incumbent regimes and fire on
demonstrators, or to defect from regimes and support mass political protesters. One of the
basic findings from this project is that military behavior during the Arab uprisings was
influenced primarily by institutional and societal variables. For example, military defection
occurred only if necessary pre-existing institutional and social conditions were present in the
country. In regards to institutional variables, military defection occurred when there were
parallel security forces that counterbalanced the strength of the military, significant rivalries
between the military and other state security forces, a system of military conscription, and
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the military had autonomy to control personnel in the mid-and-lower ranks of the armed
forces. As for societal variables, military defection occurred when the protest movements
were large, non-violent, broad-based, and consisted of non-traditional demonstrators.

CHAPTER 2:
LITERATURE REVIEW
To understand military responses during the Arab uprisings it is necessary to explore
the civil-military relations literature and the variables that influenced military responses
during mass political protests. During the 1960s and 1970s, civil-military scholars viewed
military responses as solely issues of military coups d’état. The majority of research from these
two decades explored two general questions: the factors that caused a military coup
(Huntington 1957; Finer 1962; Nordlinger 1977), and why some coups succeeded whereas
others failed (Goodspeed 1961; Thompson 1976).
The military coup literature during the 1960s and 1970s was an expansive field with
hundreds of authors studying the military's role in politics through individual case studies
(Özbudun 1966; Astiz 1969; Cox 1976), comparative case studies (Feit 1968; Feit 1973),
large-n quantitative studies (Wells 1974; Jackman 1978; Zimmerman 1979), and regional
examinations including Africa (Welch Jr. 1970; Decalo 1976), Latin America (Fossum 1967;
Nun 1969; Solaun and Quinn 1973; Needler 1975), and the Middle East (Rostow 1963;
Haddad 1965).
A main reason why the study of military coups was so popular during the 1960s and
1970s was because of the prevalence of coups during this period. Powell and Thyne (2011)
note 287 coups occurred from 1950 - 1979, which equaled to approximately ten military
coups every year, or a military coup occurring every five to six weeks for thirty years. When
one consider the frequency of military coups during the mid-twentieth century it is
22
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understandable why so many civil-military scholars and researchers studied this topic.
However, even though the literature on military coups provides keen insight on the role of
the military, since the research only focused on coups there was little research that examined
other forms of military behavior, especially the role of the military during mass political
unrest.
One of the earliest studies to explore the role of the military during revolutionary
movements was D.E.H. Russell in her 1974 book, Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Forces.
Russell examines the relationship between military disloyalty and the success of mass
rebellions by looking at fourteen rebellions during the early and mid-twentieth century.1
Russell creates a numerical scale that measures three factors: the degree of military disloyalty,
the point of the revolution when the military defected, and the proportion of military
personnel disloyal to the regime. Russell constructs a military disloyalty score for each
rebellion and notes the higher the military disloyalty score, the more likely mass rebellions
succeeded. However, a critical drawback of Russell's research is she fails to identify the
specific factors that cause military disloyalty and she fails to explain why military personnel
were disloyal.
After the publication of Russell's research in 1974, similar studies on the role of the
military during revolutions and mass political protests remained sparse until the downfall of
communist regimes beginning in 1989 and continuing with the breakup of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991. Once the USSR dissolved there was renewed
scholarly interest into how militaries behaved during popular uprisings. For instance,
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Russell examines the rebellions of Mexico (1911), Cuba (1912), Italy (1914), Albania (1924), Afghanistan
(1929), Brazil (1930), Honduras (1933), Austria (1934), Spain (1934), Colombia (1948), China (1949), Bolivia
(1952), Burma (1954), and Cuba (1958).
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researchers explored specific case studies and asked questions such as: why did the Chinese
military repress protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Scobell 1992; Kou 2000), and why
did the Indonesian military support protesters during the 1998 protests (Lee 2005)?
Additionally, scholars examined the variation of military behavior within a regional context
and posed questions such as: what explained differences in military responses across Eastern
Europe in the early 1990s (Thompson 2001), and why did some militaries suppress
protesters whereas other militaries supported protesters during the Color Revolutions of
Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) (Binnendijk and
Marovic 2006). An overall drawback of the research is scholars have not examined military
responses to mass political protests in a comprehensive and multi-causal manner. Even
though scholars explore institutional, domestic, societal, and international variables
individually, seldom have researchers combined all of these areas and discuss how the
variables interact and influence military responses during mass political protests.
The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. Section one summarizes
research that examines single variables and argues the literature falls short of fully explaining
military responses. Section two explores the recent literature that uses multi-causal
explanations to explain military responses to mass political protests and contends this field
of research also fails to provide convincing arguments and systematic methods that truly
explain variation in military responses to mass political protests, especially in a comparative
context. This chapter concludes by explaining how this project builds upon previous models
to determine varying military responses specifically during the political phenomenon of the
Arab uprisings.
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Literature Examining Single Variables
There is a rich literature focusing on one explanatory variable or a single group of
variables. This research can be categorized into one of six groups: military
professionalization and military autonomy; factional divisions within the military and society;
divisions within the state security apparatus; regime-military relations; societal variables; and
international variables. This section examines each of these six groups, summarizes the main
arguments from scholars, and highlights the research's shortcomings and limitations.
Levels of Military Professionalization and Military Autonomy
A first group examines the militaries' level of professionalization and the level of
military autonomy. Some scholars argue militaries with higher levels of professionalization
are less likely to use violence against civilians since the military respects civilian control over
the state (Huntington 1957) and since military violence against civilians diminishes civilians'
trust in the armed forces (Perlmutter 1969, 396). In contrast, other scholars (Nordlinger
1977; Fitch 1998; Kamrava 2000) provide a competing argument that militaries in
developing countries with higher levels of professionalization are more likely to use force
against citizens. Kamrava (2000) observes Middle Eastern militaries with higher levels of
professionalization are usually the most modern and technologically advanced institution in
the country and often take advantage of their superiority by suppressing and dominating
other political institutions within the country and the civilian population.
Several scholars examine the relationship between the level of military
professionalization and military responses during the Arab uprisings. Six years prior to the
Arab uprisings, Bellin (2004) categorized MENA militaries as either professional or
patrimonial, and argued professional militaries were more likely to defect from regimes than
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patrimonial militaries since professional militaries do not serve the ruling regime's selfinterests. After the Arab uprisings occurred, Bellin (2012) defended her earlier argument by
noting MENA militaries with higher levels of professionalization (e.g. Egypt and Tunisia)
defected from incumbent regimes and supported mass protesters in comparison to
patrimonial militaries (e.g. Bahrain and Syria) that supported the incumbent regime and used
violence against civilians. Additional scholars echo Bellin's central findings that MENA
militaries with higher levels of professionalization were less likely to fire on citizens and
more likely to defect from incumbent regimes (see Gause 2011; Sayigh 2011a, 391; Sayigh
2011b; Lutterbeck 2012; Stepan and Linz 2013, 29).
However, there are two shortcomings of the military professionalization argument
within the examination of the Arab uprisings. First, military professionalization fails to
explain military fracturing and why individuals from the same military might behave
differently. The military professionalization argument presumes military personnel will
behave uniformly due to overarching institutional characteristics of the armed forces, but
such an approach fails to explain variation of military responses within a single military. Such
a scenario occurred in Libya and Yemen where some military personnel defected from the
regime whereas others remained loyal to the regime (Barany 2011, 29 - 31). A second
shortcoming specifically addresses Bellin's classification of patrimonial versus professional
militaries. Bellin notes the Libyan and Yemeni militaries are patrimonial, yet both militaries
experienced military fracturing during the Arab uprisings as large number of military
personnel defected from the regime. How can the variable of military professionalization
fully explain military responses considering both professional and patrimonial militaries
experienced full or partial defection during the Arab uprisings?
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Another argument discussed in the literature is that the level of military autonomy
affects military responses during mass political protests. Military autonomy refers to the level
of exclusivity the military possesses from both society and the regime. Examples of military
autonomy include whether the military controls the hiring and placement of internal
personnel, whether the military has independent control over its budget, whether the military
has access to top-of-the-line weaponry, and whether civilian oversight manages the internal
affairs of the military (Pion-Berlin 1992). Pion-Berlin (1992) argues that examining the level
of military autonomy is vital to understanding military behavior since the military typically
makes decisions based upon its institutional interests. For example, Campbell (2009, 14)
argues militaries with higher levels of institutional autonomy tend to have less civilian
oversight, which makes it easier for militaries to use violence against civilians.
In addition to the relationship between militaries and civilians, military autonomy
also addresses the issue between militaries and regimes, and the level of autonomy a ruling
leader grants the military can impact how the military behaves. For instance, the Haitian
protests in 1986 demonstrate that when a regime provides a military with too much
autonomy, and when mass political protests break out in the country; the military can defect
from the incumbent regime. President Jean-Claude Duvalier rewarded the Haitian military
with high levels of institutional autonomy (including modern weaponry, legal immunity, etc.)
as compensation for years of regime loyalty and Duvalier assumed these favors would ensure
military officers would remain loyal to him. However, once mass political protests erupted
across Haiti, the military defected from the regime because Haitian officers realized the
military no longer needed the regime, and the mass political protests provided the Haitian
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military with an ideal opportunity to physically remove Duvalier from office and take control
of government (Snyder 1992, 387-388).
In addition to regimes granting militaries with too much autonomy, recent
examinations of the Arab uprisings have demonstrated regimes can provide militaries with
“too little” autonomy. Stepan and Linz (2013, 28) note that in Syria President Bashar alAssad deliberately limited the institutional autonomy of the Syrian military by constantly
watching over the military and micro-managing institutional decisions to ensure the military
personnel remained loyal to the regime.
Overall, the main issue with explaining military responses to mass political protests
strictly through issues of military autonomy is that the research ignores variables examining
the relationship between the military and the regime, and variables between the military and
society. The Haitian case above demonstrates the necessity of evaluating both regime and
societal variables in addition to examining issues of military autonomy. For instance, the
reason the Haitian military intervened against the Duvalier regime was due to mass political
protests gripping the country. Since there was civilian unrest in Haiti it provided the military
with the opportunity to intervene against the regime. One could argue that if the Haitian
protests never occurred then the Haitian military likely would have continued its loyalty to
the Duvalier regime, just as it had done for years prior. Overall, the military
professionalization and autonomy arguments fail to fully explain military responses to mass
political protests since they do not adequately address the dynamics that regime, societal, and
international variables can also have upon military behavior.
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Factional Divisions within the Military and Society
A second group of variables examines factional divisions within the military and
society. Factional divisions refer to cleavages within the military, and cleavages that separate
the military from segments of society. Examples of factional divisions include generational
differences (senior officers vs. junior officers), communal affiliation (ethnic, regional
religious, tribal, etc.), and socio-economic/class affiliation. Within the military, generational
differences between senior and junior officers have caused divisions that disrupted military
cohesion and influenced military responses during mass political protests. Johnson (1964,
124) observes this trend in Latin America during the 1960s and 1970s and notes younger
Latin American officers believed they belonged to a "virtuous" generation that made them
better qualified to govern the country in relation to senior officers from older generations.
Other examples of generational cleavages dividing military personnel and affecting military
responses during mass political protests include: 1825 Russia (Taylor 2001, 937), 1945
Venezuela (Johnson 1964, 124), 1979 El Salvador (Williams and Walter 1997, 93-95), 1994
The Gambia (Saine 1996), and 2000 Ecuador (Barracca 2007, 152).
Another factional division occurs when there is communal heterogeneity within a
military. This describes militaries where personnel represent different communal affiliations
including disparate ethnic, regional, religious, or tribal identities. Scholars note that in
heterogeneous militaries, divisions among communal identities can greatly impact how
individuals respond during domestic unrest. McLauchlin (2010) observes the communal
identification of military personnel and military defection in three Middle Eastern countries:
Iran, Jordan, and Syria. McLauchlin demonstrates that military personnel are more likely to
support their own communal group during mass political protests, especially if there are
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communal cleavages in the military and if the mass political protests highlight communal
grievances. Syria is an example where communal identities divide both the military and
society. The ruling al-Assad regime represents the country's minority Alawite ethnic group
and al-Assad has mostly appointed fellow Alawites to senior military leadership positions
(Heydemann 2013, 65). Even though Alawites dominate the upper echelon of Syrian military
command, most Syrians are Sunni and due to the country's system of military conscription,
young Sunnis tend to fill the lower rank-and-file of the Syrian military. During the Arab
uprisings most defections in the Syrian military were from the Sunni rank-and-file who
deserted the barracks and refused to use violence against civilians (Heydemann 2013, 64). In
contrast, the Alawite officers in the Syrian military have remained loyal to the Assad regime.
Yemen provides a similar situation to Syria but in Yemen, military units are organized
through close-knit tribal groups and only the military units tribally aligned with President
Saleh’s Sanhan tribe remained loyal to the regime (Knights 2013).
Divisions also occur when the military is communally homogeneous but when
citizens represent an entirely distinct communal group from the armed forces. Bahrain
provides an example as both the ruling al-Khalifa regime and the Bahraini military are
composed of Sunni Muslims, the country’s minority sectarian group. In contrast, the
majority of Bahraini citizens identify with Shia Islam, which creates a clear sectarian division
between the regime and the military, and the total population (see Louër 2013).2 Due to the
communal configuration in Bahrain, the Sunni-based military was willing to use violence
against the Shia-majority population due to these rigid sectarian divisions.
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For more examinations regarding sectarian splits influencing MENA military responses during the Arab
uprisings see Droz Vincent 2011, 7; Gause 2011; Nepstad 2011, 489; Sayigh 2011a; Heydemann 2013, 66; and
Droz-Vincent 2014, 39.
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A final communal division includes the socioeconomic and class affiliations of
military personnel. During the mid-twentieth century scholars noted several militaries across
the developing world supported the advancement of the middle classes and intervened in
politics specifically to protect middle class interests (Nun 1967; Perlmutter 1969; Nordlinger
1977; Reif 1984). Stepan (1971) examines the self-identification of Brazilian officers in the
1960s and finds Brazilian officers intervened in politics because they felt the Brazilian
middle-class was being threatened by the country’s lower classes. In regards to the Middle
East, Halpern (1963) claims that the 1952 Free Officers Movement that overthrew the
Egyptian monarchy emerged because of middle-class officers wanting to implement more
favorable policies for the country's growing middle-class.
Overall, factional divisions fail to fully explain military behavior for several reasons.
First, in regards to generational divisions, militaries are hierarchical institutions that are
constructed where older and more experienced officers usually occupy senior positions,
whereas younger officers and rank-and-file soldiers hold junior positions. This institutional
configuration is nearly universal in all militaries across the world, so if there is a characteristic
of this system that inherently causes severe divisions within the military -- one should expect
constant struggles between senior and junior officers in militaries across the world.
However, this is not the case, which indicates grievances between senior officers and junior
officers cannot singularly explain military responses during mass political protests. If
anything, generational divisions appear to be an exception rather than a norm, and it is
unconvincing to assume generational divisions solely explain variation in military responses,
especially during the Arab uprisings.
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Additionally, one cannot predict military responses solely by examining the
communal affiliation of military personnel in comparison to the communal affiliation of
civilian populations. For instance, the communal affiliation argument fails to explain varying
military responses between Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia during the Arab uprisings. All
three of these North African countries are relatively homogenous in regards to ethnic and
sectarian affiliations since the majority of citizens in these three countries are Arab-Berber
and overwhelmingly identify with Sunni Islam.3 Of these three countries only the Tunisian
military defected from the regime and supported the civilian demonstrators during the Arab
uprisings. The communal division argument also fails to explain why the Algerian and
Moroccan militaries remained loyal to their respective regimes even though both countries
have a similar communal configuration to Tunisia. If various factional divisions exist within
a country those divisions can certainly influence military responses during mass political
protests, but as the Arab uprisings demonstrate, factional divisions alone cannot explain
varying military responses and institutional, regime-military, societal, and international
variables also have to be considered.
Divisions within the State Security Apparatus
A third group of variables explore divisions within the state security apparatus. This
includes divisions between the military and other internal state security groups, and also
intra-branch rivalries within the armed forces. Janowitz (1977) observes internal security
forces increased in size and political strength in many developing countries during the 1960s
and 1970s, which led to militaries and internal security forces competing for material
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https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/download-2010. Accessed September 5, 2015.
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resources, budgets, and political prestige. An example of this occurred in Tunisia, as there
were divisive institutional rivalries between the Tunisian military and the Tunisian internal
security forces. During the Ben Ali regime the Tunisian military was politically marginalized
by the regime in comparison to the internal security forces housed within the Ministry of
Interior. Several authors argue that since President Ben Ali politically alienated the Tunisian
military it was easier for Tunisian officers to defect from the regime and side with protesters
(see Brooks 2012; Jebnoun 2014; Bou Nassif 2015; Lutterbeck 2015).
Divisions between militaries and internal security forces also address the larger issue
of coup proofing and counterbalancing. Quinlivan (1999) notes coup proofing is a common
practice for autocratic leaders that includes the creation of multiple internal security agencies
that continuously monitor the military to detect any disloyalty throughout the country’s
security apparatus. Libya provides an example of coup proofing as President Muammar
Qaddafi deliberately weakened the military and counterbalanced it with special units and
militias better equipped and better trained than the regular army (Droz-Vincent 2011, 6).
These coup-proofing tactics allowed Qaddafi to remain in power for over four-decades,
however, once the Arab uprisings began, the coup-proofing tactics backfired on the Qaddafi
regime (Gaub 2013a, 221). Since Qaddafi deliberately weakened the military, the armed
forces were essentially ineffective and helpless once NATO aerial attacks were launched
against Qaddafi’s strongholds. The coup-proofing tactics employed by Qaddafi ended up
euthanizing the Libyan military, and as a result the Libyan military disintegrated and
fractured, resulting in large factions of desertion and defection.
The last variable in this group explores divisions within the military between
different armed force branches. Throughout the developing world, the army is usually the
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most relevant (and sometimes the only) military branch within a country. However, scholars
note there are some examples where divisions between armed force branches can cause
varying military responses. One example occurred during the Burmese protests in 1988.
Boudreau (2004, 213) demonstrates that prior to the protests the Burmese government
provided higher salaries to army officers and lower salaries to air force officers. Once mass
political protests began in August 1988, officers from the Burmese Air Force were more
likely to defect from the regime in comparison to officers from the Burmese Army, since air
force officers were financially marginalized by the regime.
These three variables fail to fully explain military responses because they disregard
the significance of regime, societal, and international variables. Internal divisions between
military branches and rivalries between security forces are less informative without also
examining the role of the regime and the ruling leader. As the Burmese uprising in 1988
indicates, ruling leaders have an integral role in contributing (and sometimes stoking)
divisions between armed force branches. In the case of Burma, the government deliberately
favored the army over the air force. Therefore, to truly understand divisions within the state
security apparatus, an observer must also understand the dynamics and interactions the
ruling leader plays in creating and sustaining intra-service rivalries.
Coup proofing and counterbalancing security forces also fail to fully explain military
behavior since it ignores the impact of foreign intervention and society. In the case of Libya,
decades of successful coup proofing by the Qaddafi regime could not ensure regime loyalty
or regime longevity once a superior foreign military force launched aerial attacks against the
country. The Libyan case specifically demonstrates the importance of examining
international variables. Overall, the three variables in this section do not incorporate regime,
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societal, or international variables, and as a result they only provide a partial explanation to
military responses during mass political protests.
Regime-Military Relations
A fourth group of variables explores the relationship between the military and the
regime and whether the military is central to the incumbent regime or if the military is
marginalized by the regime. Lee (2005) argues that the military's relationship to the ruling
regime is complex and that the armed forces will not necessarily be loyal to the ruling leader
even if it is closely associated with the regime. In fact, institutional measures that draw the
military closer to the regime can either be rewards or punishments, which Lee refers to as
"carrots" and "sticks." Lee highlights three types of "carrots:” (1) corporate benefits, which
consist of larger military budgets, the military's access to modern weapons and materiel, and
permitting the military access to additional economic sectors; (2) private benefits, which are
the individual incentives that officers receive including inflated salaries, supplementary
salaries, bribes, "kick-backs," and exclusive access to housing, consumer goods, and medical
care; and (3) political benefits, which include access to key political appointments such as
ambassadorial positions, and receiving political immunity, etc. (Lee 2005, 82).
Regimes can also use ultimatums or threats to induce military cooperation (i.e.
"sticks"). Examples include the regime threatening the military with imprisonment, violence,
or even execution if they are disloyal to the regime. Despite employing different tactics,
"carrots" and "sticks" ultimately serve the same function, which is to ensure military officers
and soldiers remain loyal to the ruling leader and the incumbent regime. Lee (2005) notes
regime "carrots" and "sticks" had tremendous impact on influencing military responses
during the mass political protests of China (1989) and Indonesia (1998). Lee argues one
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reason the Chinese military remained loyal to the regime during the 1989 Tiananmen Square
protests was because the military was afraid of the repercussions if they defected from the
regime. In contrast, Lee notes once mass political protests occurred in Indonesia, the
country’s military defected from the regime even though Indonesian officers received
numerous incentives and benefits from the regime. Due to these findings, Lee argues that
regime "sticks" are more effective in ensuring military loyalty than regime "carrots.”
The case of Syria during the Arab uprisings confirms Lee's central argument
considering the al-Assad regime employs numerous tactics and "sticks" to ensure the Syrian
military remains loyal to the regime.4 Other studies discuss the relationship between the
military and the regime during the Arab uprisings including Ryan (2012) who argues
Jordanian officers remain loyal to King Abdullah since the Jordanian military has close ties
to Jordanian royalty, and Volpi (2013) notes in Algeria the military remains loyal to the
regime due to the benefits officers receive from the Bouteflika government.
Another variable that affects military behavior during mass political protests includes
the channels of communication between the regime and the military. There are two issues
regarding communication channels that affect military behavior, the first is the process of
how a ruling leader gives orders to the military, and the second issue is whether the regime
isolates the military and blocks external communication from reaching the barracks during
mass political protests. An example of this latter issue occurred during the 1989 protests in
China in which Deng Xiaoping, the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, limited
the external communication Chinese soldiers received (Kou 2000, 49). Once protests started,
4

For example, the Syrian regime has ruthlessly responded to military defectors and has reportedly staged public
executions of captured defected soldiers. For more see CNN, "Dozens of defecting Syrian soldiers executed,
activists say," March 2, 2012, accessed March 24, 2014, http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/03/world/meast/syriaunrest/.
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Deng took precautionary steps to control the circulation of information and eliminated any
unofficial communication to military units, which resulted in the Chinese military becoming
isolated from the rest of society and unaware of any updates regarding the crisis from
sources outside of the regime. This type of control over the communication channels
ensured the Chinese military remained loyal to the regime.
There are several shortcomings to the arguments that explain military responses to
mass political protests solely through variables depicting the relationship between the
military and the regime. The main reason is these arguments fail to fully address additional
variables, especially societal factors. The 1998 Indonesian mass political protests
demonstrate the necessity for examining societal variables because even though the
Indonesian military received numerous incentives and benefits from the Suharto
government, these “carrots” were unable to ensure Indonesian military loyalty to the regime.
Since Indonesian officers defected from Suharto this indicates there were characteristics of
the mass political protests that caused officers to reevaluate their relationship with the
regime. Thus, to truly understand Indonesian military behavior in 1998, one must also
examine the societal variables and how the unique characteristics of the protests influenced
military defection. In addition to “carrots,” the “sticks” wielded by regimes to enforce
military loyalty can crumble in the face of international variables. Libya provides an example
as Qaddafi employed numerous ultimatums and threats that discouraged Libyan officers and
soldiers from defecting from the regime. However the "sticks" of the Qaddafi regime
became ineffective once NATO forces launched aerial attacks against the regime. This
demonstrates that domestic arrangements between regimes and militaries can potentially be
nullified by an exogenous shock, such as direct foreign military intervention. A third
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shortcoming of the regime-military variables is that the communication channel argument
fails to incorporate societal variables. As technology and telecommunication become more
ubiquitous it will become more difficult for regimes to shield the military from non-regime
communication. Even though the Chinese government was able to successfully block
outside communication to the military in 1989, the prospects of replicating that in the
twenty-first century is unlikely. Overall, the regime variables that impact military responses
during mass political protests are incomplete since they overlook other variables, especially
societal and international factors
Societal Variables
A fifth group of potential causes of military behavior includes societal variables, such
as the level of violence of the protest movement and the impact this has on military
response. In regards to the Arab uprisings, demonstrations were generally nonviolent since
protesters did not initially aim to achieve their goals through violent means. In some
instances, such as Libya and Syria, the protests devolved into violent civil wars, but these
instances are rare in comparison to the rest of the region. Also, the protests in Libya and
Syria escalated into violent armed conflicts partially because the government responded with
high levels of violence early on in the demonstrations. Recent research explores the
relationship between the level of violence of a protest movement and the type of response
exhibited by the military. Zunes (1994, 411) argues nonviolent movements are more likely to
influence military defections since the military is more hesitant to shoot unarmed civilians,
such as the case in the 1986 Philippines uprising. Zunes (2011) finds similar outcomes
during the Arab uprisings and notes the Egyptian military defected from the Mubarak regime
since the demonstrations in Egypt were generally nonviolent in nature. Nepstad (2013)
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echoes these findings and claims nonviolent movements increased military defection during
the Arab uprisings by enhancing domestic and international legitimacy, and encouraging
broad-based participation.
Another societal variable that can affect military responses include the size of the
protest movements. Beissinger (2007, 271) observes that when protest movements are large
in size, the military and state security forces are less willing to physically confront
demonstrators. Examples of large revolutionary movements that induced military defection
include the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (Kurzman 2004, 165), the dissolution of the Soviet
Union in Eastern Europe in the early 1990s (see Beissinger 2007), and the Philippine
uprising in 1986 (Boudreau 2004, 152-153). In regards to the Arab uprisings, Angrist (2013,
549-550) argues that a key component to the success of the Tunisian protest movement was
that the demonstrations were not only numerous, but also consisted of civilians from
different classes and different geographic regions across the country.
A final societal variable includes the ability of protesters to “win” over military
support. In the protest theory literature, Helvey (2004, 11) proclaims that a primary goal of
any protest movement should be to convince the military not to intervene and to assure
officers and soldiers that they will have a secure place in the future of the country if regime
change occurs. One example of protesters winning over the military occurred during the
1986 Philippine uprising in which the country's Catholic Church encouraged the military to
defect from the regime and urged protesters to support military defectors. The head of the
country’s Catholic Church, Archbishop Jaime Sin, urged Filipinos to support military
defectors, which resulted in tens of thousands of nuns, priests, and civilians demonstrating in
the street encouraging the military to defect from the regime (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011,
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35). Another example of protesters winning over the military occurred during the Iranian
Revolution where Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini gave numerous public speeches that
persuaded the Iranian military to defect from the regime, and for the Iranian public to open
their arms to any military deserters (Kurzman 2004, 114). In Iran, the protest movement
developed networks of individuals who supported military defectors by providing deserters
with physical protection after they defected, and providing logistical assistance, such as
civilian clothing, food, and transportation for deserters and their families.
Even though societal variables provide tremendous insight on how militaries behave,
they do not fully explain military responses in all instances. First, the hypothesis that nonviolent protest movements increase military defection is questionable even when examining
the Arab uprisings. For example, in both Bahrain and Tunisia the protest movements were
non-violent, yet in Tunisia the military defected from the regime whereas in Bahrain the
military defended the regime. In Bahrain, even though the protests were mostly non-violent,
the Bahraini security forces willingly and openly used violence to repress non-violent
demonstrators. Second, the size of the protest movement also fails to explain military
responses to mass political protests. The argument that more protesters increase the
likelihood of military defection fails to explain Bahrain during the Arab uprisings, which
experienced hundreds of thousands of protesters, yet the military still used violence against
these large crowds (Coates Ulrichsen 2013, 3). Third, the argument that militaries will defect
if protest movements successfully “win” over officers and soldiers also fails to fully explain
military behavior because it overlooks the importance of international and institutional
variables. Even though thousands of Egyptian protesters urged the Egyptian military to not
use violence during the Egyptian uprising, some argue the real reason the Egyptian military
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defected from the Mubarak regime was due to international pressure from the U.S. (see
Brownlee 2012). 5 Overall, societal variables fail to fully explain military behavior to mass
political protests because they do not address domestic dynamics such as communal
divisions, institutional variables, and international variables.
International Variables
A sixth group of variables examines the international factors that influence military
responses. The first of these variables include external military threats. During the Arab
uprisings, direct foreign military intervention occurred in Bahrain and Libya, and the
presence of foreign soldiers had a significant impact on influencing how the Bahraini and
Libyan militaries responded. Even though Bahrain and Libya both experienced direct foreign
intervention during the Arab uprisings, the motivations for foreign militaries invading each
country were drastically different. As noted by Goldstone (2011, 5), GCC forces invaded
Bahrain to support the al-Khalifa regime and to assist in the repression of the Shia-led protest
movements. In contrast, NATO forces launched aerial attacks to remove Qaddafi from
power. In Bahrain, the effect of direct military intervention served as a physical and
psychological reinforcement that encouraged the Bahraini military to continue supporting
the al-Khalifa regime. In Libya, the direct intervention of NATO led many Libyan military
personnel to defect from the regime.6
For example, a popular slogan chanted by protesters during the Egyptian uprising was “The people and the
army are one hand.” This demonstrates the Egyptian public was deliberately trying to win over support of the
military and to decrease the likelihood of violent military confrontation. For more see David D. Fitzpatrick and
Kareem Fahim, "Mubarak's Allies and Foes Clash in Egypt," New York Times, February 2, 2011, accessed
January 26, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/world/middleeast/03egypt.html?pagewanted=all.
5

6

NATO forces influenced the Libyan military to defect in several different ways. The most direct way was
through aerial attacks, which influenced many Libyan military personnel to defect from the Qaddafi regime.
NATO also persuaded Libyan military personnel to defect from the Qaddafi regime through propaganda.
NATO forces created thousands of pamphlets that were written in Arabic and airdropped over the Libyan
military. These pamphlets attempted to persuade the military to defect from Qaddafi. The tone of the
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In addition to direct foreign military intervention, a second international variable
includes non-lethal foreign assistance such as military aid, arms transfers, joint alliances,
diplomacy, etc. In the recent literature on authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way (2009) claim
that countries geographically closer to the U.S. and the European Union (E.U.) (such as the
Caribbean Basin or Eastern Europe), have stronger links to the West and are more easily
influenced by Western leverage than countries that are geographically distant from the U.S.
or the E.U., such as the former Soviet Union states, the Middle East, and Sub-Saharan
Africa. Levitsky and Way infer that authoritarian countries with more Western links are more
likely to adopt Western political structures and ideals, and are more likely to be held
accountable by Western governments. If an authoritarian regime with closer links to the
West were to display actions or policies that Western countries found inappropriate, such as
suppressing political opposition or using a disproportionate amount of violence towards
citizens, then the non-Western regimes would face harsh Western condemnation.
Some MENA scholars argue that the Western linkage and leverage thesis is
misleading and Brownlee (2012) specifically contends that the argument fails to explain the
unique relationship between the U.S. government and the Egyptian military. Brownlee (2012,
173) postulates:
In the conventional sense of Levitsky and Way's main concepts, during the postCold War era no autocracy has been more linked to and more leveraged by the
United States than Egypt. Rather than prying open the Egyptian regime...Washington
has preserved [Egyptian autocratic rule].

pamphlets varied. One example stated Libyan military should lay down their weapons since senior officers have
already defected. A second example urged the Libyan military to defect to restore peace and to rejoin their
families. A third example threatened the Libyan military to defect and warned them that if they continued to
fight and support Qaddafi that they would be physically overrun by NATO's superior forces. Another example
threatened Libyan military personnel to defect or else they would be persecuted in the International Criminal
Court if they were captured. For information on this argument and NATO's role in Libya see Gaub (2013b, 24
- 25).
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Overall, Brownlee exclaims that during the last forty years no country has been more
politically tied to the United States than Egypt, and that the foundation to this partnership is
the close relationship between the U.S. government and the Egyptian military, and that
during this time the primary institutional objective of the Egyptian military has been to
maintain its lucrative partnership with the U.S. In comparison to Egypt, Tunisia was able to
change "not only a leader, but a regime, in large part because the Tunisian military did not
pursue a political role and was not a major geostrategic ally of the West" (Brownlee 2012,
168). Brownlee adds "Tunisia was blessed with a military that was less entangled in politics
than the Egyptian armed forces, [and] they benefitted secondarily from the fact that their
country mattered less to the U.S. than did Egypt...Tunisia was never a regional powerhouse,
nor did it pose a strategic challenge to Israel" (2012, 169).
Brownlee is not the only scholar to observe the influence Western powers can have
on MENA politics. Yom and Gause (2012, 84) argue that a major reason why regime change
did not occur throughout the Arab monarchies is due to the diplomatic, economic, and
military support Arab regimes receive from Western countries. An example includes Bahrain
where foreign support lowers the cost of regime repression since it is unlikely that
international powers will criticize the Bahraini regime (Yom and Gause 2012, 85). Bahrain is
also the home to the United States' Fifth Fleet and the base provides the Pentagon with a
strategic port that is in proximity to Iran and also provides convenient access for the U.S.
military to respond to conflicts across the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea and Indian
Ocean. Given the strategic importance of the naval base in Bahrain for the U.S. military, it
becomes clear why the Barack Obama Administration did not criticize the al-Khalifa regime
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during the Arab uprisings and why the Bahraini military was able to respond more forcefully
without the threat of harsh, international condemnation.
Another international variable that has influenced military responses is revolutionary
diffusion, which has also been referred to as contagion, "wave-like" clusters (Levitsky and
Way 2009, 38), and "spillover effects" of geographic proximity (Beissinger 2007). The
argument is that political events occurring in one country can easily influence and “spillover” into neighboring countries. This is exactly what transpired during the Arab uprisings,
which initially started in Tunisia and then moved to Egypt, before spreading across the entire
region. Government responses in one country can also affect how a neighboring
government will address the issue if the event spills over into their country. The Color
Revolutions of Eastern Europe in the early 2000s demonstrate this phenomenon where the
success of protesters in Yugoslavia (2000) and Georgia (2003) decreased the likelihood of
violent military responses in Ukraine (2004) and Kyrgyzstan (2005)(Beissinger 2007).
Conversely, revolutionary diffusion can also harden a military's resolve to repress protesters,
regardless of the outcomes in neighboring countries. Solingen (2012) argues that the Arab
uprisings hit a “firewall” when it reached Algeria, Iran, and the GCC countries, and the
video footage of autocrats being ushered away from presidential palaces in Tunis and Cairo
alarmed autocratic leaders in other countries to take necessary measures to ensure that would
not happen to them. Clark (2012, 72-73) provides a similar argument by claiming the Arab
uprisings were unable to diffuse in a southern direction towards the authoritarian regimes of
Sub-Saharan Africa since the earlier protests in North Africa served as a warning sign to
leaders in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal and Uganda. The regimes in these countries
immediately dispatched security forces and militaries onto the streets, cordoned off key

45
public spaces, and arrested key political dissidents before the demonstrations increased and
could pose a threat.
The international variables provide a necessary perspective to better understand
military behavior during mass political protests, but international variables in isolation
cannot fully explain MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings. Direct foreign
military intervention is a unique variable because if a powerful foreign military intervenes it
can trump domestic factors. But direct foreign military intervention is rare and in the
majority of cases where there is no direct foreign military involvement one must explain
military responses through different factors. For example, in Tunisia there was no direct
foreign military intervention during the Arab uprisings, yet, the Tunisian military still decided
to defect from the Ben Ali regime, and the reason for Tunisian military defection must be
explained by domestic, institutional, and societal variables between the Tunisian military, the
Ben Ali regime, and the Tunisian population.
The foreign links-and-leverage argument also fails to fully explain military behavior.
If foreign links were truly the most significant variable in military responses to mass political
protests then military behavior would be pre-determined by the policies and interests of
dominant foreign countries. Such a deterministic view inherently overvalues the power of
dominant foreign countries and undervalues institutional, regime, and societal variables in
the country experiencing mass political protests. Even though international links can have a
significant impact on military responses, this factor oversimplifies the complexity and the
decision-making that can influence militaries when they face a mass political protest.
The third international variable, revolutionary contagion, also fails to fully explain
military behavior. The primary reason is because most political crises are unique to just one
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individual country and are not a part of a larger contagion movement. For example, the
revolution in the Philippines in the 1980s was an isolated incident (both temporally and
geographically) and was not directly inspired by any preceding mass political protest
movement. Moreover, the Tunisian uprising that sparked the Arab uprisings cannot be
explained by contagion since the protests started in that country. Overall, the international
variables cannot fully explain military behavior in isolation since regime, institutional, and
societal variables have a significant role in determining the decision-making of officers and
soldiers during mass political protests.
Literature Examining Multi-Causal Explanations
Fitch (1977, 78) claims "there is no single criterion, but rather a multiplicity of
decision criteria" that influence the militaries' decision to intervene in politics. Two recent
studies build upon this quote and examine multi-causal explanations in regards to military
behavior to mass political protests. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, a new
phenomenon was identified by Pion-Berlin et al. (2014) called "military quartering." This
term includes instances during mass political protests where ruling leaders order the military
to use violence against protesters but the military disobeys these orders and decides to
remain “quartered” within its barracks. As Pion-Berlin (2014, 231) et al. indicate, military
quartering is not as mutinous as conducting a military coup but it also demonstrates the
military is insubordinate towards the regime. When a military officer decides to ignore an
executive order and to not violently engage protesters, the decision to remain on the
sidelines can be seen as an act of political intervention, albeit indirect and passive.
To examine this recent phenomenon, Pion-Berlin et al. study seven cases of military
quartering since 2000: Serbia (2000), Argentina (2001), Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004),
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Ecuador (2005), Tunisia (2010), and Egypt (2011). The authors also identify three cases since
2000 (Bolivia 2003, Iran 2009, and Bahrain 2011) where the military obeyed executive orders
and used violence against demonstrators. The authors determine that five variables influence
whether militaries disobey executive orders to use violence against mass political protesters:
(1) when the military has grievances towards the lack of material benefits they receive from
the regime; (2) when the military is more closely affiliated to public interests than regime
interests; (3) when the military rejects actions to undertake internal security missions; (4)
when it is unconstitutional for the military to use violence against civilian protesters; and (5)
when there are institutional divisions within the country’s security apparatus (Pion Berlin
et.al. 2014, 246). This recent research is beneficial to the literature as it attempts to synthesize
variables from various sources (institutional, regime, and societal). However, despite the
research’s insight, the primary shortcoming is that the authors fail to differentiate between
the independent variables, as it is unclear whether there is a relationship between these five
variables. For instance, does military quartering occur because all five variables are present,
or does military quartering occur only if one or two of the factors are present? Even though
the researchers examine institutional, regime, and societal variables, they do not explain the
relationship between the variables.
Another recent article that examines multi-causal explanations is Barany (2013) who
argues that military responses to revolutionary movements are best explained by eighteen
variables across four sources: (1) influences from the military, (2) influences from the state,
(3) influences from society, and (4) influences from outside the country. The eighteen
variables from Barany's model are listed below in table 2.
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Table 2. Barany's Variables for Measuring Army Responses to Revolution7





Influences from the Military
Ethnic/Religious split within uniformed
ranks
Sociopolitical divisions among military
elites
Elite versus average units
Regular military vs. other parts of the
security state
Splits between branches of the armed
forces
Senior versus junior officers
Professional soldiers versus conscripts
Generals' decision-making autonomy





Influences from the State
The regime's treatment of the military
The generals' view of the existing regime
The regime's directions to the military












Influences from Society
Size composition, and nature of
demonstrations
The army's record of conduct towards
society
The popularity of the revolution
Rebel efforts to win the army's support

Influences from Outside the Country
 The potential for foreign intervention
 Revolutionary diffusion
 Foreign exposure of officers

Barany (2013, 63) states his model takes into account all the main sources of military
influence and provides scholars with the ability to broadly apply these variables across
disparate settings. In this regard, Barany provides a welcomed addition to the literature by
exploring multi-causal explanations with a systematic model. However, even though Barany
identifies eighteen different variables across four sources, it is uncertain how the eighteen
variables interact with one another. For example, Barany suggests institutional variables are
the most significant influence on military responses during revolutionary movements, but it
is unclear how much more significant institutional variables are in comparison to regime,
societal, and international variables. Additionally, Barany's model is unclear whether there is
any significance as to the total number of variables there are within a country. What if a
country only possesses one institutional variable, yet another country possesses four
7

Table derived from Zoltan Barany, “Armies and Revolution,” Journal of Democracy 24, 2 (2013): 62-76.
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institutional variables? One would logically assume the more variables present in a country
increases the likelihood of military defection, but Barany does not provide any insight or
expectation of how these eighteen variables interact in regards to influencing military
responses to revolutionary movements.
This dissertation aims to test Barany’s model and systematically apply the eighteen
variables to the MENA region specifically in regards to the Arab uprisings. It should be
noted Barany cautions:
There is no clever model that can tell us, once we “plug in” all the appropriate
variables, what a military will do in a crisis...[and]...there is no way around the
sobering reality that the weight of each variable is ultimately determined by the
individual context. There is no shortcut, no substitute for knowing the individual
case and knowing it well (2013, 64).
While it is true that in-depth knowledge of a country is the single best measure of
understanding military responses within a specific country, Barany underestimates the
usefulness of systematically comparing the dynamics of military responses in a comparative
and regional context. In addition to Barany's specific model, this project builds upon the
larger literature by examining the variation of military responses during the Arab uprisings
across the entire MENA region. This project explores cases where MENA militaries either
defected from the regime, defended the regime, fractured, or played a minimal role during
the Arab uprisings due to internal security forces successfully suppressing the
demonstrations or because the country's protest movement never reached a threshold that
necessitated state security responses. Overall, this project builds upon the literature and
creates a unique dataset that examines the entire MENA region to better understand how
different variables impacted varying military responses during the Arab uprisings.
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Conclusion
This chapter argues research that examines only a single variable or a single variable
group does not fully explain military responses during the Arab uprisings. Additionally, even
the recent research that explores multi-causal explanations does not systematically synthesize
varying conditions across numerous episodes of mass political protests. This dissertation
argues that institutional, regime, societal, and international variables all contribute to military
responses, and that these variable groups need to be tested systematically in a comparative,
region-wide setting. In the next chapter I outline how I transform Barany's model into the
MENA Military Index, an original dataset that measures military responses during the Arab
uprisings by measuring military behavior across twenty-one different MENA countries. The
aim of the MENA Military Index is to combine institutional, regime, societal, and
international variables into a single unified dataset with the goal of better understanding
varying military responses during the Arab uprisings.

CHAPTER 3:
THE MENA MILITARY INDEX
This chapter presents the methodology of the project and the data analysis. In the
methodological portion of this chapter I examine the dependent and independent variables,
explain how I developed the MENA Military Index from Barany's model, discuss how I
operationalized the index and address the role MENA experts played with the index's
questionnaire. The second half of the chapter examines the results and central findings from
the MENA Military Index. The dependent variable of this project is the variation of MENA
military responses during the Arab uprisings and I categorize five different types of military
responses. The independent variables for the project are derived from Barany's model in
which he explores eighteen variables across four areas (institutional, regime, societal, and
international). I then detail how I transform Barany's model into the MENA Military Index,
which is a collection of twenty dichotomous variables that measure military responses during
the uprisings. In this section I also explain how MENA scholars and experts contributed to
the creation of the MENA Military Index through their in-depth knowledge of one of the
region's twenty-one countries. In the second half of the chapter I present the findings of the
index and suggest that MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings are best
understood through the combination of both institutional and societal variables. MENA
militaries defected or fractured from ruling regimes if there were institutional variables in the
country prior to the uprisings that paved the way for military insubordination. In addition,
military defection or fracturing occurred if the uprisings possessed specific societal
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characteristics that made it more difficult for the military to use violence against protesters.
The final section of this chapter concludes and discusses the case study chapters that will be
examined in chapter 4 (Tunisia), 5 (Egypt), and 6 (Bahrain).
Varying Military Responses during the Arab Uprisings
This project measures varying military responses during the Arab uprisings. The goal
of the dissertation is to understand why some militaries defected from incumbent regimes
and supported mass political protesters whereas other militaries defended incumbent
regimes and used violence to repress mass political protests. In total, there were five types of
military responses during the Arab uprisings including, (1) militaries that defected from the
incumbent regime and sided with protest movements, (2) militaries that fractured with some
personnel defecting from the regime and others defending the regime, (3) militaries that
defended the incumbent regime and willingly used violence to suppress protesters, (4)
militaries that played a limited role due to internal security forces effectively suppressing the
demonstrations thus avoiding the need for the armed forces to intervene, and (5) militaries
that played a limited role since demonstrations in the country were minimal or non-existent.
Table 3 lists the twenty-one MENA countries and the five military response types.
The first response type includes militaries that defected from the ruling regime and sided
with mass political protesters. This describes Egypt and Tunisia where both militaries were
unwilling to use violence against demonstrators and by the end of the uprising Egyptian and
Tunisian officers defected from their respective incumbent regimes.1

1

For more details on the role of the Tunisian and Egyptian military during the Arab uprisings see Chapters 4
and 5 of this dissertation.
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Table 3. Five Types of Military Responses during the Arab Uprisings
Defected and
sided with the
opposition

Fractured,
some defected
and some
defended

Defended the
regime and
repressed
protesters

Egypt
Tunisia

Libya
Syria
Yemen

Bahrain
Iraq
Oman

Minimal Role:
Success of
Internal
Security
Forces
Algeria
Iran
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Mauritania
Morocco
Saudi Arabia

Minimal Role:
Limited
Protests
Israel
Palestine
Qatar
Turkey
UAE

The second response type includes militaries that fractured with some officers and
soldiers defecting from the ruling regime while others defended the regime. This describes
the militaries in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. In Libya, the military split between forces that were
closely linked to President Qaddafi through familial and tribal affiliation, and other forces
that were not communally linked to Qaddafi and defected from the regime.2 Military
fracturing in Libya ultimately led to the breakout of civil war where Libyan rebels overcame
forces still loyal to Qaddafi through the assistance of NATO airstrikes. In Syria, the military
fractured primarily based upon communal affiliation as Alawite officers were more likely to
defend the regime than the Sunni soldiers that were not ethnically affiliated with the
president (Droz-Vincent 2014a, 50). This distinction partially explains why the Assad regime
has remained in power even though the country devolved into a bloody civil war. Fracturing
also occurred in Yemen as military officers and soldiers from the Sanhan tribe were more
likely to support President Ali Abdullah Saleh whereas officers and soldiers not affiliated

2

Barany (2011, 29 - 31).
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with the Sanhan tribe were more likely to defect from the regime.3 In Yemen, military
fracturing forced President Saleh out of office and he ultimately stepped down from office
and transferred political control to a transitional government (Knights 2013).
The third response type includes militaries that defended the ruling regime and used
violence against anti-government protesters. One notable example includes Bahrain where
the military defended the al-Khalifa regime and used violence to suppress the protest
movement (Coates Ulrichsen 2013; Louër 2013; Nepstad 2013).4 The Iraqi and Omani
militaries also defended the ruling regimes and used violence against domestic political
protesters during the Arab uprisings even though these cases are less documented and
military responses in each country were not as severe or intense as in the Bahraini case. The
involvement of the Iraqi military during the Arab uprisings was unique given the peculiar
political and security situation of the country over the last decade. The U.S. invasion of Iraq
left a heightened political and security landscape in the country and as a result the newly
formed Iraqi military was responsible for intervening in domestic security issues to ensure
state stability. In March 2011, mass political protests gripped Iraq and military forces
responded by joining internal security forces and violently dispersed and suppressed
protesters.5 Similarly, in Oman, the military intervened in late March 2011 and assisted
internal security forces in dispersing demonstrators and arresting anti-government protesters
(al-Shaibany and Hammond 2011).

3

Ibid.

4

For more see Chapter 6.

Aref Mohamed, “Iraqi forces use water cannon to disperse protests,” Reuters. March 4, 2011, accessed
February 11, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests-idUSTRE7233UK20110304.
5
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The fourth and fifth military response types during the Arab uprisings involved no
military response at all. In these instances protest movements were either effectively
addressed by internal security forces and thus did not necessitate the need for military
personnel to intervene, or the demonstrations in the country were minimal and did not
warrant state security intervention. There were eight countries during the Arab uprisings
where militaries were not involved due to internal security forces successfully suppressing
protests (Algeria, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia).
Lastly, there were five countries where militaries did not respond due to the fact that
demonstrations during the Arab uprisings were either minimal or non-existent (Israel,
Palestine, Qatar, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates). Israel is a cultural and political
outlier in the region as the country is a democracy and remained relatively immune to the
broader pan-Arab wave of social movements that swept across the region. As for Palestine,
the territories experienced some demonstrations where protesters marched in solidarity with
the movements in Egypt and Syria, but these events were isolated and minimal.6
Coincidentally, Turkey, a democratic country, and the authoritarian gulf sheikdoms of Qatar
and United Arab Emirates, also experienced minimal protests during the Arab uprisings and
there was no need for the militaries of either country to intervene since there were hardly
any anti-regime demonstrations to address.
Operationalizing the Variables
To explain these five military response types during the Arab uprisings, I created the
MENA Military Index, which in an index of twenty variables that explore institutional,
regime, societal, and international factors. The variables from the MENA Military Index are
6

“Palestinians launch unity rally in Gaza,” Reuters. March 14, 2011.
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derived from Barany's model that was discussed in chapter 2 and outlined in table 2. To
create the MENA Military Index, I transformed Barany’s original eighteen variables into yesno questions where each “yes” answer confirms that the variable is present within a country
and each "no" answer indicates the variable is absent from a country. A "yes" answer means
a condition existed within the country and increased the likelihood the military defected
from the incumbent regime during the Arab uprisings. In contrast, a "no" answer means a
condition did not exist within the country and decreased the likelihood the military defected
from the incumbent regime during the Arab uprisings. Ultimately, a "yes" response increases
the likelihood of military defection during the Arab uprisings whereas a "no" response
increases the likelihood of military defense of the incumbent regime during the uprisings.
Table 4 lists Barany's original eighteen variables and how I converted them into the
MENA Military Index. The left column lists the variable group (military, regime, society, and
international) and the variable number, the middle column lists Barany's original variable,
and the right column transforms the variable into a yes/no question. The MENA Military
Index consists of twenty variables whereas Barany’s original model includes eighteen
variables since Barany includes a single variable that measures the "size, composition, and
nature” of protest movements. In the MENA Military Index, I separate these three concepts
into three distinct variables (variables 12, 13, and 14).
Since I convert Barany's original variables into either "yes" or "no" responses I also
apply numerical values to each response where a "yes" equals a 1 and a "no" equals a 0. The
methodological motivation for transforming Barany’s variables into an index of
dichotomous variables is based upon the research from Fish (2006), who creates a global
index (the "Parliamentary Powers Index”) that examines the political strength of national

57
parliaments. Fish measures global parliaments across thirty-two dichotomous variables and
applies a process where if a variable is present within a country's legislature it receives a
“yes” and if a variable is absent from a country's legislature it receives a “no.”
There are advantages and disadvantages with adopting such a methodological
approach. One disadvantage with dichotomous variables is that yes and no responses
oversimplify complexities and nuances that exist in the reality of everyday civil-military and
regime-military relations -- especially in the predominantly authoritarian regimes across the
MENA region. Admittedly, many of the variables influencing military responses during the
Arab uprisings go well beyond simple yes or no responses. A second disadvantage is that the
dichotomous variables are rudimentary and do not provide a complex analysis of MENA
militaries. However, there are numerous advantages to this methodological approach such as
the simplicity of the yes/no responses. The binary responses create a useful guideline as to
whether certain variables are present or absent within a country. A second advantage is that
the dichotomous variables make it possible to uniformly measure numerous characteristics
across a disparate region. The metric can provide observers with a general overview of the
similarities and differences of civil-military and regime-military relations in the MENA
region and the ability to detect discernable trends across MENA militaries. A third advantage
is that the literature examining civil-military relations in the MENA region contains few, if
any, systematic and "quantitative" studies. Even though the quantitative aspects of this
project are fundamental, they still provide a useful methodological addition to a field with
few systematic and quantitative studies, especially in regards to a region and subject where
data availability has been elusive.

Table 4. Converting the Variables to the MENA Military Index
Barany (2013) Variables
Military
#1

Ethnic/Religious split within uniformed ranks

#2

Sociopolitical divisions among military elites

#3

Elite vs. Average units

#4

Militaries vs. other parts of the security state

#5

Splits between branches of the armed forces

#6

Senior vs. Junior officers

#7
#8

Professional Soldiers vs. conscripts
Generals' decision-making autonomy

Regime
#9

Regime's Treatment of Military

#10

Generals' view of the existing regime

#11

Regimes' Directions to the Military

MENA Military Index Questions
Are there any significant communal (e.g. ethnic, regional, sectarian,
tribal) splits that divide soldiers within the military? (Y/N)
Does the socio-economic background of soldiers create any
significant rifts within the military? (Y/N)
Are there any parallel security forces within the state's security
apparatus that deliberately counterbalance the strength of the
military? (Y/N)
Are there any significant rivalries between the military and other
security forces (e.g. police, presidential guard)? (Y/N)
Are there any significant rivalries between the armed force branches
(e.g. rivalries between the Army, Navy, Air Force)? (Y/N)
Are there any significant rifts between senior and junior officers?
(Y/N)
Does the military use conscription? (Y/N)
Does the ruling leader grant the military autonomy over selecting
officers? (Y/N)
Are soldiers unsatisfied with the amount of material (e.g. salaries,
weaponry) and non-material (e.g. job appointments, preferential
access to education, housing, medical) benefits they receive from the
ruling leader? (Y/N)
Did someone other than the current ruling leader (e.g. prior leader,
legislature, judiciary) appoint the Defense Minister and other senior
generals? (Y/N)
If the regime ordered the military to violently intervene against
protesters, did those orders come from someone other than the
ruling leader? (Y/N)
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Society
#12

Size, Composition, and Nature of Demonstrations

#13

Size, Composition, and Nature of Demonstrations

#14

Size, Composition, and Nature of Demonstrations

#15

Army's Record of Conduct Toward Society

#16

Popularity of the Revolution

#17

Rebel Efforts to Win the Army's Support

International
#18

Potential for Foreign Intervention?

#19

Revolutionary Diffusion

#20

Foreign Exposure of Officers

During the Arab uprisings did more than 1% of the country's
population take part in the demonstrations? (Y/N)
Did the Arab uprisings protesters include a significant proportion of
demonstrators other than young men (e.g. women, the elderly,
children)? (Y/N)
Was the country's Arab uprisings originally non-violent in nature?
(Y/N)
Does the military have a clean record without any significant
domestic human rights violations? (Y/N)
Were the Arab uprisings protests broad-based in which
demonstrations took place in different regions of the country and
where protesters represented diverse backgrounds and disparate
political ideologies? (Y/N)
Was the Arab uprisings protest movement successful at winning over
a significant proportion of soldiers? (Y/N)
During the Arab uprisings, did foreign military troops intervene with
the purpose of overthrowing the ruling regime?7 (Y/N)
In states geographically contiguous to the country, did any of the
militaries defect from their regimes during the Arab uprisings? (Y/N)
Did a significant proportion of officers receive their military
education or training in a foreign country? (Y/N)

Question 18 deviates slightly from Barany’s original variable. In his article Barany states “the most important external variable is the possibility that a foreign power or
powers might intervene in the country experiencing revolutionary upheaval” (2013, 72). In this vein, Barany indicates a military’s response to domestic political protests
is based upon the possibility or likelihood a foreign military will intervene. However, the MENA Military Index examines whether a country actually experienced
foreign intervention rather than examining the possibility of foreign intervention. The primary reason for this change is because it is easier to measure whether a
foreign military actually intervened rather than measuring the possibility of foreign military intervention.
7

59

60
MENA Military Index Questionnaire
After creating the MENA Military Index, I constructed a questionnaire, which was
given to selected MENA regional scholars and experts (see Appendix A for the full text of
the questionnaire). The majority of experts were academics or non-academic policy experts
and I contacted them due to their extensive knowledge and publishing record on one of the
twenty-one MENA countries. In total, I contacted 182 experts and asked each expert to
answer the questionnaire specifically regarding their country of expertise. Overall, seventyone experts responded to the questionnaire (39% percent response rate) and a distribution
of the number of respondents per countries can be found in table 5. After the seventy-one
experts completed the questionnaire I aggregated the responses for each country by
identifying the majority responses for each question. For example, if a country had three
expert respondents and two of the experts answered a question with a "yes" and a third
expert answered the same question with a "no," the majority response was favored (in this
scenario the variable would be considered as "yes").8
After the questions were aggregated I created an index score for each country, which
I calculated by taking the sum of yes/no responses divided by twenty (the total number of
variables). Index scores range between 0.00 and 1.00 with a score of 0.00 meaning that all
twenty variables for a country received a 0, or every response was a no. An index score of
1.00 indicates that all twenty variables for a country were 1, or were answered as a yes, and
an index score of 0.50 means that ten of the aggregated responses were 0 and the other ten

8

In some instances, experts were split on "yes" and "no" responses and when this occurred I examined each
non-majority response and determined the final outcome as to whether the variable should be counted as a
“yes” or a “no.” The list of non-majority responses and the rationale for each answer is provided at the end of
this dissertation in Appendix B. Moreover, I went through several of the variables to ensure accuracy and a list
of these variables and the rationale for the changes are listed in Appendix C.
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were 1. The significance of the index score is to provide a quantitative metric to predict a
military's response during the Arab uprisings. Since it is assumed that yes responses will
more likely lead to military defection, the primary hypothesis of this project is that the higher a
country's index score, the more likely the country’s military defected from the ruling regime during the Arab
uprisings, whereas the lower a country’s index score the more likely the country’s military defended the ruling
regime during the Arab uprisings.
Table 5. MENA Military Index: Number of Respondents for each Country
Country
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Mauritania

Respondents
5
3
3
4
5
3
3
2
3
3
3

Country
Morocco
Oman
Palestine
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
Turkey
UAE
Yemen
Total

Respondents
5
3
4
3
3
4
4
4
1
3
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Findings of the MENA Military Index
The initial findings of the MENA Military Index are presented below in table 6,
which lists the index scores in numerical order from highest to lowest. The highest index
score belongs to Egypt (0.7), which possessed fourteen variables that influenced military
defection during the Arab uprisings whereas Turkey had the lowest index score (0.2) and
only possessed four variables that influenced military defection.9 Overall, the average index
score for all twenty MENA countries was 0.395, meaning that on average MENA countries

9

Egypt’s index score is calculated by 14 ÷ 20 = 0.7; Turkey’s index score is calculated by 4 ÷ 20 = 0.2
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possessed eight variables to influence military defection during the Arab uprisings. There are
several useful observations to discern from table 6. First, military defection can occur even if
some of the twenty variables are absent from the country. This is verified since no country
possesses an index score of 1.00 even though there were still cases of military defection
during the Arab uprisings. Second, every MENA country possesses at least some variables
that can encourage military defection since no countries have an index score of 0.00. Third,
most MENA countries have an index score of 0.4 or lower, suggesting that the majority of
MENA countries possess only a moderate number of variables to influence military
defection.
Table 6. The MENA Military Index Scores
Country
Egypt
Yemen
Syria
Libya
Tunisia
Lebanon
Oman

Index Score
0.7
0.65
0.6
0.55
0.55
0.5
0.5

Country
Iraq
Mauritania
Kuwait
Palestine
Saudi Arabia
Algeria
Bahrain

Index Score
0.4
0.4
0.35
0.35
0.35
0.3
0.3

Country
Iran
Morocco
Israel
Jordan
Qatar
UAE
Turkey

Index Score
0.3
0.3
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.25
0.2

Table 7 provides the index scores of the twenty-one MENA countries organized by
the five military response types. The main finding from this table is that higher index scores
led to military defection or fracturing during the Arab uprisings. The five countries to
experience either military defection or fracturing (Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen)
all have an index score of 0.55 or higher. This suggests that these five countries possessed at
least eleven variables that influenced the military to either defect or fracture from the regime.
The two countries that experienced military defection, Egypt and Tunisia, have an index
score of 0.70 and 0.55, respectively. The three countries that experienced military fracturing,

Table 7. Index Scores by Military Response Type
Defected

Score

Fractured

Score

Defended

Score

Egypt

0.7

Yemen

0.65

Oman

Tunisia

0.55

Syria

0.6

Libya

0.55

Average

0.625

Average

0.6

Score

Minimal
Role:
Limited
Protests

Score

0.5

Minimal
Role:
Success of
Internal
Security
Forces
Lebanon

0.5

Palestine

0.35

Iraq

0.4

Mauritania

0.4

Israel

0.25

Bahrain

0.3

Kuwait

0.35

Qatar

0.25

Saudi
Arabia

0.35

United
Arab
Emirates

0.25

Algeria

0.3

Turkey

0.2

Iran

0.3

Morocco

0.3

Jordan

0.25

Average

0.344

Average

0.25

Average

0.4
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Libya, Syria, and Yemen, have index scores of 0.55, 0.6, and 0.65, respectively. In countries
where the militaries defended the regime or had a minimal role during the Arab uprisings,
the index scores are 0.50 or lower. There appears to be a transition point between an index
score of 0.50 and an index score of 0.55. It is unclear why this is the case but it intuitively
makes sense that the more variables a country possesses, the more likely that country will
experience military defection or fracturing. It is interesting to note that this threshold exists
at the halfway mark, meaning that if a country possesses eleven or more of the twenty
observed variables, the country experienced military defection or fracturing during the Arab
uprisings, whereas if a country possesses ten or fewer of the twenty variables, the military
either defended the regime or had a limited role.
The index scores in table 7 suggest there are numerical differences between varying
military responses, but the table does not provide insight into why there are differences and
it fails to identify the specific variables that are present in some cases and absent in others.
To better understand the specific variables within the MENA Military Index it is worthwhile
to examine all twenty variables across each MENA country in a single, comprehensive chart.
Tables 8 and 9 list the twenty variables and the twenty-one MENA countries and identifies
whether a variable was absent or present in each country. If a variable was present within a
country it is marked with the numeral 1, and if a variable was absent within a country it is left
blank. The tables also include the sum of how frequent a variable was present across all of
the twenty-one MENA countries. To make tables 8 and 9 more legible the variable number
is listed rather than the variable name.10 In table 8 the variables are listed left to right in

10

The variable names can be referred to from Table 3.
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numerical order, whereas in table 9 the variables are listed left to right based upon the
frequency they appear within the MENA Military Index.
The first observation to make with tables 8 and 9 is the summed totals at the bottom
of the chart, which demonstrate the variables that are most present and least present in the
index. For example, variable 14 (non-violent nature of protests) was present in every MENA
country. In the classic literature on revolutions, protesters typically employ strategies of
violent armed struggles to achieve their goals, such as the classic revolutions in the 1800s
and 1900s in China, France, and Russia. One of the motivations for variable 14 in the
MENA Military Index is to measure the violent nature of the protest movement, which the
recent literature argues that non-violent protests can be more successful than violent protests
in increasing the likelihood that the military will defect from the ruling regime.11 It is
important to mention that variable 14 does not imply that the uprisings across the twentyone MENA countries were identical, and it also does not assume that protesters never used
violence against state security forces. Rather, this variable indicates that during the Arab
uprisings the majority of demonstrations were non-violent since protesters did not aim to
achieve their goals specifically through violence, physical force, or armed insurrections.
On the other end of the spectrum there were four variables that were only present in
either one or two MENA countries. This includes variable 5 (rivalries between the armed
force branches), variable 10 (someone other than the ruling leader appointing the defense
minister and other senior military generals), variable 11 (whether orders for the military to
intervene were indirect or came from someone other than the ruling leader), and variable 18
(foreign military troops intervening with the purpose of overthrowing the ruling regime).
11

For more see Chenoweth and Stephan (2011).
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A second observation regarding tables 8 and 9 is to identify the variables present in
Egypt and Tunisia since those two countries experienced military defection. In total, Egypt
and Tunisia share eleven variables (variables 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17). Four of
these variables are institutional including parallel security structures that counterbalance the
military, significant rivalries between the military and internal security forces, military
conscription, and the military having the autonomy to make personnel decisions within the
armed forces. The shared variable that relates to the regime is that significant portions of
Egyptian and Tunisian officers were unsatisfied with the material and non-material benefits
they received from their ruling leaders. Lastly, six of the shared variables are societal
including the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries not having a precedence of committing
egregious human rights violations against civilians prior to the uprisings and in both
countries the protests were large, consisted of non-traditional protesters, were non-violent,
broad-based, and demonstrators were successful at winning over the military.
A third observation to make with tables 8 and 9 is to examine the difference between
militaries that defected and militaries that fractured. Overall, the variable that differentiates
military defection from military fracturing is variable 1, which discusses whether there are
communal splits that divide military personnel. In the two countries where militaries
defected (Egypt and Tunisia) there are no communal splits between military personnel,
however in the three countries where militaries fractured (Libya, Syria, and Yemen) there are
communal splits between military personnel. It is not a coincidence that communal splits
cause military fracturing as the variable inherently assumes cleavages within the armed
forces. It should be specified that communal splits between military personnel do not
singularly explain military fracturing since there were seven other MENA countries that

Table 8. MENA Military Index Variables Results (Numerical Order)12
Variable
Type
Variable #
Military Defected
Military Fractured

Military Defended

Military Minimal Role:
Success of Internal
Security Forces

Military Minimal Role:
Low Protests

For the variable name see Table 3.

1

1
1
1
1
1

2

3

4

5 6 7

8

9

1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1 1
1
1
1 1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1

1

1
1

Regime

1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1
1 1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1 1
10 6 13 10

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1

5 9 11 12

International

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

1

1
1
1

Societal

2

1

8

11

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

18

19

20
1

1
1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1

1

1 1 1
1 1
1
1
1 1
1
1
21 10 15

1
1
1
1
4

1

5

1
11

67

12

Country
Egypt
Tunisia
Libya
Syria
Yemen
Bahrain
Iraq
Oman
Algeria
Iran
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Mauritania
Morocco
Saudi
Arabia
Israel
Palestine
Qatar
Turkey
UAE
Totals

Institutional

Table 9. MENA Military Index Variables Results (Most Frequent to Less Frequent)13
Variable 14 16
Military Defected
Military Fractured

Military Defended

Military Minimal Role:
Success of Internal Security
Forces

Military Minimal Role:
Low Protests

For the variable names see Table 3.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

3

9

8

13 20

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

15 7 12 2 6 19 17 10 5 11 18

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1
1
1

1

1

1

1 1 1
1
1
1
1 1 1
1
1
1
1
1
1
21 15 13 12 11

1
1

11

1
1
1

1
1

1
1
1

1
11

1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1 1

1
1
1

1
1 1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1
1 1

1
1

1
1

1
1

1

1
1
1

4

1

1
1

1

1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1 1
10 10 10 9

8

6 5

5

4

2

1
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13

Country
Egypt
Tunisia
Libya
Syria
Yemen
Bahrain
Iraq
Oman
Algeria
Iran
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Mauritania
Morocco
Saudi
Arabia
Israel
Palestine
Qatar
Turkey
UAE
Totals
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possessed communal splits within the armed forces but did not experience military fracturing
(Iraq, Lebanon, Mauritania, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates).
A fourth observation with tables 8 and 9 is to examine the variables absent in
Bahrain, Iraq, and Oman, since the militaries in these three countries defended the ruling
regime from mass political protests. There were six variables absent in Bahrain, Iraq, and
Oman including variable 5 (rivalries between the armed force branches), variable 6
(generational splits between senior and junior soldiers), variable 7 (whether or not the
country has military conscription), variable 10 (someone other than the ruling leader
appointing the defense minister and other senior military generals), variable 11 (whether
orders for the military to intervene were indirect or came from someone other than the
ruling leader), and variable 18 (foreign military troops intervening with the purpose of
overthrowing the ruling regime). The next step is to compare whether any of the six
variables absent in Bahrain, Iraq, and Oman are present in Egypt and Tunisia. Of the six
variables absent in Bahrain, Iraq, and Oman, the only one present in both Egypt and Tunisia
is variable 7, which examines whether a country employs a system of military conscription.
This is an interesting finding because in theory, conscription expands the diversity of
individuals serving within a country by making military service mandatory. It seems possible
that the presence of military conscription increases military defection since conscripts come
from varying backgrounds and should more easily identify with the general public and
population at large. Additionally, in countries without military conscription the regime can
construct the military to specifically recruit groups and individuals that will be more loyal to
the regime (such as a specific ethnic, religious groups, etc.). Similarly, in a system without
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military conscription the government can deliberately block certain groups from military
service that would be less loyal to the ruling leader or incumbent regime.
For these reasons it is tempting to assume that the variable of military conscription
neatly explains military responses during the Arab uprisings, but the information from tables
8 and 9 proves this is not the case. The clear reason why military conscription cannot
singularly explain military behavior during the Arab uprisings is because military conscription
also exists in Algeria, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Yemen even though military
defection did not take place in any of these countries. Overall, the information from tables 8
and 9 suggest that no single variable can neatly explain military responses during the Arab uprisings,
which was one of the primary arguments for creating the comprehensive approach of the
MENA Military Index in the first place.
Even though individual variables fail to explain military responses it is possible that
different types of variables can explain military behavior during the Arab uprisings. In his
original article, Barany argues that military behavior during revolutions is primarily based
upon institutional variables within the military, followed by variables between the military
and the regime, then societal variables, and lastly, international variables. To test Barany’s
variable rankings, table 10 lists the five military response types and tabulates the percentage
of institutional, regime, societal, and international variables present in the twenty-one
MENA countries. To recall, there were two MENA militaries that defected from the regime,
three militaries that fractured, three militaries that defended the incumbent regime, seven
militaries that did not respond due to the success of internal security forces, and five
militaries that did not respond due to the country experiencing minimal protests. In addition,
the MENA Military Index includes eight institutional variables, three regime variables, six
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societal variables, and three international variables. Table 10 calculates the percentage of the
four variable sources present in each of the five military response types. For example, since
there are two countries that experienced military defection, there are sixteen possible
institutional variables that can exist within those two countries (since there were eight
institutional variables examined).
Table 10. Percentage of Present Variable Conditions by Military Response Type
Conditions
Military
Response
Type
Defected
Fractured
Defended
No Response:
Internal
Security Forces
Success
No Response:
Minimal
Protests
Accumulative
Percentage

Institutional

Regime

Societal

International

63%
(10/16)
63%
(15/24)
29%
(7/24)
33%
(21/64)

33%
(2/6)
56%
(5/9)
11%
(1/9)
29%
(7/24)

100%
(12/12)
78%
(14/18)
72%
(13/18)
42%
(20/48)

17%
(1/6)
22%
(2/9)
33%
(3/9)
25%
(6/24)

30%
(12/40)

0%
(0/15)

30%
(9/30)

33%
(5/15)

39%
(65/168)

24%
(15/63)

54%
(68/128)

27%
(17/63)

If Barany’s original argument is correct then in militaries that defected from the
ruling regime, institutional variables should have the highest percentage, followed by regime
variables, then societal variables, and lastly international variables. But as table 10
demonstrates, this is not the case since societal variables have the highest percentage (100
percent), followed by institutional variables (63 percent), then regime variables (33 percent)
and lastly international variables (17 percent).
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This finding suggests that societal variables most strongly explain military defection,
and a way to test this is to compare the percentage of societal variables present in militaries
that defected (Egypt and Tunisia) to militaries that defended the regime (Bahrain, Iraq, and
Oman). If societal variables truly explain the difference between military defection and
military loyalty, then one should expect significantly lower societal percentages in Bahrain,
Iraq, and Oman. However, table 10 indicates this is not the case considering that 72 percent
of the societal variables were present even in the three countries where the militaries
defended the ruling regime. Interestingly, there are a higher percentage of societal variables
in countries where the militaries defended the regime in comparison to institutional variables
(63 percent), regime variables (33 percent), and international variables (17 percent) in
countries where the militaries defected from the ruling regime. This finding is important
because it demonstrates that societal variables were prevalent in instances of both military
defection and military loyalty. Also, across the entire index, societal variables have the
highest percentage (54 percent), which indicates that in many countries across the MENA
region the protest movements possessed unique characteristics that could have influenced
military defection since protests were large, non-violent, broad-based, and attracted nontraditional demonstrators.
Even though societal variables do not fully explain the difference between military
defection and military loyalty during the Arab uprisings, it is possible that institutional
variables do. For example, 63 percent of institutional variables are present in countries that
experienced military defection or military fracturing, whereas 29 percent of institutional
variables are present in countries where the militaries defended the ruling regime. Moreover,
in countries with no military responses, institutional variables are only present 32 percent of
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the time.14 This demonstrates that the presence of institutional variables creates conditions
for military insubordination through either defection or fracturing.
Overall, table 10 suggests that military defection and military fracturing occurred
because of the presence of both societal and institutional variables. More specifically, it
appears as if military defection and fracturing occurred during the Arab uprisings as a result
of a two-step process. Step one: a country had to possess the institutional variables that
paved the foundation for military defection and step two: the country also had to experience
the necessary societal variables during the Arab uprisings that increased the opportunity for
military defection or fracturing. This two-step process explains why the Egyptian and
Tunisian militaries defected from the incumbent regimes, yet the Bahraini military defended
the regime. As table 8 demonstrates, even though Bahrain contained the necessary societal
variables for military defection, unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Bahrain did not possess the
necessary institutional variables.
Conclusion
Recent studies examining the role of MENA militaries during the Arab uprisings
explore individual countries or small-n comparative analyses while examining only a few
variables that happen to be present in the observed cases. The MENA Military Index builds
on Barany’s model and creates a comprehensive dataset to test MENA military responses
during the Arab uprisings. The central hypothesis of the project is that countries with higher
index scores were more likely to experience military defection during the uprisings in
comparison to countries with lower index scores. Overall this finding was confirmed and it

14

This calculation examines both no military response groups in which institutional variables were present 33
times out of a total of 104 possibilities 33 ÷ 104 = 32%.
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was also discovered that militaries that defended and fractured possessed similar index
scores. The primary variable that differentiated between military defection and military
fracturing was variable 1 -- whether there were communal cleavages within a country's armed
forces.
Overall, the index demonstrates that military defection and fracturing occurred due
to societal and institutional variables. Specifically, military defection and fracturing during the
Arab uprisings was a two-step process. First, countries had to possess the necessary
institutional variables that helped paved the foundation for military insubordination such as
parallel security forces that counterbalanced the military, a damaging rivalry between the
military and other state security forces, a system of military conscription that filled the rankand-file of the armed forces with young men from the at-large population, and the military's
institutional autonomy to select and make personnel decisions within the armed forces.
Second, the country had to experience an event that gave the military the opportunity to
defect or fracture. A mass political protest had to occur in the country and the uprising had
to possess specific variables, such as being historically large, broad-based, non-violent,
consist of non-traditional protesters, and employ a strategy to win over the military.
The MENA Military Index is the first project of its kind to comprehensively examine
varying military responses across the MENA region in regards to the Arab uprisings;
however, it is useful to compare the findings from this project to other research. The most
relevant study to this project is the research by Pion-Berlin et. al (2014), who examined
instances of "military quartering," where militaries refused orders from ruling leaders to
repress mass political protesters. In their study, Pion-Berlin et. al identify five variables that
cause militaries to not intervene during mass political politics: grievances towards the regime,
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close affinity to the public interests, disdain for internal security missions, constitutional
measures that discourage the military's political intervention, and internal divisions within the
state security apparatus. The main similarity between the MENA Military Index and the
research from Pion-Berlin et. al is that both studies identify divisions within the security
apparatus as a main factor for why militaries do not use violence against demonstrators. The
MENA Military Index finds that if the regime deliberately creates parallel security forces to
counterbalance the military, and if there are significant rivalries between the military and
other state security forces, then these two variables can pave the way for possible military
defection or fracturing. Interestingly, the striking difference between the MENA Military
Index and the "military quartering" argument is that the latter fails to identify societal
variables and how the specific characteristics of the protest movement can affect military
response. This dissertation suggests that within the context of the Arab uprisings, the dual
role of institutional and societal variables caused militaries to either defect or fracture.
The remainder of this project examines three cases during the Arab uprisings:
Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia. The three case study chapters use primary sources (unclassified
government documents, government archives, nongovernmental organization archives, etc.)
and secondary sources to examine the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index in more
detail. Each chapter follows a similar format by first examining the historical role of the
military within the country, then discussing the role the military played during the country's
uprising, and lastly, examining the twenty variables from the MENA Military Index at a more
detailed level. Overall, the case study chapters reinforce the findings from the MENA
Military Index, confirm the experts' evaluations, and also highlight the influence institutional
and societal variables had on military responses during the Arab uprisings.

CHAPTER 4
THE TUNISIAN MILITARY DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS
This chapter examines the Tunisian military during the Arab uprisings. The Tunisian
protests were unexpected and caught the Tunisian government and much of the world offguard. The protests began on December 17, 2010, with the self-immolation of struggling
street merchant, Mohamed Bouazizi, and then spread across the entire country motivating
hundreds of thousands of Tunisians to protest against the regime and the country’s
struggling economic conditions. After weeks of intensifying nation-wide protests, President
Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali ordered the Tunisian military to assist internal security forces in
confronting demonstrators. However, the Tunisian military was unwilling to use violence
against civilians and defected from the regime in favor of protesters. After the military
defected, President Ben Ali fled the country on January 14, 2011, and political power was
transferred to a civilian, transitional government. The Tunisian uprising served as a spark for
other MENA protests and encouraged millions of citizens across the region to demonstrate
against autocratic governments and stagnant economic conditions.
This chapter explores the variables that contributed to Tunisian military defection
during the uprising. To better understand the context of the Tunisian military during the
uprising the first section of this chapter provides a historical overview of the Tunisian
military from 1956 until 2010 and examines the development of the Tunisian armed forces
and the role of the military within Tunisian politics and society. The second section
examines the Tunisian uprising in detail and highlights the role of the Tunisian military
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during the unrest. The third section examines the twenty variables of the MENA Military
Index in Tunisia and reinforces the central findings from chapter 3. This section highlights
that the Tunisian military possessed institutional variables that paved the way for military
defection and that the characteristics of the uprising made it more difficult and raised the
costs for the Tunisian military to use violence against protesters. This chapter demonstrates
that the Tunisian military was marginalized by the Ben Ali regime as the country's internal
security forces grew and expanded at the expense of the Tunisian military. In addition, the
2010-2011 Tunisian uprising possessed characteristics that made it more difficult for the
military to use high levels of violence and repression against protesters, considering the
movement was historically large, broad-based, non-violent, consisted of non-traditional
demonstrators, and protestors strategically aimed to win over military. As suggested by the
MENA Military Index in chapter 3, the Tunisian case verifies that the presence of both
institutional and societal variables created conditions that made Tunisian military defection
possible.
Background of the Tunisian Military
To better understand Tunisian military response during the Arab uprisings one must
understand the historical role and development of the Tunisian military. Tunisia was a
French protectorate during the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth
century before officially gaining independence in 1956. One of the noteworthy
characteristics of Tunisian independence was that it was a peaceful transition with no armed
struggle and as a result the Tunisian military had a limited role in the independence
movement. This is critical because at the dawn of Tunisian statehood, the Tunisian military
was not a significant political institution in the country and it remained politically
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insignificant, and was deliberately constructed to be a small institution under the rule of the
country’s first president, Habib Bourguiba (Brooks 2013, 209). President Bourguiba ensured
that the military concentrated on external defense and was not responsible for the internal
security of the country (Abadi 2013, 434-436, 533-534). Additionally, Bourguiba ensured the
military remained apolitical by prohibiting military officers from joining political parties or
from creating political associations.1 There are several reasons why Bourguiba limited the
political role of the Tunisian military under his rule. The first reason is that in the late 1950s,
Tunisia did not have many external threats from neighboring countries and there was no
need for a large military. A second reason is that Bourguiba feared a large Tunisian military
could potentially threaten his regime and he kept the military deliberately small and apolitical
to decrease the likelihood of a military coup against him.2
In 1961, Tunisia faced its first major military test as an independent country. The
French Navy still maintained a base in the northern Tunisian city of Bizerte and the base was
tactically important to the French military during its war in Algeria. In opposition to French
military involvement in Algeria, the Tunisian military blockaded the French fleet in Bizerte,
which escalated into a four-day confrontation between the French and Tunisian military. In
total, 670 Tunisians were killed during the Bizerte crisis and the episode demonstrated the
resolve of the nascent Tunisian military and eventually led to the French abandoning its
military bases.3

1

For more see Brooks (2013, 209) and Jebnoun (2014, 300).

Bourguiba’s decision to keep the Tunisian military small and apolitical also conforms to the early concept of
coup proofing, which was explored in Chapter 2.

2

3

For more on the Bizerte crisis see Alexander (2010, 90-91).
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After the Bizerte crisis, the Tunisian military grew in size and expanded its
institutional mission. The 1959 constitution instituted a system of selective military
conscription two years prior to the Bizerte crisis and as a result, the number of troops in the
armed forces increased significantly. After the events in Bizerte the Tunisian military grew
from 8,000 in 1959 to 17,000 in 1965.4 As the Tunisian military expanded in the early 1960s,
so did its institutional mission, and the military became more involved in international
peacekeeping missions across the African continent. For example, in the mid-1960s Tunisia
volunteered soldiers, materiel, and resources to the United Nations Operation in the Congo
(UNOC).5 However, despite the growth of the Tunisian military in both terms of personnel
and the expansion of its institutional mission, the Tunisian military was still devoted to
external defense and did not participate in internal security issues.
By the 1970s, Tunisia was beginning to change demographically and economically.
Demographically, the generation that ushered in independence in the mid-1900s was aging
while younger Tunisians were more critical of the Bourguiba regime, especially regarding the
country’s economic policies and lack of economic growth. During the mid-1970s, students
and workers frequently staged protests against the government and these events culminated
in January 1978 when the country's labor union, the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail
(Tunisian General Labor Union, UGTT), called for nationwide protests.6 The UGTT strike
drew nearly 500,000 protesters from across the country and overwhelmed the Tunisian
internal security forces, which were on the ground responsible for controlling the crowds
4

For more on the relationship between conscription and the growth of the Tunisian military see Ware (1985,
48) and Abadi (2013, 434-436, 533-534).
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For more see Abadi (2013, 434-436, 533-534), and the United Nations, "Republic of Congo - ONUC Facts and
Figures," accessed September 25, 2015. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onucF.html.
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(Disney 1978, 12). The 1978 protests prompted President Bourguiba for the first time in the
country's modern history to deploy Tunisian soldiers onto the streets to assist the internal
security forces. Bourguiba’s decision to deploy the military proved to be wise as the military
was able to assist internal security forces and suppress the uprising, which resulted in the
death of 100-200 civilians.7 As a result of deploying the military, the Bourguiba regime
remained intact and in power, and the 1978 protest represented a key moment in Tunisian
history by demonstrating that the Bourguiba regime was willing to order the military to
repress political protesters, and when ordered, the Tunisian military was willing to use
violence in confronting civilian demonstrators.
In the early 1980s, the Tunisian economy continued to struggle and in order to
receive financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Tunisia instituted
austerity measures that significantly raised the prices of basic foodstuffs such as bread. Once
the IMF-led austerity measures were implemented in 1984 and the cost of basic foodstuffs
skyrocketed, thousands of Tunisians flooded the streets in the so-called “Bread Riots.” The
Bourguiba regime responded by deploying both internal security forces and military soldiers
throughout downtown Tunis to enforce the government’s state of emergency and the
country's nighttime curfew (Paul 1984, 4). Similar to the unrest six years prior, the Tunisian
military intervened on behalf of the regime and suppressed protesters.
In 1987, three years after the Bread Riots, President Bourguiba was eighty-four yearsold and on November 7, 1987, Ben Ali, then prime minister, led a constitutional coup
against Bourguiba claiming the president was no longer mentally or physically capable of
running the country (Ware 1988, 592). Tunisian doctors corroborated Ben Ali’s claim and as

7

For estimates on the number of protesters that died see Disney (1978, 12) and Vandewalle (1988, 607-608).

81
residing prime minister, Ben Ali conveniently assumed the role of the presidency in
Bourguiba’s absence.
From the military perspective, the political ascent of Ben Ali to the presidency was
viewed optimistically considering Ben Ali was a former officer who served in the Tunisian
Armed Forces in the 1960s and 1970s. One of Ben Ali's first security directives as president
was creating the National Security Council (NSC), a small group that consisted of the
president, the prime minister, the defense minister, the foreign minister, the interior minister,
the deputy secretary of the ministry of interior, the chief of staff for the armed forces, and
the general director of military intelligence (Jebnoun 2014, 6). The purpose of the council
was to collect, analyze, and assess information on domestic, foreign, and defense policies
with the aim of safeguarding internal and external state security (Ware 1988, 595). At first the
Tunisian military perceived the establishment of the NSC positively and thought it would
provide the military with more direct access to the president and to the ruling political elite
of the country. However, the Tunisian military quickly realized that Ben Ali was not going to
bring the military closer to the regime, and in fact, the opposite occurred. During Ben Ali’s
rule, Tunisian military officers were further marginalized from political influence and power.
Even though Ben Ali served in the Tunisian military earlier in his career, his political
ascent occurred within the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Interior, especially in the country's
internal intelligence and internal security organizations. Overall, Ben Ali was a byproduct of
the internal security apparatus and he favored the expansion of the Ministry of Interior at the
expense of the Ministry of Defense and the Tunisian military.8 There are three specific
examples early in Ben Ali’s presidency that demonstrate this: first, Ben Ali took direct

8
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control of the country’s police and the Ministry of Interior; second, Ben Ali placed the
country’s Presidential Guard directly under his control where prior it was controlled by the
government; and third, Ben Ali created parallel security structures to fuel competition and
prevent cooperation between the country’s security forces (Lutterbeck 2015, 821-824).
While Ben Ali centralized control of the internal security forces he also took steps to
deliberately marginalize the Tunisian military. Four years into Ben Ali’s presidency, the socalled “Bareket el-Sahel affair of 1991” occurred and highlighted Ben Ali’s preference of the
Ministry of Interior and internal security forces over the Ministry of Defense and the
military. The affair was the result of growing, conservative Islamist ideology that swept
across the country and infiltrated the political and religious ideologies of many Tunisian
military personnel. In 1991, Interior Minister Abdallah Qallal informed President Ben Ali
that hundreds of Islamist sympathizers in the Tunisian military were plotting a coup against
the president (Lutterbeck 2015, 817). Through domestic intelligence the Ministry of Interior
uncovered that a group of coup plotters had met in the small town of Bareket el-Sahel9 and
state security forces arrested the meetings’ participants, tortured them, and rooted out the
coup before it could be initiated (Bou Nassif 2015, 70). Upon this discovery, Ben Ali
arrested hundreds of military officers affiliated with the coup or who were believed to harbor
Islamist ideologies. Most of the officers arrested were eventually released or declared
innocent, but the episode significantly demoralized the Tunisian military and created an
institutional rift between the armed forces and the Ben Ali regime.10 The animosity between
the Ben Ali regime and the Tunisian military was further exacerbated by reports that Interior
There are different transliterate spellings of Bareket el-Sahel including ‘Barakat al-Sahil,’ ‘Bareket al-Sahel,’ and
Barraket Essahel.’ The name refers to a small town in Tunisia that is approximately five kilometers west of the
beach resort town, Hammamet.

9
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Minister Qallal embellished the Bareket el-Sahel scandal and encouraged President Ben Ali
to arrest military officials in order to increase the institutional standing of the internal
security forces (for more see Bou Nassif 2015).
After the political embarrassment of the 1991 Bareket el-Sahel affair, the Ben Ali
regime financially marginalized the military, which is demonstrated by the disproportionate
budgets the Ministry of Defense received in comparison to the Ministry of Interior. Every
year during Ben Ali's presidency the Ministry of Interior received a higher budget than the
Ministry of Defense. For example, the highest percentage of the national budget that the
Ministry of Interior received during Ben Ali's presidency was 9.7 percent in 1992, whereas
the lowest percentage was 5.5 in 2005. In contrast, the highest percentage of the national
budget that was allocated to the Ministry of Defense during the Ben Ali regime was 5.9
percent in 1992 and the lowest percentage was 3.6 in both 2005 and 2008.11
In addition to the financial disparity between the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of
Defense, political controversy continued between the Tunisian military and President Ben
Ali. In 2002, a military helicopter crashed under suspicious circumstances and killed the army
chief of staff, Brigadier General Abdelazziz Skik.12 Some in the Tunisian armed forces
believed the Ben Ali regime had a direct role in the helicopter crash (Signé 2014, 8) and the
regime certainly raised suspicions by attempting to cover up the episode and then not
releasing the investigative files on the crash (Jebnoun 2014, 8).
Others claimed that even if the regime did not have a direct role in the 2002
helicopter crash, the faulty equipment that caused the crash was a result of the small budgets
11

Percentages are derived from Bou Nassif (2015, 72).
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the Ministry of Defense received, which forced the military to operate with second-hand and
outdated equipment (Signé 2014).
One of the most paradoxical aspects of the Tunisian military during the Ben Ali
presidency is that despite the military’s marginalization, officers willingly followed regime
orders and intervened against protesters such as during the 2008 demonstrations in Gafsa.
The city of Gafsa is located approximately 350 kilometers southwest of the capital and has
traditionally been overlooked by the central government and has received only minimal
resources in comparison to other regions across the country. Protests in Gafsa started in the
early half of 2008 and were focused on the rampant unemployment in the region, the
regime's lack of transparency, and the ongoing nepotism within the government (Pachon
2014, 522-523). Initially, the Tunisian internal security forces were able to control the
protests, but by June the demonstrations intensified and increased in size, which made it
more difficult for the police to contain the crowds. On June 7, 2008, the regime ordered the
army to reinforce internal security forces, and soldiers were deployed across the area, leading
to the arrest of hundreds of protesters and effectively ending the demonstrations (Pachon
2014, 523).
Military involvement in the 2008 protests raises an interesting question. Why did the
Tunisian military follow orders in 2008 considering it was so marginalized by the Ben Ali
regime? There are three possible explanations: (1) since the military intervened in protests in
1978 and 1984 there was a historical precedent for the military to confront demonstrators,
(2) since the protests took place in Gafsa, a marginalized region hundreds of kilometers from
the capital, it was easier for the military to rationalize intervention against protesters, and (3)
even though the military was marginalized by the regime, the armed forces was a
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professionalized organization and respected and followed institutional protocol when an
order was given.
Considering the Tunisian military intervened and used force against demonstrators in
the 2008 Gafsa protests, one would logically assume the armed forces would have acted
similarly during the 2010-2011 Arab uprisings. However, as the following section
demonstrates this was not the case. After the Arab uprisings began, the internal security
forces were the first security units to respond, but once protests intensified, military soldiers
were ordered by the regime to support and reinforce the internal security forces. The
Tunisian military deployed soldiers across the country to assist internal security forces, but
the Tunisian military only went so far in defending the regime. The Tunisian military was
unwilling to use violence against protesters that would have been necessary to maintain Ben
Ali’s presidency. The next section of this chapter provides a detailed narrative of the
Tunisian military during the country’s uprising and explains how the military responded
during the four weeks of protest.
The Uprising in Tunisia and the Role of the Military
Sidi Bouzid is centrally located in Tunisia approximately 300 kilometers (186 miles)
southwest of the capital, Tunis. The city is situated between four Tunisian cities with the city
of Kasserine to the west, the phosphate mines of Gafsa to the southwest, the industrious
and coastal city of Sfax to the east, and the conservative and religious heart of the country,
Kairouan, to the northeast. Despite Sidi Bouzid’s geographic centrality in the country, the
city and the larger region have been traditionally marginalized by the government in Tunis,
and have received minimal resources and infrastructure in comparison to the northern and
coastal provinces of the country. On Friday December 17, 2010, a twenty-six year-old street
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vendor, Bouazizi, who typically set up his wares in Sidi Bouzid’s main market, went in front
of the city’s local municipal building, poured petrol over his body, and lit himself on fire.
Bouazizi’s defiant act was triggered by desperate circumstances in which he was struggling to
make a living for his family of eight, and was frequently targeted by state security officials
and forced to provide bribes for his cart to remain open.13 In front of the Sidi Bouzid
municipal government building, Bouazizi lit a flame to protest his individual grievances, and
by doing so he highlighted the struggling conditions and unfair treatment that so many other
Tunisians like him experienced.
Bouazizi was taken to the hospital, still alive, and Sidi Bouzid erupted in protests.
Hundreds of citizens flooded the streets and saw themselves in Bouazizi: hard-working
Tunisians who were unable to overcome the obstacles of regime corruption and crippling
economic conditions. As hundreds of citizens took to the street in Sidi Bouzid, the
government responded by deploying local police forces to control and contain the
demonstrators. Even from day one, the Tunisian internal security forces were willing to
violently confront protesters by firing tear gas on the hundreds of protesters who were
ransacking shops and clogging Sidi Bouzid's major roadways.14
In the days following Bouazizi's self-immolation, protests intensified and spread to
other regions across the country. But as demonstrations intensified, so did the government’s
harsh response, and on December 25, 2010, in the town of Regueb, forces from the Brigade
de l’ordre Publique (Brigade of Public Order, BOP), a specialized security unit, fired the first
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shots of the uprising and injured several protesters.15 A few days later, on December 28,
2010, Ben Ali made his first televised speech and compared protesters to “outlaws” and
“terrorists.”16 The president referenced Tunisian law No. 69-4 of 1969, and reminded
Tunisians that government authorities had to be informed before any public meetings,
demonstration, or gathering could take place. Ben Ali demonized the protesters and warned
Tunisians that future protesters would be subject to arrest and receive harsh punishment in
accordance to Tunisian law.
On the same day as Ben Ali’s televised address, the government transferred the still
ailing Bouazizi from a hospital in Sfax to a specialized burn unit facility in Ben Arous, a
region just south of the capital.17 The president's speech, combined with Bouazizi’s medical
transfer, resulted in a decrease of protests during the following days. However, everything
changed on January 4, 2011, after Bouazizi finally succumbed to his injuries and died.
Four changes occurred in the aftermath of Bouazizi’s death that propelled the
Tunisian uprising. First, protests intensified across the country, especially in the interior
towns of Douz, Kasserine, and Thala. Second, internal security forces responded to the
increased protests with a high level of violence and physical force. The majority of deaths
and injuries during the Tunisian uprising took place during the period of January 4 - January
14 in the interior of the country. Third, prior to Bouazizi’s death the protests primarily
consisted of the lower class, the unemployed, students, and disenfranchised youth. But after
Bouazizi's death, the movement attracted a wider spectrum of citizens. For example, the
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country's labor union, UGTT, and the country's bar association18 also joined the protests and
this expanding cross-class coalition not only increased the overall number of demonstrators
but also heightened the national identity of the movement. Fourth, prior to Bouazizi’s death,
protests were isolated to the rural and marginalized regions in the country's interior, but after
Bouazizi's death the protests began to spread to the coastal regions, and ultimately to the
capital.
After January 4, 2011, some of the most violent episodes of the entire uprising
occurred in the region of Kasserine, especially in the town of Thala. On January 5 and
January 6, there was widespread protesting, rioting, and looting across Thala and internal
security forces responded violently and harshly, leading to the injury and incarceration of
dozens of protesters. On the morning of January 8, hundreds of citizens gathered outside
Thala’s main police station and demanded authorities to release the prisoners from the
previous days’ protests. Rather than acquiescing to the citizens' demands, the Tunisian
internal security forces called for reinforcements and the following day more troops plus
heavily armed-paramilitary units and snipers arrived into the city.19
The escalation in Thala was one of the bloodiest events during the entire uprising.
The Tunisian National Fact Finding Commission (TNFFC) notes that in the region of
Kasserine, where Thala is located, internal security forces were responsible for the deaths of
twenty-one citizens and the injury of 624 citizens. Out of the twenty-one deaths in the
region, the commission determined the police caused twenty, and out of the 624 injuries, the
18
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police caused approximately 500, two were caused by the National Guard, and the remaining
122 were undocumented (even though it is highly likely those injuries were also caused by
the police).20 The commission also determined that the Tunisian internal security forces did
not properly follow institutional protocols during the uprising. For instance, in Tunisia there
is a protocol in which security forces are supposed to use a gradual increase of force when
confronting protesters. The first step is to use water cannons, the second step is to utilize
tear gas, the third step is to fire vertically in the air away from protesters, the fourth step is to
fire over the crowds' heads, and the final step, which is only to be utilized in survival
situations, permits security forces to fire directly on citizens. The TNFFC (2012, 100) reports
that Tunisian internal security forces blatantly violated the protocol and fired directly at
protesters without properly increasing force gradually.
The military did not have any role in the uprising until the violence in Kasserine
intensified in early January. In Tunis, President Ben Ali immediately ordered an emergency
meeting for his national security committee and discussed strategies on how to respond and
address the demonstrations. The meeting included top security officials such as the
president, the interior minister, the defense minister, the head of presidential security, and
the chiefs of staff of the military branches. One of the meeting's outcomes was that the
Tunisian military needed to intervene and reinforce the internal security forces on the
ground. On January 9, 2011, army chief of staff, General Rashid Ammar, deployed a squad
of military soldiers in the city centers of Thala and Kasserine, and soldiers were ordered to
secure government buildings while internal security forces directly engaged protesters
(TNFCC 2012, 82 and 105).
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On January 10, 2011, President Ben Ali gave his second televised speech, which was
markedly different from the first speech he delivered on December 28, 2010. One difference
was that Ben Ali spoke in the local, colloquial Tunisian Arabic dialect, rather than in the
standard, and more formal Arabic. A second difference was that in the second speech Ben
Ali acknowledged the protesters' legitimacy and provided some concessions such as pledging
to not run for president during the next election, lowering the price of basic foodstuffs,
creating over 300,000 new jobs, promising to no longer cut off the country's internet
services, and removing some of his cabinet members from office.21 A third difference is that
Ben Ali made security concessions and assured the public that state security forces would no
longer use firearms against civilians. Despite Ben Ali’s conciliatory tone his speech did little
to reduce the protests in the country, and in the following days demonstrations only
increased, especially in the capital. In the neighborhood of Ettadhamen protesters unleashed
a new wave of riots and demonstrations and despite Ben Ali's televised assurance security
forces would no longer use firearms, reports indicated police forces were firing on
protesters.22 With unrest gripping the capital, the regime ordered the military to deploy
throughout the streets of Tunis and to monitor major intersections and protect key
governmental buildings. But by January 13, 2011, the military's willingness to support the
regime was waning and newspaper reports claimed that some soldiers began to withdraw
from their posts.23
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The following day, January 14, 2011, would end up being a historic day in Tunisia,
since that was the day President Ben Ali fled the country and his twenty-four years of
autocratic rule ended. There is still uncertainty of the exact details of what happened on
January 14, 2011, but the TNFFC provides the best account of the days' events and of the
commission’s 1,000-page report, approximately seventy pages exclusively detail and
summarize the events of January 14, 2011.
There were five key events that occurred on January 14. First, the day began with
high levels of protests in the capital as tens of thousands of demonstrators gathered outside
of the Interior Ministry building early in the morning. This was important because the
Ministry of Interior was one of the most crucial political organizations within the Ben Ali
regime, and the thousands of protesters converging outside of the building were a physical
reminder that the government’s grip on power was slipping. Second, reports indicate
President Ben Ali was paranoid of an imminent assassination attempt all day, and this fear
was heightened by rumors that Tunisian military helicopters were spotted over the
presidential palace with orders to kill the president.24 Third, several family members of the
president's wife (the Trabelsis) were apprehended at the Tunis-Carthage Airport by
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Lieutenant Colonel Samir Tarhouni while they were trying to flee the country for Europe.25
Fourth, at 3:00 p.m. President Ben Ali ordered a state of emergency, and fifth, at 5:47 p.m.,
President Ben Ali, his wife, and a small coterie of other family members departed on the
presidential plane from the el-Aouina military base and headed towards Saudi Arabia.
The senior military officers especially played a key role on January 14, 2011. It is
important to note there are examples of both military loyalty and military insubordination
during the day. For instance, the TNFFC reports that the army chief of staff, General
Ammar, was compliant with at least three regime orders on January 14, 2011. First, the chief
of presidential security, Ali Seriati, feared protesters would descend upon the presidential
palace in Carthage and as a precaution, Seriati ordered General Ammar to send military
reinforcements to the presidential palace, which Ammar reluctantly did (Jebnoun 2014, 308).
Second, when President Ben Ali declared a state of emergency at 3:00 p.m., Defense
Minister Ridha Grira called General Ammar and ordered him to deploy military forces onto
25
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the streets of Tunis in order to protect key buildings, which Ammar also did (TNFFC 2012,
225 and 305 – 306). Third, after Lieutenant General Tarhouni apprehended members of the
Trabelsi family at the airport, Defense Minister Grira ordered General Ammar to go to the
airport to sort out the ordeal (TNFFC 2012, 238 and 306).
Even though General Ammar was complicit with these orders it should be noted
that during the day he also refused several orders from senior officials. For example, in the
morning, protesters ransacked the houses of Trabelsi family members and Seriati called
Ammar and wanted military soldiers deployed outside the Trabelsi residences to protect the
family members and their property. Ammar refused and cited that the responsibility of the
military was to protect state institutions and public facilities and not to protect the private
property of the president's extended family (TNFFC 2012, 306). Ammar also refused an
order from Seriati to send more military forces to the presidential palace after Ben Ali had
fled the country (al-Arabiya 2011).
As soon as Ben Ali fled the country, the Tunisian security apparatus split and a
power struggle emerged between the varying security units. Defense Minister Grira was
skeptical of Seriati and assumed Seriati had deliberately forced Ben Ali out of the country to
seize power for himself. Shortly after the presidential plane departed, Defense Minister Grira
called the air force chief of staff, Taieb Lajimi, and ordered him to arrest Seriati. Lajimi was
stationed at the el-Aouina military base where Ben Ali’s plane just departed and Grira knew
Seriati would still be there. Approximately thirty minutes after Ben Ali’s plane took off, at
around 6:15 p.m., Air Force Chief-of-Staff Lajimi arrested Seriati on orders from the defense
minister (Jebnoun 2014, 310).
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The distrust between the security forces continued in the following days after Ben
Ali fled the country. There were reports of firefights between the military and internal
security forces who were still loyal to Ben Ali and Seriati.26 Some of the security forces that
remained loyal to Ben Ali thought the president was going to return from Saudi Arabia and
they were afraid the military was attempting to seize political power in Ben Ali's absence.
However, Ben Ali never returned to Tunisia. Amidst the chaos of Ben Ali’s departure, an
emergency meeting convened on the night of January 14, 2011, and ruling government
officials determined Ben Ali should not be allowed back in the country. Initially, Prime
Minister Mohamed Ghannoushi temporarily took over as president, but this only lasted one
day before the speaker of parliament, Fouad Mebazaa, replaced him. A new unity cabinet
was formed, and Ben Ali's ruling party, Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD), was
dissolved. In regards to the military, on January 24, 2011, Army Chief of Staff General
Ammar publically announced his support for the revolution when addressing a crowd of
1,000 demonstrators outside of the Defense Ministry building.27
The TNFFC determined that during the Tunisian uprising the Tunisian military
never fired weapons on protesters. This is telling because at the onset of the uprising, the
Tunisian military was complicit with regime orders. For instance, when Ben Ali ordered the
military to deploy onto the streets of Kasserine and Thala in early January 2011, senior
military leadership followed orders. When senior security officials, such as the defense
minister and presidential chief of staff, ordered the military on January 14, 2011, to secure
crucial governmental buildings, the military leadership followed orders. When General
26 Tarek Amara and Christian Lowe, "Tunisia forces fight presidential guards near palace," Reuters. January 16,
2011, accessed Nov. 21, 2015. http://mobile.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE70D2OV20110116.
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Ammar was ordered to negotiate the release of the president's family at the Tunis-Carthage
Airport, he followed orders. However, crucially, the Tunisian military never fired weapons
and never used the level of violence necessary to ensure the survival of the Ben Ali regime.
The unwillingness of the Tunisian military to use violence against protesters contributed to
Ben Ali fleeing the country, and after his departure the Tunisian military did not interfere
once political power was being transferred to a civilian, transitional government.
The next section examines the variables that contributed to Tunisian military
defection from the Ben Ali regime during the Arab uprisings. The section explores the
twenty variables of the MENA Military Index in-depth and determines that the Tunisian
military defected due to the presence of both institutional and societal variables. As for
institutional variables, the Tunisian military was marginalized by the Ben Ali regime, there
was a rivalry between the armed forces and the internal security forces, the military had
autonomy to select personnel within the armed forces, and there was a system of
conscription. In addition, the uprising possessed numerous social variables that made it
more difficult for the military to rationalize using violence against protesters. For instance,
the Tunisian uprising was large, broad-based, non-violent, consisted of non-traditional
protesters, and actively tried to win over military support. All of these factors raised the cost
of violence and decreased the likelihood the Tunisian military would use violence against
protesters.
The MENA Military Index & Tunisia
As discussed in chapter 3, Tunisia possesses a MENA Military Index Score of 0.55,
which means there were eleven variables that influenced the military to defect during the
uprising. Table 11 illustrates the twenty variables in Tunisia and indicates which of the
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variables were present (labeled as “yes") and which of the variables were not present (labeled
as "no"). According to the MENA Military Index the eleven variables that potentially
influenced the Tunisian military to defect from the Ben Ali regime during the uprising
include: (1) the presence of parallel security forces that counterbalanced the military, (2) the
rivalry between the military and other security forces, (3) the system of military conscription,
(4) the military’s autonomy to make institutional appointments at the mid-and-lower levels
of the armed forces, (5) officers' dissatisfaction with regime benefits, (6) the large size of the
Tunisian uprising, (7) the participation of non-traditional protesters in the uprising, (8) the
non-violent nature of protests, (9) the Tunisian military’s clean history with no egregious
human rights violations against the population, (10) the broad-base scope of the protests,
and (11) the movement’s ability to successfully win over the military. Of these eleven
variables four are institutional and address characteristics within the military and Tunisia’s
security apparatus, one variable addresses the relationship between the military and the
regime, and six variables are societal and based upon the characteristics of the Tunisian
uprising.
Barany’s original argument claims institutional variables are the most relevant factor
to explain military behavior in revolutions, followed by regime variables, then societal
variables, and lastly international variables. However, the Tunisian case suggests societal
variables were equally, if not more, influential than institutional variables. The importance of
societal variables influencing Tunisian military behavior makes sense if one examines why
the Tunisian military did not use violence in the 2010 - 2011 uprising, whereas the armed
forces willingly used violence against previous protests in 1978, 1984, and 2008. The 2010 2011 protests were different from previous Tunisian demonstrations since it was larger,
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broad-based, consisted of a wide coalition of classes and social groups, occurred across the
entire country, and was non-violent. Overall, there was something unique in the events that
unfolded in late December 2010 and early January 2011 that forced the Tunisian military to
question whether it truly wanted to use violence against citizens, given the size, breadth, and
depth of the protest movement.
According to the MENA Military Index there are an additional nine variables that
were not present in Tunisia including: (1) no significant communal rifts within the military,
(2) no socio-economic rifts within the military, (3) no rivalries between the armed force
branches, (4) no significant generational rifts between senior and junior soldiers, (5) Ben Ali
appointed the defense minister, (6) the fact Ben Ali did not explicitly order the military to
fire on protesters, (7) the absence of any foreign military troops that invaded the country
with the aim of overthrowing the incumbent regime, (8) military defection did not occur in
neighboring states, and (9) minimal influence from foreign military training.
The following subsections explore the institutional, regime, societal, and
international variables in more detail and discuss the role each of these variables had on
Tunisian military response during the uprising. The first subsection explores the eight
institutional variables, the second subsection explores the three regime variables, the third
subsection explores the six societal variables, and the fourth subsection explores the three
international variables. As these subsections reveal, the presence of existing institutional
variables in Tunisia coupled with the societal characteristics of the Tunisian uprising
influenced the Tunisian military to defect from the Ben Ali regime.

Table 11. Tunisia and the MENA Military Index Variables
Variable
Institutional 1. Communal splits between soldiers?
2. Socio-economic rifts between soldiers?
3. Parallel security forces to military?
4. Rivalry between military and other security
forces?
5. Rivalries between military branches?

Yes/No
Variable
No
11. Did orders to intervene come
from someone other than the ruling
leader?
No
12. Uprising larger than 1% of
population?
Yes
13. Protesters include women and
children?
Yes
14. Uprising non-violent in nature?
No

6. Senior vs. Junior splits?
7. Conscription?

No
Yes

8. Military have autonomy in appointments?

Yes

Regime 9. Soldiers unsatisfied with regime benefits?

Yes

10. Someone other than the current leader
appointed the Defense Minister and other
leading generals?

No

Yes/No
No
Regime
Yes

Societal

Yes
Yes

15. Military have clean record with
no human rights violations?
16. Were protests broad-based?
17. Did movement win over
soldiers?
18. Did foreign troops intervene to
overthrow leader?
19. Militaries of contiguous
countries defect?

Yes

20. Significant portion of soldiers
receive foreign military training?

No

Yes
Yes
No

International

No
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Institutional Variables
Of the eight institutional variables in the MENA Military Index, four were present in
Tunisia and the other four were absent. The four institutional variables that were present and
potentially influenced Tunisian military defection included the Ben Ali regime
counterbalancing the Tunisian military with parallel security forces, the stark rivalry that
existed between the Tunisian military and the Tunisian internal security forces, the Tunisian
military’s ability to make appointments within the armed forces, and the system of military
conscription.
Of the four variables present in Tunisia, the two that arguably impacted military
defection the most were parallel security forces that counterbalanced the armed forces, and
the rivalry that existed between the Tunisian military and the Tunisian internal security
forces. Bou Nassif (2015) argues that one of the characteristics of the Ben Ali regime was the
expansion of the Tunisian internal security forces at the expense of the military. After taking
office, Ben Ali instituted two new provisions, Article 10 of Law 88–6 (June 2, 1988), which
placed the control of the Presidential Guard under presidential authority, and Law 88-88
(July 25, 1988), which placed the entire internal security apparatus also under presidential
control.28 In addition to centralizing the internal security forces under his control, Ben Ali
created an internal security apparatus, which some scholars note, was “byzantine in its
complexity” (Hanlon 2012, 5). The hierarchy and organization of the internal security forces
during Ben Ali's regime largely remains a mystery since many of the documents remain
classified. However, there were five types of internal security forces within the Ministry of
Interior including: (1) the traditional police, (2) the Garde National (National Guard), (3) the
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sûreté de l'État (State Security, also referred to as the political police, which was quickly
disbanded in the spring of 2011 shortly after Ben Ali fled), (4) the garde présidentielle (the
Presidential Guard),29 and (5) the police judiciaire (the Judicial Police). In addition to these five
main branches, there were also numerous specialized police forces such as the Direction
Générale des Unités d'Intervention (Intervention Units), which consisted of the Brigade Nationale
d'Intervention Rapide (National Rapid Intervention Brigade BNIR), BOP, and the Brigade AntiTerrorisme (Anti-Terrorism Brigade, BAT) (Pachon 2014, 514).
The Tunisian internal security forces also counterbalanced the Tunisian armed forces
by outnumbering military personnel. Lutterbeck (2015, 818-819) notes that even though the
exact number of Tunisian internal security forces during the Ben Ali regime is unknown,
peak estimates claim there were as many as 130,000-200,000 internal security forces in the
country. Schraeder and Redissi (2011, 6) note that if these estimates are correct, then
Tunisia’s internal security forces equaled the total number of internal security forces in
France, a country where the population is six times larger than Tunisia. More conservative
estimates claim the Tunisian internal security forces during the Ben Ali regime numbered
50,000, which are based on the totals provided by the interim-interior minister, Farhat Rajhi,
in February 2011.30 Even if the conservative estimates of 50,000 are used, those figures still
suggest that internal security forces outnumbered the 35,800 Tunisian military forces.31
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The counterbalancing role of the internal security forces created a rivalry between
the military and the internal security forces, which is best exemplified by the Bareket el-Sahel
affair that was explored earlier in this chapter. In that episode, hundreds of Tunisian military
officers were arrested under the suspicion they harbored Islamist sympathies and were
aiming to overthrow the president. This episode created a discernable rift between the
military and the regime and further emphasized Ben Ali's preference and closer allegiances to
the senior officials of the internal security apparatus.
A third institutional variable that appears to have influenced Tunisian military
defection during the uprising was the military's ability to make appointments in the mid and
lower levels of the armed forces. Even though Ben Ali marginalized the military and
counterbalanced it with internal security forces, he did not micromanage the personnel
appointments at the mid and lower levels. Other MENA autocrats have deliberately
appointed junior officers at the mid and lower levels of the armed forces to ensure military
loyalty (see Quinlivan 1999), but Ben Ali did not employ this tactic, and instead, the
personnel decisions within the Tunisian military were based on merit. Tunisian military
promotions are codified and institutionalized within Tunisian law and decree number 72-380
from December 6, 1972, outlines the process of how promotions are earned within the
military.32
Tunisian officers are promoted within the military through merit and performance,
rather than through communal links and patronage. Because of this, the Tunisian military
has qualified and professional officers across the military organization, but these officers are
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not unconditionally loyal to the regime since they were not handpicked by the regime to
occupy those positions.
A fourth institutional variable that possibly influenced Tunisian military defection
during the uprising was the system of military conscription that fills the lower-ranks of the
armed forces. Military conscription is derived from Article 15 of the 1959 constitution and
the Tunisian Ministry of National Defense's website indicates all citizens over the age of
twenty are liable for military service for one year.33 In reality there are numerous exemptions
to military service such as citizens enrolling in military vocational schools rather than serving
in basic training. Another exemption is a program referred to as “individual assignments,”
where employed citizens can forego military service by paying a fee to the government that is
based on a proportion of their salary.34
Despite the conscription system, the Tunisian government does not heavily enforce
the program and many citizens avoid military service entirely. Estimates claim less than 10
percent of twenty-year olds in Tunisia appeared for their service over the last few years, and
government experts suggest only 3,500 conscripts have been registered annually during the
last decade (Meddeb 2015). Moreover, most Tunisians with higher levels of education and
income are able to avoid military conscription resulting in conscripts disproportionately
representing the lower classes. Interestingly, Tunisian conscripts shared similar
characteristics to many of the early protesters from the 2010 - 2011 uprising as both groups
were less educated, from poorer and more rural regions, and had limited economic
opportunities. Even though there is no evidence officers ever ordered conscripts to fire on
Republic of Tunisia Ministry of National Defense, “National Service,” accessed on November 8, 2015.
http://www.defense.tn/index.php/en/component/k2/item/143-service-national.
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protesters, it is reasonable to assume it was less likely Tunisian conscripts would have used
violence against civilians, especially considering conscripts shared similar demographic
characteristics to many of the demonstrators.
Four institutional variables from the MENA Military Index were absent in Tunisia
including no socio-economic, communal, or generational splits among military personnel,
and no splits between the armed force branches. The first three variables are closely related
such as the lack of significant communal, socio-economic, or generational splits between
military personnel. Regarding the lack of communal splits, Tunisia is a homogenous country
and most of the 10.6 million inhabitants are of Arab descent and identify with Sunni Islam.35
As a result there are no significant ethnic or religious rifts that fracture citizens or military
personnel.
The only possible communal fault line in Tunisia is regional affiliation, where the
capital Tunis, its surrounding suburbs, and the coastal regions of the Sahel (which
incorporates cities such as Hammamet, Mahdia, and Sousse) have disproportionately
received more resources from the government in comparison to regions in the country's
interior and south.36 Jebnoun (2014, 4) mentions this regional disparity also exists within the
Tunisian military as most officers typically come from the cosmopolitan and wealthy regions
of the country, whereas the rank-and-file conscripts tend to represent the poorer and more
rural regions of the country such as Gafsa, Kairouan, and Sidi Bouzid. However, despite the
regional disparity within the military, Jebnoun (2014) notes this difference does not play a
significant role in creating animosity within the armed forces. In addition to the lack of
35
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communal splits, there is no evidence of socio-economic or generational splits within the
Tunisian military.
The fourth institutional variable from the index not present in Tunisia is there is no
significant rivalry within the military between the armed force branches. Similar to militaries
in most countries, in Tunisia, the largest and most politically significant armed force branch
is the army. This is evident in the number of Tunisian Army personnel in comparison to air
force and navy personnel. For example, in 2010, the Tunisian Army had 27,000 personnel
whereas the air force had 4,000 and the navy had 4,800.37 Even though the majority of
Tunisian military personnel are from the army there is no evidence air force or navy
personnel were envious of the army's larger size and more active political role. Even if there
were minor divisions within the military, they were overshadowed by the larger rivalry
between the armed forces and the internal security forces.
Of the eight institutional variables, the ones that appear to be most significant in
influencing the Tunisian military to defect from the Ben Ali regime are the counterbalancing
of the military with parallel security forces, the rivalry between the military and internal
security forces, and the military's autonomy to make personnel decisions within the armed
forces. Even though it does not appear Ben Ali specifically enlarged the internal security
forces to "coup-proof" the regime from military intervention, the growth of the internal
security apparatus marginalized and created a rivalry with the Tunisian military. It should be
noted numerous scholars argue that the marginalization of the Tunisian military was a major
influence as to why the Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali regime during the
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uprising (Brooks 2013; Jebnoun 2014; Bou Nassif 2015; Lutterbeck 2015), so the results
from the MENA Military Index reaffirm these earlier studies.
Regime Variables
According to the MENA Military Index there was one regime variable present in
Tunisia and two regime variables absent. The one regime variable that was present and
possibly influenced Tunisian military defection was the military’s dissatisfaction with the
benefits it received from the Ben Ali regime. As discussed above, Ben Ali favored the
internal security forces and provided the Ministry of Interior with larger budgets, more
personnel, and closer access to the regime's nucleus of ruling power. As an institution, the
Tunisian military was marginalized by the regime and was unsatisfied with the funds it
received (see figure 1). From an individual level, officers did not receive many personal
benefits (either monetary or political) from the Ben Ali regime. Bou Nassif (2015)
demonstrates that the majority of cushy political appointments and ambassadorial positions
in the Tunisian government during the Ben Ali regime were typically given to high-ranking
officials from the country’s dominant political party, the RCD, rather than awarded to senior
military officials. Bou Nassif (2015, 78) notes only three percent of ambassadorial
appointments during Ben Ali’s tenure consisted of former military officers whereas
approximately ninety-five percent of appointments were provided to civilians, specifically to
Ben Ali's political cronies from the ruling RCD party.38
This trend is also evident when examining the salaries of officers. For example, a
mid-ranking officer, such as a colonel-major, received a monthly salary of $900 U.S. dollars
(approximately 1,500 Tunisian Dinars), and a first lieutenant in the Tunisian military received
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a monthly salary of $450 U.S. dollars (approximately 750 Tunisian Dinars).39 In comparison,
the average income for a Tunisian worker is approximately $390 U.S. dollars (650 dinars)40
suggesting that mid-level officers made a little bit more than the average Tunisian worker.
Figure 1. Percentage of the Tunisian National Budget (1981 – 2011)41
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The Ben Ali regime also did not provide the Tunisian military with lavish monetary
compensation, or access to preferential political appointments. Rather, the primary
beneficiaries of the regime’s patronage were high-ranking officials in the country’s ruling
party, and more closely, the president’s family, especially his wife’s family, the Trabelsis.
Schraeder and Redissi (2011, 9) note the first lady’s family was able to accumulate a
tremendous amount of wealth during Ben Ali’s rule, which resulted in both immediate and
distant Trabelsi family members owning at least 180 major companies across the country and
accumulating an estimated net worth of nearly 16 billion U.S. dollars (Byrne 2012). The
39
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Tunisian military as an institution, and individual military personnel within the armed forces,
were not the primary beneficiaries of Ben Ali’s corrupt regime. Instead, they were on the
outside looking in and were generally unsatisfied with the lack of resources they received and
once protests culminated, it was easy for officers to step aside and allow civilian unrest to
topple the government. An example of these sentiments are demonstrated by a retired
Tunisian naval chief of staff who expressed during the Tunisian uprising “the [Tunisian
military] officers were not going to risk their lives, and the lives of others, for the sake of a
regime that had offered [the military] nothing” (Bou Nassif 2015, 79 – 80).
The first regime variable that did not appear to influence Tunisian military defection
is that Ben Ali appointed all of his defense ministers and senior generals in the Tunisian
armed forces. The theory behind this variable argues that if the ruling leader appoints the
country's defense minister and senior military executives, then those individuals are more
likely to remain loyal to the leader during anti-regime protests. In Tunisia the defense
minister is a civilian appointed by the president42 and during the uprising Defense Minister
Grira was a close confidant to President Ben Ali. Three senior military chiefs advise the
Tunisian defense minister and at the outbreak of the uprising this included Air Force Chief
of Staff General Lajimi, Army Chief of Staff General Ammar, and Naval Chief of Staff
Senior Captain Mohamed Khamassi.43
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This is based from Article 55 of the country's 1959 constitution.

During the Bourguiba regime, there was an additional military official in the Ministry of National Defense
called the chief of staff of the armed forces. The chief of staff advised the defense minister and coordinated
policy between the three branches (Hanlon 2012, 4). President Ben Ali dissolved this position in 1987, yet after
the Tunisian uprising, the transitional government reinstated the position and appointed the former Army
Chief of Staff General Ammar, to this position (Jebnoun 2014, 302). 2010.
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In addition to appointing the defense minister, President Ben Ali also appointed all
three of the military chiefs.44 According to the MENA Military Index, since Ben Ali
appointed all four of these positions it was assumed all would have remained loyal to Ben Ali
during the uprising. However, during the Tunisian uprising this is only partially true. Defense
Minister Grira remained loyal to the Ben Ali regime but Army Chief of Staff Ammar was
only loyal at the beginning of the uprising and less loyal to the regime as events unfolded on
January 14, 2011. Air Force Chief Lajimi also displayed mixed responses during the uprising
considering he arrested Ben Ali's chief of security, Seriati, on January 14, 2011, but did so on
orders from the defense minister. This can be perceived as an act of obedience, since he
followed the chain of command from a superior official, but also as insubordination since he
arrested the chief of Ben Ali’s personal security unit. Overall, this variable provides mixed
results but demonstrates that even though President Ben Ali appointed the three military
chiefs and the defense minister this did not ensure the military would remain loyal to the
regime.
The second regime variable that did not appear to influence Tunisian military
defection is the issue of whether and how the Ben Ali regime gave orders to the armed
forces during the uprising. The theory behind this variable argues that if a ruling leader gives
the military a clear and direct order to violently engage protesters, then the ruling leader’s
intentions are clearly signaled to the military and the military is more likely to follow those
orders. However, if a ruling leader gives an ambiguous order, or if someone other than the
44
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ruling leader orders the military to violently engage protesters, then the military is less certain
of the ruling leader’s intentions and this uncertainty leads officers and soldiers to question
the orders and elect not to fire on protesters. Immediately after the Tunisian uprising there
was uncertainty as to whether executive orders were ever given to the military to fire on
protesters, and if so, what those orders entailed and who gave those orders to whom. After
the uprising, Army Chief of Staff Ammar testified he never received direct orders from
President Ben Ali during the uprising to fire on protesters (Jebnoun 2014, 306 and Bou
Nassif 2015, 65). However, even though Ben Ali may not have explicitly given orders to
General Ammar to fire on protesters, there is evidence that numerous senior officials gave
the military implicit orders to violently intervene during the uprising. For example, on
January 11, 2011, Defense Minister Grira ordered the military to deploy soldiers on the
ground and instructed them to not wear their distinguishable military regalia. General
Ammar realized that without the military's regalia, soldiers would look nearly identical to
internal security forces already deployed on the ground. Ultimately, Ammar agreed to deploy
the military but they wore their traditional military regalia out of fear that not doing so would
implicate the military in the violent actions that the internal security forces were committing
against civilians (TNFFC 2012, 304 and Jebnoun 2014, 306).
In this subsection the only variable that appears to have influenced defection was the
military's dissatisfaction with the lack of benefits it received from the Ben Ali regime. In
many regards this issue is similar to the institutional variables explored in the previous
subsection. Since the internal security forces were arguably Ben Ali's preferred security
institution, the military did not receive either corporate benefits or private benefits from the
regime. The Tunisian case also relates to the argument of "carrots" and "sticks" presented by
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Lee (2005). President Ben Ali did not utilize carrots to the Tunisian military, which Lee
argues does not ensure regime loyalty. Moreover, Ben Ali used sticks more than carrots to
the military personnel, but these actions were still unable to ensure regime loyalty, which
counters Lee's central finding. In addition to this variable, the Tunisian case provides mixed
results regarding variable 10 (defense minister appointments) because even though Ben Ali
appointed all of the senior military officials, this did not ensure all of the leading generals and
chiefs of staffs would remain loyal to the ruling leader.
Societal Variables
All six of the societal variables from the MENA Military Index were present in
Tunisia, suggesting the Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali regime partially due to
unique characteristics of the country’s uprising. The first societal variable suggests the
Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali regime since the protests were numerous and
included hundreds of thousands of demonstrators. The Arab Awakening dataset from
Jenkins and Herrick (2012) indicates approximately 1.43 percent of Tunisians protested
during the uprising, whereas the surveys from Beissinger et al. (2014, 11) note that 16
percent of respondents protested during the uprising. It is likely the actual number of
Tunisian protesters during the uprising is somewhere in-between these two figures, but even
if a median point, such as eight percent, is used, that still represents an extraordinarily high
number of Tunisian protesters. For instance, eight percent of the Tunisian population would
mean approximately one million citizens demonstrated during the uprising.
The second societal variable that possibly influenced the Tunisian military to defect
was the broad-based nature of the protests. A unique characteristic of the Tunisian uprising
is it took place across the entire country and attracted a wide range of Tunisians from
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different social and economic backgrounds. The Tunisian uprising began in the interior and
marginalized region of Sidi Bouzid before spreading to other rural and poorer regions such
as Gafsa and Kasserine. Eventually, the protests migrated to the commercial hub of Sfax,
and north to the coastal cities of Sousse and Hammamet before reaching the capital of
Tunis. The TNFFC reports that protests occurred in all of Tunisia's twenty-four regions,
which suggests the uprising was not isolated to a specific regional area but was truly
representative of the entire country. In addition to geographic breadth, the Tunisian uprising
consisted of numerous social groups. Initially, protesters were either similar to Bouazizi,
young men from the lower classes who were struggling economically, or unemployed youths
and students. However, as the protests spread, demonstrators diversified and the movement
incorporated the middle-class, business professionals, labor unions, and lawyers. Similar to
the regional breadth of the uprising, the wide range of societal groups that participated in the
Tunisian uprising meant the protests were not isolated to a specific group or social class. It
was an uprising for all Tunisians and thus did not represent a single group.
The third societal variable that played a role in influencing the Tunisian military to
defect was the non-violent nature of the protests. The goal of the movement was to force
political change and to draw attention to two grievances: the increasing corruption of the
Ben Ali regime, and the crippling economic conditions that Tunisians were facing in their
everyday lives. The uprising was not an armed rebellion where the opposition attempted to
overthrow the government through violence and physical domination. Rather, the uprising
attempted to achieve its goals through mass protests and non-violence. This does not mean
all Tunisian protesters were non-violent, as there were instances of protesters attacking
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security forces, ransacking government buildings, or burning police stations.45 But these
violent acts were rare and generally occurred in response to the violence state security forces
initially displayed against protesters.
The fourth societal variable that potentially influenced the Tunisian military to defect
was the non-traditional protesters, such as women, the elderly, and children participated in
the uprising. Survey data from after the uprising report 79 percent of the Tunisian protesters
were male and 21 percent were female (see Beissinger et. al 2014). Even though the gender
percentage is not evenly split, it is noteworthy that a fifth of all protesters in the Tunisian
uprising were women and demonstrates female protesters were active participants during the
unrest. The TNFFC (2012, 508) highlights the significance of women and devotes an entire
section of the report on the role of women during the uprising. In total, twelve women were
killed and twenty-five were injured as a result of violence from state security forces. In
addition to women, the Tunisian uprising also consisted of middle-aged and older
demonstrators. Beissinger et. al. (2014) find that nearly 40 percent of all protesters during the
Tunisian uprising were aged thirty-five or older, and that a quarter of all protesters were aged
forty-five or older. The survey data did not include minors (under the age of eighteen), but
other sources suggest children were also involved in the uprising. The TNFFC (2012, 83)
reports teenagers were instigated several protests, such as the case in Kasserine on January 8,
2011. This is further demonstrated by the figures that fifteen children died as a result of state
security violence during the uprising (TNFFC 2012, 514).
The fifth societal variable that possibly influenced the Tunisian military to defect was
anti-regime protesters strategically tried to win over the armed forces. This occurred because
45
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the Tunisian military was generally well liked, especially in comparison to the disdain that
most Tunisians had towards the country’s internal security forces. One of the reasons
Bouazizi set himself on fire was due to the rampant corruption of the country's internal
security forces, and most Tunisians understood the differences between Ben Ali's mukhabarat
(security state) and the country's military. There are numerous accounts during the uprising
where soldiers and civilians warmly embraced and celebrated with one another.46 Another
interesting component addressing the relationship between civilians and the Tunisian
military occurred when Tunisian news outlets reported on January 7, 2011, that President
Ben Ali removed General Ammar from his post because the general refused to follow
presidential orders to fire on protesters. As it turned out these claims were untrue and
months after the uprising it was discovered the source of this false story was the Tunisian
blogger, Yassine ‘Ayari, who was the son of a deceased military officer and a vocal critic of
the regime. ‘Ayari admitted to fabricating the story and leaking it to the press for several
reasons: (1) he wanted to create a wedge between the military and the regime, (2) he wanted
to paint the military in a positive light to increase public support of the military, and (3) he
that hoped once the story was leaked it would make it extremely difficult for the military to
fire on protesters if they ever received such an order.47
The sixth societal variable that possibly explains why the Tunisian military defected
from the Ben Ali regime is there is no evidence of the Tunisian military committing
egregious human rights violations against Tunisian citizens in the historical context of the
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country. To examine this empirically, the CIRI Human Rights dataset was consulted, which
examines the level of human rights violations in a country.48 The index ranges from 0 – 8,
with 0 indicating the country has performed poorly and commits high levels of human rights
violations against the population, whereas an 8 indicates the government does not commit
human rights violations against the population.
Figure 2. Tunisia & CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (1981 – 2011)
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Figure 2 charts the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index from 1981 to 2011.49 As
demonstrated by figure 2, Tunisia has generally scored between 3 and 6 on the physical
integrity rights index since 1981. Tunisia scored a 3 in 1986, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2005, 2006,
and 2008. To examine whether or not the Tunisian military was responsible for human rights
violations during these years, the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights
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Practices50 and Amnesty International's Annual Reports51 were examined. The reports only
mention the Tunisian military twice and both occasions involved the Tunisian military
convicting a civilian in military court.52 Notably, the reports indicate that the Tunisian
internal security forces were responsible for the majority of human rights violations within
the country, not the military.
Tellingly, all six of the societal variables were present in Tunisia. This suggests that
the societal characteristics played a key role in convincing the Tunisian military to not use
violence against protesters. Out of the six variables the three that appear most influential
include the large size of the protests, the broad-based nature of the protests, and the non-
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violent tactics of demonstrators. Since the Tunisian uprising consisted nearly a million
Tunisians from across the entire country and contained individuals from various
backgrounds, it was difficult for the regime to discount the legitimacy of the uprising. At
first, President Ben Ali called protesters "terrorists" and "outlaws," but as the protests
expanded and incorporated doctors, lawyers, women, teachers, students, women, Islamists,
secularists, etc. it was increasingly difficult to deny the legitimacy of the uprising. The
Tunisian case verifies recent arguments that non-violent demonstrations, high number of
protesters, and cross-class coalitions can decrease the likelihood of violent military response
(see Zunes 1994, Chenoweth and Stepan 2011, and Nepstad 2013). The characteristics of the
Tunisian uprising increased the costs of repression and dissuaded violent military response.
The Tunisian military was never accustomed to using high levels of violence against the
population on a day-to-day basis in comparison to the internal security forces. Ben Ali
created a de facto police state where the Tunisian internal security forces monitored,
harassed, and violently confronted civilian opposition but the military was mostly pushed to
the sidelines of everyday regime maintenance and removed from the internal machinations
of day-to-day politics. This difference partially explains why the Tunisian internal security
forces were prepared to use violence against the population but the Tunisian military was
unwilling to use violence against protesters, especially considering the unique characteristics
of the uprising that increased the cost of repression.
International Variables
All three of the international variables were absent in Tunisia. The first international
variable was that Tunisia did not experience direct foreign military intervention during the
uprising. The theory behind this variable argues that a foreign military intervening a country
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experiencing mass political protests with the specific aim of overthrowing the incumbent
regime would increase the likelihood of military defection. This variable did not play a role in
Tunisia since there was no direct foreign military intervention or even a threat of foreign
military intervention during the uprising. Even though foreign troops did not directly
intervene in Tunisia does not mean foreign powers, especially the U.S. and France, did not
play a role before and during the uprising.
The U.S. provided military and security assistance to the Tunisian military especially
through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) program, a State
Department-led initiative that assists North African and Sahelian countries with territory
control and strengthening counterterrorism measures (Arieff 2011, 11-12). In addition, the
U.S. provided support and training to the Tunisian military through the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program. However, even though the U.S. had close
military relations to Tunisia, many officials in the U.S. government became more critical of
the Ben Ali regime and recognized the president's ostentatious wealth, greed, and corruption
were a detriment to Tunisian politics.53 These perspectives became public after Wikileaks
disclosed hundreds of internal U.S. State Department cables.
In contrast to the U.S.'s growing uncertainty of the Ben Ali regime, there is
indication that France supported the Ben Ali regime up until his ouster on January 14,
2011(Aleya-Sgahier 2012, 41, and Schraeder 2012, 668). For example, the French foreign
minister, Michele Alliot-Marie, vacationed in Tunisia in late December 2010 while protests
were in full force in the southern regions of the country, and several days before Ben Ali
53
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fled, Alliot-Marie suggested France should send security experts to assist the Tunisian police
in quelling the protests.54 Even though French security personnel never arrived, it was
reported the French government delivered 10,000 teargas grenades to the Ben Ali regime,
which arrived coincidentally on January 15, the day after Ben Ali fled the country (Jebnoun
2014, 314 10n).
The second variable absent in Tunisia included the limited foreign military training of
the Tunisian armed forces. Even though the U.S. was closely affiliated with the Tunisian
military in programs such as IMET, unclassified U.S. Department of Defense records from
the 2010-2011 fiscal year show only 121 Tunisian military personnel received military
training and education from the U.S. military,55which is a small number and does not
represent a sizable proportion of the entire Tunisian armed forces. However, the total
number of Tunisian military officers and soldiers trained by the U.S. does not give the whole
story and the U.S. provided sizeable foreign and military aid to Tunisia in the years leading
up to the uprising ranging from 19 million to 37 million per year from 2008 - 2010 (Arieff
2011, 12). Also, during the uprising President Obama recognized and supported the
legitimacy of the Tunisian protesters as he released an official statement on January 14, 2011,
that applauded the "courage and dignity of the Tunisian people" and called on the Tunisian
government to "hold free and fair elections in the near future that reflect the true will and
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aspirations of the Tunisian people."56 Due to this it appears the U.S. government supported
the Tunisian uprising and were fine with regime change from taking place in the country.
However, there is no hard evidence the U.S.'s indirect support of the Tunisian protesters
directly influenced the Tunisian military to defect, even though American support made it
more likely the Tunisian armed forces would refrain from using violence against civilians.
Overall, these two international variables (direct foreign military intervention and foreign
military training) from the MENA Military Index were absent in the country and there is no
direct evidence these two factors influenced Tunisian military defection.
Lastly, the third international variable that did not appear to influence Tunisian
military defection was “contagion” did not have an effect on Tunisian military behavior
during the country's uprising. The reason for this is Tunisia was the first country during the
Arab uprisings to experience unrest and it was impossible for the Tunisian military to be
influenced by the actions of other MENA militaries since the protests originated in Tunisia.
According to the MENA Military Index, Tunisia did not possess any of the three
international variables. As this chapter reinforces, a foreign military did not invade Tunisia
during the uprising, a significant number of Tunisian soldiers did not receive foreign military
training, and there was no influence from contagion from neighboring countries. That being
said, the role of international governments might be underestimated in the index in regards
to Tunisia since it does not account for factors such as diplomatic relations, foreign aid, etc.
It is noteworthy that the U.S. government was supportive of the Tunisian protests and
accepted regime change and the ousting of President Ben Ali. The Tunisian case
demonstrates that the international variables of the MENA Military index might not be
56
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capturing the full effect of international influence on military response, but despite this it still
does not appear that international variables played as large as a role on shaping Tunisian
military response in comparison to institutional and societal variables.
Conclusion
This chapter examined the Tunisian uprising of 2010-2011 and explored the
historical development of the Tunisian military, the specific role of the Tunisian military, and
the variables that influenced the Tunisian military to defect from the regime and to not fire
on protesters. The Tunisian military is a professional institution deliberately kept small by
President Bourguiba and was further marginalized during the presidency of Ben Ali.
However, the Tunisian military was willing to intervene and protect the ruling regime in
protests in 1978, 1984, and 2008. However, apart from these three instances, the Tunisian
military did not use violence against protesters during the 2010-2011 uprising.
The main finding of this chapter is the Tunisian military defected from the regime
during the recent uprising as a result of institutional and societal variables. As for the societal
variables, the 2010-2011 Tunisian uprising was unlike previous protests in Tunisian history
considering the uprising was large, non-violent, broad-based, included non-traditional
protesters, and successfully won over the military. These unique societal variables combined
with institutional variables helped pave the way for military defection. Institutionally, the
presence of parallel security forces that counterbalanced the military, the rivalry between the
military and the internal security forces, and the ability for the military to make personnel
decisions within the armed forces also contributed to the Tunisian military refraining from
using violence against civilians and ultimately deciding to defect from the Ben Ali regime.

CHAPTER5:
THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS
This chapter examines the variables that influenced the Egyptian military to defect
from the Mubarak regime during the Egyptian uprising, which took place from January 25,
2011, to February 11, 2011. The unrest in Egypt was arguably the apex of the Arab uprisings
as international media broadcasted the mass demonstrations from Cairo’s Tahrir Square and
captivated audiences from across the world. The Egyptian uprising started just eleven days
after President Ben Ali fled Tunisia as Egyptians were inspired by the events that took place
in Tunis. However, there are three main differences between the uprisings in Egypt and
Tunisia. First, whereas the Tunisian demonstrations started in the country’s marginalized
interior and eventually reached the country’s capital weeks later, in Egypt, the protests
started and remained in the capital of Cairo during the duration of the uprising. Since the
Egyptian protests took place in Cairo it meant the Egyptian government had to address the
demonstrations immediately and the Egyptian government ordered the military to reinforce
internal security forces only after three days of protests, whereas in Tunisia, Ben Ali ordered
the military onto the streets after three weeks of demonstrations. Second, there is
documentation that the Egyptian military used violence and fired on protesters at the onset
of the demonstration. This contrasts with Tunisia where there is no evidence that the
Tunisian military ever fired their weapons on Tunisian protesters. The third difference is that
in Egypt, once Mubarak resigned from office, the Egyptian military controlled the post-
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revolutionary government, whereas in Tunisia the military immediately transferred
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political power to a civilian-led transition government. After Mubarak resigned on February
11, 2011, Egyptian officers oversaw the governance of the country for a year and a half
before government control was formally handed over to civilians once Mohamed Morsi, the
Muslim Brotherhood politician, won the presidency. Interestingly, Morsi’s reign as Egyptian
president only lasted one year as the Egyptian military intervened against Morsi in July 2013
and removed him from power. Shortly afterwards a former military officer, General Abdel
Fatteh al-Sisi, was elected as Egyptian president, and has held that position since June 2014.
The first section of this chapter provides a historical overview of the Egyptian
military and discusses the role and development of the Egyptian military in Egyptian politics
from 1952 until the onset of the demonstrations in 2011. The second section explores the
major events that occurred during the Egyptian uprising and highlights the substantive role
the Egyptian military played during the demonstrations. The third section applies the twenty
variables of the MENA Military Index to the Egyptian case and identifies the variables that
influenced Egyptian military behavior during the protests. Despite the differences between
the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings, this chapter demonstrates that the variables influencing
military behavior in both countries were similar. For example, the Egyptian military defected
from the President Mubarak regime due to existing institutional variables that paved the way
for military defection. Similar to Tunisia, in Egypt there were parallel security forces that
tried to counterbalance the military, there were rivalries between the military and other state
security forces, there was a system of military conscription, and the Egyptian military had the
institutional autonomy to make personnel decisions within the armed forces. Egypt also
possessed additional institutional variables such as socio-economic and generational
divisions within the armed forces. These institutional variables in Egypt were coupled by the

unique characteristics of the Egyptian protests that provided the military with the
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opportunity to defect. Similar to the Tunisian uprising, the Egyptian uprising was large,
broad-based, non-violent, consisted of non-traditional protesters, and demonstrators actively
won over the military. These factors raised the costs of sustained military violence against
civilians and increased the likelihood the military would side with protesters.
Background of the Egyptian Military
To better understand the role of the Egyptian military during the Egyptian uprising,
it is useful to briefly examine the evolution and formation of the Egyptian armed forces
during the second half of the twentieth century. The modern configuration of the Egyptian
state began in 1952 when a group of nationalist, junior officers called the Free Officers
initiated a coup against the country's ruling leader, King Farouq. The Free Officers
intervened due to a combination of economic, political, and societal factors. Economically,
the Free Officers felt King Farouq was too compliant with Western economic interests and
permitted Western businesses unhindered access to Egypt's markets at the expense of
cultivating and growing Egypt's domestic economy. Politically, the Free Officers thought the
monarchical regime was systemically corrupt, ineffective, and failed to address the concerns
of middle-class Egyptians. Socially, the Egyptian military was still recovering from its defeat
against Israel in the 1948 war and Egyptian popular opinion remained unfavorable towards
the Egyptian military.1
After the 1952 coup the Free Officers controlled Egyptian politics under the
auspices of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), consolidated political control,
dissolved political parties, and eliminated political rivals (i.e. The Muslim Brotherhood)
1
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(Beattie 1994, 101; Abdel-Malek 1968, 91-92). In 1956, four years after the coup, one of
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the leaders from the Free Officers Movement, Gamal Abdel Nasser, officially became
president and by this time the Egyptian military had arguably become the most powerful
institution in the country.
By the 1960s, Egypt was geopolitically one of the most important countries in the
MENA region, which was reinforced by Nasser's active foreign policy agenda that attempted
to spread and unify the ideology of Arab socialism. As a result, the Egyptian military became
actively engaged in numerous foreign conflicts across the Middle East such as the 1962
Yemeni Civil War. The crisis in Yemen started after the death of the Yemeni king, Imam
Ahmad bin Yahya, which triggered a group of Yemeni military officers to launch a rebellious
coup against the monarchy with the aims of overthrowing the king’s successor and
establishing a republican state modeled after Egypt. To support the Yemeni republican
forces, the Egyptian military sent 70,000 troops to Yemen but the war was a calamitous
affair and resulted in a drawn-out five-year quagmire in which neither side (the Yemeni
Royalists, or the Yemeni Republicans and Egyptian military) could make significant advances
(Hashim 2011a, 70-71). The prolonged war had several negative effects on Egypt including
the death of thousands of Egyptian soldiers, straining the Egyptian treasury, and
overextending the Egyptian armed forces.2 This final aspect especially haunted Egypt as the
70,000 Egyptian troops stationed in Yemen meant there were fewer troops available to
defend the country and left Egypt susceptible to a possible attack.
In June 1967 such a scenario occurred as Israel launched sudden and devastating
attacks on its Arab neighbors, including the Egyptian territories of the Gaza Strip and the
Sinai Peninsula. Egyptian forces were caught off-guard and were quickly overrun by Israeli
2
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forces as the Egyptian military was in disarray since thousands of Egyptian troops
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remained in Yemen. Israeli forces quickly destroyed the majority of the Egyptian Air Force
in the Sinai and within a week the Israelis occupied the entire peninsula.3 This was a
cataclysmic result for President Nasser and demonstrated that significant changes had to be
made within the country and the armed forces. After the 1967 defeat, Nasser implemented
five notable changes to the Egyptian military: forcing the defense minister to resign, purging
the military ranks of deadweight officers especially those loyal to the defense minister,
professionalizing the military and placing more significance on military training, streamlining
and centralizing military command under the auspices of the Minister of War, and removing
superfluous military structures that complicated the armed forces' chain of command
(Gawrych 1987).
Nasser ruled Egypt for three more years until his death in 1970, and his vice
president and former Free Officer compatriot, Anwar Sadat, took over as president. At first
there was uncertainty over how long Sadat would remain president since there were a
number of military and political elites that wanted to pry executive control from Sadat's
hands. But Sadat surprisingly demonstrated a Machiavellian touch for politics and initiated
numerous policies in 1971 known as the "Corrective Revolution," that removed key rivals
from office and implemented his own system of rule and governance to solidify his
presidency.4 In regards to the military, Sadat feared a possible coup, so as a countermeasure,
he implemented numerous changes to the Egyptian armed forces. Sadat heightened the
intra-military rivalries within the Egyptian armed forces, created numerous alliances with
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junior officers to undermine senior officers that disagreed with him, imposed a system of
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frequent rotation for soldiers and officers, and implemented divide-and-rule tactics to
encourage unrest and competition between officers (Bou Nassif 2013, 513 and Gawrych
1987, 282). Impressively, even though Sadat enacted measures that heightened competition
at the individual level, the system made the Egyptian military a more efficient security force
since officers became more disciplined for fear that a single misstep could have them
demoted, reassigned, or fired.
The watershed moment for the Egyptian military during Sadat's regime occurred in
the 1973 "Yom Kippur War" when Egyptian forces reclaimed territory in the Sinai Peninsula
from Israel. After decades of military failures, the success of Egyptian forces during the 1973
war was long overdue from the Egyptian perspective and the "victory" provided President
Sadat with tremendous leverage both domestically and internationally. After the 1973 war,
Sadat transformed Egypt's foreign policy by dissolving Egypt's relationship with the USSR.
As Cairo averted its eyes from Moscow, Sadat found a new strategic international partner in
Washington D.C., and by the mid-1970s, Egypt was increasing its political and military
relationship with the United States and Western-centric international institutions. For
instance, in 1977 Egypt implemented economic programs recommended by the IMF and the
World Bank, which required Egypt to cut subsidies on essential commodities, impose
austerity programs of state spending, and increase the prices on many basic food items.5
After these policies went into effect thousands of Egyptians erupted in protests in
response to these economic changes. In fact, the demonstrations were so large that
protesters overwhelmed the Egyptian police forces and as a result President Sadat ordered
the military to support internal security forces and to use violence against the civilian
5
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protesters. The Egyptian military helped the regime survive the 1977 protests and this
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event demonstrated that Egyptian officers and soldiers were willing to intervene against
civilian protesters in order to defend the ruling government.
In addition to the Western-led economic changes in Egypt, the other significant
foreign policy development in Egyptian politics in the late 1970s was the Camp David
Accord agreement that diffused military relations between Israel and Egypt and provided the
Egyptian military with a substantial increase in U.S. financial and military assistance. Even
though the Camp David Accords were celebrated in the West and within the upper echelons
of the Egyptian government, many Egyptians were appalled that their government partnered
with both Israel and the United States. As a result, Islamist factions emerged in Egyptian
society and infiltrated the military ranks, which led to a band of militant junior officers
assassinating President Sadat at a military parade in 1981.6
After Sadat’s assassination, Vice President Mubarak took over as Egypt’s next
president. Mubarak, similar to his two predecessors, was a former military officer who
ascended through the ranks of the Egyptian Air Force before being appointed as Sadat's vice
president in the mid-1970s. The fact that some junior officers from the Egyptian military
assassinated President Sadat did not escape Mubarak and as a result he enlarged the
country’s internal security forces to counter the strength of the Egyptian military and to also
monitor political dissent and root-out extreme Islamist threats that existed across Egyptian
society. The main body responsible for eliminating extreme Islamist factions was the Central
Security Forces (CSF), an organization that existed since the late 1960s under Nasser but
significantly increased in size and strength under Mubarak. Similar to the Egyptian military,
the CSF used conscripts to fill the rank-and-file of the organization. Typically, conscripts
6
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that were deemed unfit for the Egyptian military were sent to the CSF and these soldiers
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faced difficult conditions such as multi-year service time, mediocre pay, a rigid and physically
demanding daily routine, and the psychological toll of violently engaging civilians.7
Ultimately, the conditions in the CSF worsened to such a state that a mass revolt of CSF
conscripts gripped the country in 1986 that included mass demonstrations, rioting, and acts
of arson.8 In response, President Mubarak ordered the Egyptian military onto the streets to
subdue CSF troops and as a result 107 were killed and another 715 were wounded in the
clashes (Ryan 2001, 33). The Egyptian military intervention quelled the riots and
demonstrated that even though the president changed, the Egyptian military was still willing
to defend the regime.
President Mubarak also ensured Egyptian officers remained loyal to his regime by
providing economic benefits to individual officers and also fostering the Egyptian military’s
economic empire. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Egyptian military established the
Ministry of Military Production, a bureaucratic branch of the Egyptian military that oversaw
the military’s factories and commercial production. In addition, Law 32 in 1979 provided the
Egyptian military with financial and institutional independence from governmental budgetary
oversight.9 As a result of these policies, the Egyptian armed forces became one of the most
dominant economic powers in the country and received hundreds of millions of dollars
yearly from these sectors.10

7

For more on the conditions of the CSF see Gotowicki (1997).

8

Ibid.

9

For more information see Harb (2003, 285-286) and Frisch (2001).

10

For more on the Egyptian military’s economic production see Gotowicki (1997) and Frisch (2001).

After the Egyptian military supported President Mubarak during the 1986 CSF
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riots, he turned a blind-eye to the economic development of the Egyptian military and left
the economic empire of the Egyptian armed forces unmonitored. However, this changed in
the late 1990s and early 2000s with the rise of Egypt’s liberal capitalist elite, whose economic
policies potentially threatened the economic stronghold of the Egyptian armed forces.
Interestingly, President Mubarak’s son, Gamal, was a key figure in Egypt’s liberal capitalist
elite and Gamal’s ascent in Egyptian politics created a power struggle between the military,
the president, and the president’s son and his liberal capitalist elite colleagues.
While this power struggle gripped the upper echelons of Egyptian politics at the
beginning of the twenty-first century, there was an increase of protests and social
movements taking place across the country. In particular there were three significant social
protests in Egypt leading up to the 2011 uprising including the Kefaya Movement of 20042005,11 the 2008 April 6 Protests,12 and the protests in the aftermath of the death of Khaled
Said (an Egyptian man who was beaten to death by Egyptian internal security forces in the
summer of 2010).13
These separate movements demonstrated the rising tensions in Egyptian society and
this discontent was unleashed in early January 2011 as images of the Tunisian protests were
broadcasted into Egypt. The sight of President Ben Ali fleeing Tunisia was inspirational to
thousands of Egyptians who were disenfranchised with the Mubarak regime. President Ben
Ali fled Tunis on January 14, 2011, and Egyptian protest groups immediately mobilized. It
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only took these groups nine days to coordinate protests and they eyed a symbolic date to
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unleash their uprising -- January 25, 2011, which coincidentally was Egypt's National Police
Day -- a day to remember and celebrate the civic role, duty, and heroism of the country's
police forces.
There are six key observations relevant to understanding the context, role, and
position of Egyptian military at the dawn of the 2011 Egyptian uprising. First, the Egyptian
military has been an important political institution in the country ever since the Egyptian
military initiated the 1952 coup that founded the modern state. Second, since the Egyptian
military was the engine of the 1952 coup it meant the Egyptian military had the leverage to
create political structures advantageous to the military as an institution and also construct
systems that were economically and politically beneficial for officers. Third, all three
Egyptian presidents from 1952 to 2011 were former military officers, which demonstrates
the political significance of the Egyptian armed forces and its central political role. Fourth,
Egypt played a key geopolitical role across the MENA region during the second half of the
twentieth century. Egypt was involved in numerous foreign wars and conflicts, and the
Egyptian government often utilized the Egyptian military as the country's primary foreign
policy instrument. Because of this the Egyptian military needed to be large, needed to have
modern weaponry, and needed to have an external focus. Fifth, President Mubarak, much
like his Tunisian contemporary, President Ben Ali, modified the Egyptian security apparatus
in the 1980s and 1990s by massively expanding the Egyptian internal security apparatus,
which in essence created a de facto police state in Egypt. Sixth and perhaps most
interestingly for this study, is that the Egyptian military demonstrated on several occasions
that it was willing to defend the incumbent regime and use violence against civilians. This is
evident as the Egyptian military followed regime orders and physically intervened during the

1977 Bread Riots and the 1986 CSF Riots. Even though the Egyptian military defended
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the regime and used violence against civilians and internal security forces in 1977 and 1986,
the Egyptian military decided to defect from the regime during the 2011 uprising. The
following section details the Egyptian uprising from late January 2011 to mid-February 2011
and highlights the specific role the Egyptian military played during the eighteen-day uprising
that transformed Egyptian politics.
The Uprising in Egypt and the Role of the Military
On the evening of January 24, 2011, thousands of Egyptians were preparing for
nationwide protests across the country for the following day. Social media played a pivotal
role as protest groups assisted with organizing details such as establishing the times and
locations of when and where demonstrators would occur. Existing civic groups such as the
organizers of the “April 6 2008 Protests,” the Kefaya movement, and the "ultras" of
Egyptian football clubs (i.e. al-Ahlawy SC and al-Zamalek SC) were critical in orchestrating
the logistics of the January 25 protest (Hashim 2011b, 114). According to social media posts,
the plan was for protesters to meet outside of the Ministry of Interior building at 2:00 p.m.
on January 25, 2011, and then to demonstrate for three hours until 5:00 p.m. (el-Ghobashy
2011). The government was aware of these plans and the regime made preparations outside
of the Interior Ministry building, which included sealing off streets and increasing photo ID
check points in the surrounding area.14 However, the protesters never planned on marching
to the Interior Ministry building, starting demonstrations at 2:00 p.m., or ending at 5:00 p.m.
Instead protesters planted those fake plans to obfuscate and confuse Egyptian security
forces – and it worked. At 12:00 p.m., dozens of small demonstrations started throughout
the city at different locations and these groups marched through the streets of Cairo with
14
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one common goal – to converge in Cairo’s center at Tahrir Square by late afternoon (el-
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Ghobashy 2011). Egyptian security forces were caught off-guard and were unprepared for
the number of protesters, the route change, and the overall fervor of the demonstrations. By
early evening, thousands of protesters made their way to Tahrir Square demanding
substantive political changes including the firing of the country's interior minister, the
cancellation of Egypt's on-going state of emergency, and implementing term limits to
Mubarak’s presidency.15 Near midnight the crowds in Tahrir remained raucous and refused
to disband and the regime ordered more police forces to descend upon the square to
physically remove the thousands of protesters still there. As a result, approximately 13,000
riot police and hundreds of armored security vehicles invaded Tahrir firing tear gas canisters
at demonstrators and dispersing protesters with physical force (el-Ghobashy 2011).
The following morning, January 26, reports indicate that demonstrations took place
in other cities across the country such as the port of Suez where state security forces killed
three, injured 110, and arrested dozens (el-Ghobashy 2011). The security forces in Cairo
altered their tactics for the upcoming day's protests by closing downtown businesses,
rerouting metro lines, establishing numerous security checkpoints across the city, and
dispersing thousands of plain-clothes police officers to blend into the crowd and monitor
civilian activity (el-Ghobashy 2011). But the change in police tactics did little to stop
protesters from flooding the streets of Cairo as tens of thousands of Egyptians continued to
demonstrate across the country and state security forces responded by firing rubber bullets,
tear gas canisters, and wielding bamboo staves and metal batons.16
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The events of January 25 and 26, 2011, were the largest demonstrations in
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modern Egypt and the magnitude of the protests suggested to the regime that riot police and
internal security forces would not be enough to ensure stability. On Friday evening, January
27, 2011, the regime was preparing for the next wave of protests and decided it was time to
deploy the Egyptian military. By Saturday afternoon, military soldiers were stationed on the
streets of Egypt and were supporting, reinforcing, and even resupplying internal security
forces with tear gas canisters and ammunition in the areas surrounding Tahrir Square
(Ketchley 2014, 168). As protests escalated on Saturday afternoon, the Egyptian military
became more directly involved as soldiers started replacing internal security forces rather
than reinforcing police forces (Ketchley 2014, 155). In Suez, there were reports of heavy
gunfire taking place between Egyptian soldiers and angry protesters outside of the Suez
police station.17 Across the country the military was deployed to secure public buildings and
in Cairo the military set up their primary “base” outside of the Museum of Egyptian
Antiquities, which is one block north of Tahrir Square.18
The initial behavior of the Egyptian military was similar to military response during
the 1977 and 1986 protests and suggested that the Egyptian military was willing to defend
the incumbent regime and use physical force to suppress civilian protesters. For example,
Amnesty International (2011c, 76) reported that on January 29, a thirty-six year-old man was
stopped by the military for being out after curfew and was handcuffed, blindfolded, and
beaten by soldiers. In addition, there are reports the Egyptian military fired weapons into the
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air at Tahrir Square and the military’s main base near the Museum of Egyptian
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Antiquities became a de facto prison where protesters were detained and subjected to torture
and ill treatment from soldiers.19
Even though reports indicate that Egyptian military soldiers were violently engaging
civilians on the ground, the senior military officers painted a different picture. On February
1, 2011, Egyptian military officials announced on state media that the military would not use
force against citizens in upcoming protests and stated, “the presence of the army in the
streets is for [the people’s] sake and to ensure [the people’s] safety and well-being…the
armed forces will not resort to use of force against our great people."20 That same evening,
President Mubarak also made a televised announcement to the country in which he agreed
he would not run for reelection after his term was over but he would stay in office until his
term ended in September 2011.21
February 2, 2011, represented a turning point in the Egyptian revolution as proregime forces on horseback and camelback invaded Tahrir Square and violently attacked
demonstrators.22 It is believed these forces sympathetic to the regime were hired by the
regime to intimidate and disperse the anti-government protesters in Tahrir. Even though
there is no evidence these pro-regime forces consisted of soldiers, there are reports the
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military indirectly assisted them. For example, the pro-regime crowds entered Tahrir
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Square from the north and the only way to enter Tahrir from that direction meant passing
through military checkpoints. Moreover, it is reported that during the "Battle of Tahrir" the
military looked-on motionless as pro-regime forces attacked protesters.23 The February 2
attacks in Tahrir Square were a turning point in the Egyptian uprising for two reasons. One,
the episode demonstrated how out of touch the Mubarak regime had become. Even if the
regime had nothing to do with the pro-regime forces that invaded Tahrir Square, the attacks
only galvanized the protest movement and proved that demonstrators would not be
intimidated or deterred through physical force. Two, despite the evidence that the Egyptian
military implicitly assisted pro-regime forces at the Tahrir Square attacks, the Egyptian
military began inching closer to the side of the protesters and away from the Mubarak
regime.
In the days following the attack the senior military leadership convened and explored
alternative options outside of Mubarak. The newly appointed vice president, Omar
Suleiman, Defense Minister Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, and Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq
opened up discussions with opposition forces and began to devise plans on how to remove
President Mubarak from power through constitutional measures.24 Suleiman, Tantawi, and
Shafiq were all former military officers and their meeting demonstrated for the first time
during the uprising that the military institution was beginning to drift away from the
Mubarak regime.
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In addition to coordinating events behind the scenes, senior military officers,
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such as Defense Minister Tantawi and Lieutenant General Sami Hafez Anan visited Tahrir
Square and displayed their solidarity with the movement and gave assurances that the
protesters' demands would be met.25 On February 10, 2011, military officers reinstated the
Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), a council only convened under dire
circumstances, and met without President Mubarak or Vice President Suleiman (Frisch 2013,
188). In the SCAF meeting Egyptian military leadership discussed the next course of action
in Egyptian politics and released a public communiqué (the first of several) to the Egyptian
people. The first communiqué stated:
Based on the responsibility of the Armed Forces, and its commitment to
protect the people, and to oversee their interests and security, and with a
view to the safety of the nation and the citizenry, and of the achievements
and properties of the great people of Egypt, and in affirmation and support
for the legitimate demands of the people, the Supreme Council of the Armed
Forces convened today, 10 February 2011, to consider developments to date,
and decided to remain in continuous session to consider what procedures
and measures that may be taken to protect the nation, and the achievements
and aspirations of the great people of Egypt.26
The first SCAF communiqué was vague but suggested that the military was making plans
behind the scenes to oust Mubarak from power.
At this point the entire country assumed Mubarak was on his way out, and when an
impromptu presidential address was scheduled for the evening of February 10, 2011, most
Egyptians thought this would be Mubarak’s formal resignation speech. Hundreds of
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thousands of Egyptians gathered in Tahrir Square and millions watched from their
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homes, but astonishingly, President Mubarak did not resign that night and rather, in a
rambling and infantilizing speech, Mubarak maintained he would remain Egypt’s president
but would delegate more responsibility and substantive powers to the vice president. At first
the protesters in Tahrir Square were dumbfounded and shortly afterwards the confusion
turned into rage. Nearly a million protesters flooded Cairo’s streets late Thursday night after
Mubarak’s address and the following day there were massive plans for demonstrations across
the country in solidarity against Mubarak.
Early on Friday, February 11, the SCAF released a second communiqué that stated
the military’s commitment “to protecting the legitimate demands of the people and…to
ensure a peaceful transfer of authority and the achievement of the democratic and free society
that the people demand" (emphasis added by author).27 While the second SCAF
communiqué was released to the Egyptian public, discussions and meetings took place
behind the scenes that paved the way for Egypt’s future. At 4:00 p.m. on Friday February 11,
President Mubarak left Cairo for his residence in the southern Sinai resort town of Sharm elShiek. Two hours later, Vice President Suleiman publically announced President Mubarak
had stepped down and that governance of the country was immediately handed over to
military leadership under the SCAF.28 Upon Suleiman’s announcement, the SCAF released a
third communiqué, which stated, “the current government, and governors shall continue as a
caretaker administration until a new government is formed,” and guaranteed a “peaceful
transition of authority within a free and democratic system that allows for the assumption of

27

Ibid.

CNN, “Egypt is Free after Mubarak Quits,” February 11, 2011, accessed February 2, 2016.
http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2011/02/11/egypt-unrest-protesters-begin-18th-day-of-demonstrations/.
28
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democratic and free state.”29 After these announcements, millions of Egyptians celebrated in
the streets throughout the country.30
The following day celebrations across Egypt remained euphoric, but as protesters
and demonstrators celebrated their victory, the Egyptian military made political maneuvers
to bolster their new position in Mubarak’s sudden absence. On February 12, the SCAF
dissolved both houses of Parliament, suspended the Constitution, declared the military
would rule Egypt for six months until elections could be held, and announced Prime
Minister Shafiq would remain head of the caretaker government until a new government was
formed.31 Much like the 1952 Free Officers coup, the ousting of President Mubarak in 2011
involved the Egyptian military lingering in political control longer than advertised. Overall,
the SCAF remained in power for a year and a half until June 2012, when presidential
elections finally occurred and the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Morsi, was sworn in as
president. The eighteen-month transition period was a tumultuous and politically charged
time in Egypt in which varying political groups vied for political power in Egypt’s new
political landscape. Mass demonstrations continued during 2011 and 2012 and
coincidentally, since the Egyptian military was in power during this time, military officers
were more willing to use violence to suppress protesters and restore public order. The SCAF
reluctantly handed over the reins of government to President Morsi, but Islamist rule in
Egypt was short-lived as the Egyptian military intervened and overthrew Morsi from office
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in July 2013. After a transition period of one year with a caretaker government, in which
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the Muslim Brotherhood was essentially disbanded, another round of presidential elections
occurred in the summer of 2014 and al-Sisi, a former member of the SCAF, was victorious
and was named Egyptian president in June 2014.
At the beginning of the Egyptian protests it was unclear whether the Egyptian
military would ultimately defect from the Mubarak regime. The Mubarak regime ordered the
Egyptian military to dispatch across the country only after three days of protests and the
military followed these orders willingly. Plus, there is documentation that the Egyptian
military used force and violence against civilians during the uprising. As discussed in chapter
4, after the Tunisian uprising the transition government mandated a committee to investigate
the role of the Ben Ali regime during the Tunisian uprising and it resulted in a 1,000 page
thorough report called the “Tunisian National Fact Finding Commission.” In contrast, while
the Egyptian transition government also mandated a commission to investigate the role of
the Mubarak regime during the Egyptian uprising, the results have been less informative and
less substantive in comparison to the Tunisian report. For instance, the majority of the
Egyptian report remains classified and the only unclassified excerpt includes a fifty-page
document, "Final report: The Investigative Fact-Finding Committee on the Events that
Accompanied the Revolution of January 25, 2011," that only provides minimal insight on the
government and state security’s role during the unrest.32
Overall, all the details and actions of the Egyptian military during the Egyptian
uprising are unclear. Reports from groups like Amnesty International document that some
Egyptian soldiers used violence against demonstrators during the uprising, but overall these
occurrences seem rare. Also, there is no evidence of institutional grievances in which senior
32
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or junior officers ordered violence against protesters at an institution-wide level. With the
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data available this project argues that the Egyptian military ultimately defected from the
Mubarak regime since it did not use high levels of violence against protesters and since the
military elite was essential in orchestrating Mubarak's departure. Regarding the first point,
the Egyptian military is an extremely large and powerful military that possesses heavy
artillery and weaponry that could easily dominate civilian protesters. However, despite this
advantage, the Egyptian military did not use high levels of violence against demonstrators
suggesting the armed forces were unwilling to protect the regime and thought it was too
costly to violently confront unarmed civilians. Regarding the second point, as the uprising
continued officers realized they could lead the country in Mubarak's absence and decided to
sever its allegiances with the president and thus initiated his ouster on the back of the
country’s uprising.
What were the variables that influenced the Egyptian military to not use high levels
of violence against protesters? The following section answers this question by examining the
twenty variables of the MENA Military Index in detail and demonstrates that existing
institutional variables paved the way for military defection and that the historic and unique
characteristics of the Egyptian protests provided the Egyptian military with the opportunity
to defect.
The MENA Military Index & Egypt
The remainder of this chapter examines the twenty variables of the MENA Military
Index with specific focus on the impact these variables played upon influencing the Egyptian
military’s decision to defect from the regime. As discussed in chapter 3, Egypt possesses the
highest MENA Military index score of all twenty-one MENA countries with an index score
of 0.70. This means fourteen of the twenty possible variables were present in the Egyptian

case that contributed to military defection. Table 12 illustrates the twenty variables from
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the MENA Military Index in Egypt and indicates which of the variables were present
(labeled as “yes”) and which of the variables were not present (labeled as "no").
The fourteen variables that influenced the Egyptian military to defect from the
Mubarak regime include: (1) socio-economic splits within the military, (2) the presence of
parallel security forces that counterbalanced the military, (3) rivalries between the military
and other security forces, (4) generational rifts between senior and junior officers, (5) the
system of military conscription, (6) the military’s autonomy to make internal appointments,
(7) the military's dissatisfaction with regime benefits, (8) the large size of the Egyptian
protests, (9) the participation of non-traditional protesters in the uprising including women,
the elderly, and children, (10) the non-violent nature of protests, (11) the lack of egregious
human rights violations by the Egyptian military against the civilian population in the
country’s history, (12) the broad-based scope of the Egyptian protests, (13) the movement’s
ability to successfully win over the military, and (14) a significant proportion of Egyptian
officers and soldiers receiving training and education from foreign militaries. Of these
fourteen variables six are institutional and address characteristics within the military and the
country’s security apparatus, one variable addresses the relationship between the military and
the regime, six variables are societal and based upon the characteristics of the Egyptian
uprising, and one variable addresses international dynamics.
The Egyptian case demonstrates two aspects. First, there were institutional variables
that paved the way for military defection, but these institutional variables alone would not
cause military defection. The second important aspect is that the uprising had to contain
unique characteristics that provided the military with the opportunity and motivation to

Table 12. Egypt and the MENA Military Index Variables
Variable
Institutional 1. Communal splits between soldiers?
2. Socio-economic rifts between soldiers?
3. Parallel security forces to military?
4. Rivalry between military and other security
forces?
5. Rivalries between military branches?

Yes/No
Variable
No
11. Did orders to intervene come
from someone other than the ruling
leader?
Yes
12. Uprising larger than 1% of
population?
Yes
13. Protesters include women and
children?
Yes
14. Uprising non-violent in nature?
No

6. Senior vs. Junior splits?
7. Conscription?

Yes
Yes

8. Military have autonomy in appointments?

Yes

Regime 9. Soldiers unsatisfied with regime benefits?

Yes

10. Someone other than the current leader
appointed the Defense Minister and other
leading generals?

No

15. Military have clean record with
no human rights violations?
16. Were protests broad-based?
17. Did movement win over
soldiers?
18. Did foreign troops intervene to
overthrow leader?
19. Militaries of contiguous
countries defect?
20. Significant portion of soldiers
receive foreign military training?

Yes/No
No
Regime
Yes

Societal

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

International

No
Yes
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defect. This occurred in 2011 as the protests were large, broad-based, non-violence,
consisted of non-traditional protesters, and specifically won over the military.
In addition to the fourteen variables that influenced the Egyptian military to defect,
there are six variables from the MENA Military Index that did not influence the Egyptian
military to defect from the Mubarak regime. This includes (1) no significant communal rifts
within the military, (2) no significant rivalries between the branches of the Egyptian armed
forces, (3) President Mubarak appointing the defense ministers during his regime, (4) the
lack of uncertainty of whether President Mubarak ever explicitly ordered Egyptian soldiers
to fire on protesters, (5) the absence of any foreign military troops invading the country with
the aim of overthrowing President Mubarak, and (6) militaries of neighboring states not
defecting from their incumbent regimes.33
The following subsections explore the institutional, regime, societal, and
international variables in more detail and discuss the role each of these variables had on
Egyptian military response during the uprising. The first subsection explores the eight
institutional variables, the second subsection explores the three regime variables, the third
subsection explores the six societal variables, and the fourth subsection explores the three
international variables. As these subsections reveal, the presence of existing institutional
variables in Egypt coupled with the societal variables of the Egyptian uprising influenced the
Egyptian military leadership to defect from the Mubarak regime and to seize power for
themselves.
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Institutional Variables
Out of the eight institutional variables, six were present and two were absent in
Egypt. The first and second institutional variables that potentially influenced the Egyptian
military to defect from the Mubarak regime include the counterbalancing of internal security
forces against the Egyptian military, and the subsequent rivalries this created between these
two institutions.34 The Egyptian security apparatus is an extensive and complex organization
that consists of dozens of individual security forces housed in both the country's Ministry of
Interior and Ministry of Defense. Some of the notable internal Egyptian security forces
include the Egyptian police, the CSF, the State Security Investigations (SSI), the Republican
Guard, the General Intelligence Services (GIS), and the General Intelligence Directorate
(GID).
Ever since 1952, the internal security forces in Egypt have increased in size, scope,
and mission, and have been utilized by the regime to counterbalance and rival the size and
strength of the Egyptian military. Immediately after the 1952 coup the Free Officers
expanded Egyptian internal security forces by creating the Republican Guard to protect the
president from any potential military counter-coups. The GIS was created as a domestic and
foreign intelligence service, the SSI was the primary security and intelligence arm of the
Ministry of Interior, and the CSF was a paramilitary force that was created to provide an
additional layer of internal security, and to counter the size and strength of the military.
The internal security forces expanded under President Sadat in four ways. One, Sadat
"militarized" the Republican Guard by upgrading the units to a brigade of special troops
equipped with tanks, armored cars, and military-grade weaponry (Kandil 2012, 283). Two,
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Sadat used the Republican Guard to arrest rivals and deter a military coup from removing
him from power in 1971 (Campbell 2009, 95). Three, Sadat expanded the privileges of the
Egyptian police and appointed former policemen as provincial governors rather than
appointing these positions to military officers. Four, Sadat rivaled the Egyptian military with
the SSI by having SSI forces block military promotions and siphoning off top-line
equipment and artillery to internal security forces (Kandil 2012, 301).
President Mubarak continued the tradition of increasing the size and strength of the
internal security forces. For instance, Mubarak oversaw the implementation of Ministerial
Decree 702 of 1986, which increased the breadth and scope of the internal security forces
and divided the Ministry of Interior into thirty-four specialized subcategories and provided
internal security forces with more autonomy (Kandil 2012, 335). In addition, President
Mubarak increased the role of the Republican Guard; especially after his security detail
thwarted an assassination attempted on his life in 1995 (Bou Nassif 2013, 517n26). Mubarak
also weakened the military by increasing the budget of the Ministry of Interior in comparison
to the Ministry of Defense. For example, the Ministry of Interior's budget as a proportion of
the country's GDP doubled from 1988 to 2002, police salaries quadrupled, and the regime
continued turning a blind eye to the bribes police forces extorted from civilians (Kandil
2012, 336).
Towards the end of his regime Mubarak created closer relationships with senior
members from the internal security forces such as Habib al-Adly (the former minister of
interior), and Omar Suleiman (the former director of the General Intelligence Directorate),
in contrast to officers from the military (Frisch 2013). By the end of Mubarak's regime the
Egyptian internal security apparatus permeated and penetrated all aspects of Egyptian

146
politics and society and consisted of millions of officers and nearly 17,000 detention centers
located across the country.35
The growth of Egypt's internal security forces had two effects on Egyptian military
behavior during the uprising. First, since the internal security forces typically used repression
against civilians, the military seldom used violence against civilians and were unlikely to use
force against demonstrators during the uprising. Second, since the Egyptian internal security
forces counterbalanced the Egyptian armed forces, the military was not willing to use high
levels of violence against civilians and protect a regime that deliberately oversaw and
cultivated the expansion of the internal security forces.
The third institutional variable that possibly influenced the Egyptian military to
defect was that the armed forces retained tremendous amounts of institutional autonomy in
its ability to make internal appointments and personnel decisions within the military. Since
1952, the only time the Egyptian president closely monitored and micromanaged the
personnel configuration of the armed forces was during Sadat's presidency. As discussed
earlier in the chapter, when Sadat became president he warded off numerous political rivals
and overzealous officers by overseeing military appointments and enforcing a system of
swift rotations so officers and soldiers were constantly being switched to different
assignments, positions, and locations (Bou Nassif 2013, 513-515 and Campbell 2009, 79).
However, Mubarak was less involved in the internal configuration and decision-making of
personnel within the armed forces than his predecessor, which meant that throughout the
military, most soldiers and officers had weak links to the president, which made it easier for
the individuals to defect and sever ties from the regime.
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The fourth and fifth institutional variables that influenced the Egyptian military to
defect include generational splits and socio-economic splits between military personnel. One
of the main reasons generational splits occurred within the Egyptian armed forces was due
to economic disparity between senior and junior officers. The Egyptian military is one of the
most privileged groups in all of Egyptian politics and ever since the 1950s senior military
officers have enjoyed an exclusive status in Egyptian society, which has included prized
political appointments both domestic and abroad, and also access to tremendous wealth and
salaries upon retiring from the military (Bou Nassif 2013; Frisch 2013, 181). Even though a
small minority of senior military officers have benefited from this system, overall, there is a
significant gap between senior officers, junior officers, and conscripts. For example, towards
the end of Mubarak’s regime enlisted soldiers and conscripts made approximately $20 U.S.
dollars per month, junior officers received approximately $333 U.S. dollars per month, while
the upper echelon of senior officers made up to $33,000 U.S. dollars per month (Bou Nassif
2013, 516 and Holmes 2012, 298). While it is possible for junior officers to receive
promotions and to secure a lucrative senior military position on their own, the reality is very
unlikely. Promotions are slow, spots are competitive, and often patronage or familial ties
trump merit when selections are made at the upper levels of the Egyptian military (Hashim
2011b, 107 and 121).
In addition to socio-economic rifts, ideological rifts have also caused animosity
between senior officers, junior officers, and conscripts in the Egyptian armed forces. The
most significant example include the disgruntled junior officers that were disenfranchised
with senior military leadership in the 1940s and 1950s and initiated the 1952 Free Officers
coup that created the modern Egyptian state. Over the decades other ideological rifts have
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caused generational splits within the Egyptian armed forces such as in the 1970s when junior
soldiers and conscripts tended to be more sympathetic towards Islamist ideologies in
comparison to senior officers. This partially explains the growth of Islamism within the
Egyptian military, which ultimately led to a group of Islamist junior officers assassinating
President Sadat in 1981. This religious rift continued during Mubarak's presidency as senior
officers were skeptical of the susceptibility of junior officers and conscripts of adopting
Islamic ideology and as a result when Egypt combatted Islamic terrorism in the 1990s and
2000s, senior military officers did not want the majority of counterterrorism missions to be
given to junior officers or conscripts.
The sixth institutional variable present in Egypt is the system of military
conscription, which dates back to 1948 and was institutionalized by the Free Officers in
1952 through Law 505 (Kandil 2012, 17). Military conscription requires Egyptian men from
the ages of 18 to 30 to serve for three years in the armed forces,36 but there are numerous
exceptions to get out of military service, such as physical, economic, and familial reasons,
etc.37 Egyptian conscripts tend to represent young men with lower education levels and from
poorer socio-economic backgrounds. Military service for conscripts is difficult as it lasts up
to three years, includes difficult living conditions, is physically and mentally taxing, and only
provides modest financial compensation.38
In Egypt, military defection occurred at the senior levels as generals and senior
military officials initiated defection against President Mubarak and paved the role the
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Egyptian military played during the post-revolutionary transition period. There is no
evidence Egyptian officers ever ordered conscripts to fire on protesters (even though there
are reports soldiers used violence against demonstrators at the beginning of the uprising),
but it is reasonable to assume Egyptian conscripts would have been less likely to use violence
against civilians. This is because conscripts shared many similar characteristics to the
protesters and further reinforced by the fact that the uprising had such a nationalistic and
broad-appeal across the country.
There were two institutional variables absent in Egypt including the lack of
significant communal rifts between military personnel, and the absence of significant rivalries
among the armed force branches. Egypt is a relatively homogenous country as the majority
of the population ethnically identifies as Arab-Berber and religiously identifies as Sunni
Islam. However, there is a small minority of Coptic Christians in Egypt that make up
approximately 10 percent of the total population.39 There is no data that examines the ethnic
or religious affiliation of the Egyptian military but since Egypt has a system of military
conscription this suggests citizens from all backgrounds are represented in the armed forces
even though there are not many Copts in the Egyptian military (Sharp 2012, 3). However,
despite the small number of Copts there is no evidence of communal rifts between the ArabSunni majority and the Coptic minority within the Egyptian armed forces.40 Another possible
area that can cause communal rifts is the regional background of military personnel but there
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is no evidence regional affiliation caused splits within the Egyptian armed forces. Overall,
there is no evidence communal rifts existed within the Egyptian armed forces and this
variable had no influence on the military defecting from President Mubarak.
A second institutional variable absent in Egypt was the lack of significant rivalries
between the military branches. The Egyptian armed forces consist of four main branches
including the army, the navy, the air force, and air defense. The army is the largest branch
with 375,000 troops, the air defense is the second largest with 70,000, the air force is the
third largest with 20,000, and the navy is the smallest with 14,000.41 Even though the
Egyptian Army is approximately three times larger than the Egyptian Air Defense, Egyptian
Air Force, and Egyptian Navy combined, there is no evidence of significant intra-military
rivalries within the military. In fact, the four Egyptian military branches have been relatively
harmonious during the last sixty years. For example, after the 1952 Free Officers Coup, the
newly created RCC consisted of officers from all four military branches (Kandil 2012, 100).
In addition, despite President Mubarak's air force background, he understood the
necessity of maintaining equal relations with the various chiefs of staff from the four military
branches. Another example was during the uprising the SCAF was comprised of officers
from all four branches including Major General Sedky Sobhy (Egyptian Army), Lieutenant
General Abdul Aziz Seif al-Din and Lieutenant General Anan (Egyptian Air Defense), Field
Marshal Tantawi and Air Marshal Reda Mahmoud Hafez Mohamed (Egyptian Air Force),
and Vice Admiral Mohab Mamish (Egyptian Navy).42 Overall, there is no evidence that
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significant rifts existed between the branches of the Egyptian armed forces and this variable
had no impact on the Egyptian military's decision to defect during the uprising.
It is telling that six of the eight institutional variables were present in Egypt. This
indicates there were institutional conditions present in Egypt that helped pave the way for
possible military defection prior to the Arab uprisings. For example, President Mubarak,
similar to President Ben Ali in Tunisia, built up the internal security forces, which ultimately
served as a counterbalance and became a rival to the Egyptian military. The Egyptian military
also had the institutional autonomy to coordinate personnel decisions within the armed
forces and Mubarak did not specifically place loyal officers and soldiers throughout the
Egyptian military. In addition, there were socio-economic and generational splits within the
military but it is unclear how much impact these factors had on military defection. If present,
splits between military personnel more likely indicate possible military fracturing where large
portions of soldiers are divided on their allegiances. Even though there is evidence of socioeconomic and generational differences between senior and junior officers, the Egyptian
military did not experience fracturing, so it appears these two variables did not have as large
as a role as the other institutional variables. Lastly, Egypt possesses a system of military
conscription and even though the officers were the primary actors that initiated military
defection, since the rank-and-file of the armed forces are drawn from citizens across the
country, it was less likely conscripts would have used high levels of sustained violence since
conscripts could closely relate to the general population.
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Regime Variables
There was one regime variable present in Egypt and two regime variables absent.
The one regime variable present in Egypt that potentially influenced the Egyptian military to
defect was Egyptian officers dissatisfied with the benefits they received from the Mubarak
regime. In some regards this seems like a paradox considering the Egyptian military has been
arguably the most privileged political institution in the country since the 1950s. One of the
most lucrative sectors for the Egyptian military is the enormous economic complex that has
existed in Egypt over the last four decades. As explored earlier in this chapter the Egyptian
military has earned billions of dollars from land development projects, water treatment
programs, waste management, food production, textiles, etc.43 In addition, Bou Nassif (2013,
516-528) finds that senior military officers were rewarded with plush political appointments
and exorbitant salaries. Mubarak appointed senior officers to local governorship positions
and executive positions in the state bureaucracy and also provided direct cash payments to
officers for years of "loyalty" to the regime.
This plush arrangement between Mubarak and officers was jeopardized by the rise of
Egypt's liberal capitalist elite. As mentioned in the first section of this chapter, Gamal
Mubarak, President Mubarak's son, was a key member of Cairo's liberal elite and was trained
in finance and worked as an investment banker in London before returning to Cairo in the
1990s. In the 1990s and 2000s Gamal Mubarak and his coterie of liberal capitalist colleagues
gained access to the echelons of the country's ruling party and challenged the monopoly of
the Egyptian military economic sector (Osman 2011; Zahid 2010). In addition, it was widely
believed Gamal Mubarak was being groomed as Mubarak's presidential successor (Brownlee
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2007/2008). As Gamal rose through the political ranks, friendlier liberal-capitalist economic
policies were initiated, which directly threatened the unmonitored and highly lucrative
military economic sector. Even though the Egyptian military as an institution and the
individual senior Egyptian officers received tremendous political and economic benefits
under the Mubarak regime, the liberal-capitalist policies concerned officers. As a result, many
officers were dissatisfied with the Mubarak regime by 2011, and these sentiments
contributed to the Egyptian military's decision to not use high levels of violence against
protesters during the mass uprising.
There were two regime variables absent in Egypt including President Mubarak
appointing the Egyptian defense minister, and the uncertainty as to whether Mubarak ever
explicitly ordered the military to fire on protesters. As to the first regime variable, during
Mubarak's presidency there were three different defense ministers beginning with Field
Marshal Muhammad Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala, who Mubarak inherited after Sadat’s
assassination. Abu Ghazala served as Mubarak's defense minister for eight years but the
relationship between the two was competitive and eventually led to Mubarak sacking Abu
Ghazal in 1989.44 After a two-year period with Youssef Sabri Abu Taleb as defense minister,
President Mubarak appointed the former head of the Republican Guard, Tantawi, as the new
defense minister in 1991. Tantawi remained the Egyptian defense minister for twenty years
up through the Egyptian uprising. The theoretical argument of this variable in the MENA
Military Index is that if a president appoints a defense minister then it is more likely the
defense minister will remain loyal to the president in the event of mass political protests that
challenge the regime. However in the Egyptian uprising, Tantawi did not remain loyal to
44
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Mubarak since he was unwilling to have Egyptian military forces use high levels of violence
against protesters and more importantly, Tantawi was the chairman of the SCAF, which
played a key role in ensuring President Mubarak was removed from office.
The second variable absent in Egypt refers to the uncertainty of whether President
Mubarak ever explicitly gave the Egyptian military orders to fire on protesters. The theory
behind this variable argues that if a ruling leader gives the military a clear and direct order to
violently engage protesters then military personnel will be more likely to follow those orders
since the ruling leader's intentions are clear. In contrast, if a ruling leader gives an ambiguous
order, of if someone other than the ruling leader orders the military to violently engage
protesters, then military personnel are less certain of the ruling leader's intentions and are
more likely to ignore or disobey the order. During the Egyptian uprising there was
uncertainty as to whether Mubarak ordered the Egyptian military to fire on protesters. At the
beginning of the protest it was originally believed Mubarak ordered the military to fire on
protesters45 and after Mubarak resigned one of the primary narratives was the Egyptian
military saved Egypt by refusing regime orders to fire on protesters. However, after the
uprising the authenticity of this argument was called into question as eight months after
Mubarak resigned, the chief of staff of the SCAF indicated that Mubarak never provided the
Egyptian military with direct orders to fire on demonstrators.46 More tellingly was the
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testimony of Field Marshal Tantawi during Mubarak's trial in June 2012, in which the field
marshal also claimed President Mubarak never explicitly ordered the Egyptian military to fire
on protesters.47
Similar to the Tunisian case, the only regime variable that appears to have influenced
Egyptian military defection was officers' dissatisfaction with the ruling regime. The paradox
is the Egyptian military was arguably the most financially privileged institution in the country
as it had access to billions of dollars of revenue through the armed forces comprehensive
economic empire. In this regards, the Egyptian military directly addresses Lee's (2005)
agreement regarding "carrots" and "sticks." In Egypt, the access of this additional revenue
could clearly be seen as a carrot, and similar to Lee's findings in Indonesia, carrots doled out
by the ruling leader to the military were not enough to ensure the Egyptian armed forces
would remain loyal to President Mubarak. As Lee finds, sticks tend to be a better mechanism
than carrots in ensuring militaries remain compliant to the regime. The two absent regime
variables are also interesting as the ability for President Mubarak to appoint leading senior
military leadership had no barring on ensuring loyalty to the regime. Similar to the Tunisian
case, even though Ben Ali appointed the senior military officers, not all of these officers
remained loyal to Ben Ali, which is the same case that occurred in Egypt. Considering the
first two cases of this report counter the theoretical outcomes of this variable, it begs the
question as to whether this variable truly has a causal impact on military behavior during
mass political protests.
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Societal Variables
Similar to Tunisia, all six of the societal variables were present in Egypt, suggesting
that the Egyptian military defected from the President Mubarak partially due to the unique
characteristics of the country’s uprising. The first societal variable present is a high number
of protesters demonstrated during the uprising. The Arab Awakening dataset from Jenkins
and Herrick (2012) indicate approximately 2 percent of Egyptians protested during the
Egyptian uprising, whereas the surveys from Beissinger et al. (2014, 11) note 8 percent of
Egyptians protested during the uprising.
In 2011, Egypt's population was 83.7 million48 and if 2-8 percent of Egyptians
demonstrated during the uprising then that equates to approximately 1.7 – 6.7 million
protesters. The millions of Egyptian protesters discouraged the Egyptian military from using
high levels of violence by raising the stakes of repression, making it more difficult for the
military to use physical force, and since so many protesters participated this raised the
legitimacy of the entire movement.
A second societal variable present in Egypt includes the broad-based nature of the
uprising, which attracted a wide range of Egyptians from different social, economic, and
regional backgrounds. Unlike the Tunisian protests, the Egyptian uprising was centered on
the capital city from the outset. However, protests took place across the country especially in
northern cities like Alexandria, Port Said, and al-Mahalla al-Kubra, Suez in the east, and in
the small southern town of Beni Suef (150 kilometers from Cairo). The Egyptian uprising
was also broad-based and represented a wide spectrum of Egyptians. Beinin (2014, 402)
argues there were parallel social movements occurring in Egypt during the revolution, which
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included workers, the urban middle class, the educated, technologically savvy youth, and
Islamists. The Egyptian uprising was inclusive and attracted all Egyptians regardless of their
political, economic, or religious backgrounds. Since the Egyptian uprising was broad-based it
meant the movement better represented the entire country, and thus it made it more difficult
for military officers to rationalize using high levels of violence against a movement that
represented all Egyptians.
A third societal variable present in Egypt uprising was the "non-traditional"
demonstrators, especially women, children, and the elderly. According to the survey data
conducted by Beissinger et al. (2014, 35) approximately 25 percent of demonstrators in the
Egyptian uprising were women. In addition, Amnesty International (2011c, 22) summarizes
the role of women in their report on the Egyptian uprising by stating:
Women from all sectors of society joined the uprising, and many played a
leading role in the mobilization. Young and old, veiled and unveiled,
educated and illiterate, they chanted for change; they fought against the
security forces; they slept, sometimes with their children in protest camps;
they defended Tahrir Square; and they debated about what protesters should
do next.
The Amnesty International report also addresses the other roles women played during the
revolution including the online activists who coordinated events, the doctors and nurses who
tended to the wounded in Tahrir Square, and the female victims who were injured, abused,
and killed by security forces during protests. In addition to women, there were also a high
number of middle-aged and older demonstrators during the Egyptian uprising. Beissinger et
al. (2014) find nearly 28 percent of the protesters in the Egyptian uprising were forty-five
years or older. Youth were also involved in the uprising and Amnesty International reports
that teenagers and even children were involved in protests especially outside of the Interior
Ministry building, in the Cairo suburbs of al-Matareya, the northern city of al-Mahalla al-
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Kubra, the northern city of Alexandria, and the small central town of Markaz Biba.49 Since
the Egyptian uprising consisted of a significant proportion of women, youth, and the elderly,
these "non-traditional" protesters made it more difficult for Egyptian military personnel to
use high levels of violence against civilians.
The fourth societal variable present in Egypt includes the non-violent nature of the
demonstrations. Similar to the Tunisian protests, the Egyptian uprising used peaceful tactics
and did not aim to overthrow Mubarak through physical force. Rather, protests adopted
non-violent tactics such as congregating outside of major governmental buildings, occupying
public spaces and main thoroughfares, and using vocal chants and community outreach.
Even though the majority of protests during the Egyptian uprising were non-violent,
episodes of violence still occurred during the eighteen days of protests,50 but violence was
rare and mostly was in response to the initial violence state security forces displayed against
protesters at the onset of the demonstrations. Overall, the non-violent nature of the
Egyptian uprising made it difficult for the Egyptian military to rationalize using high levels of
violence against civilians.
The fifth societal variable present in Egypt includes demonstrations “winning” over
the Egyptian military. For instance, during the uprising one of the most common chants
sung by protesters was “the army and the people are one hand.” As Ketchley (2014)
mentions this particular chant served three purposes: (1) to increase the bond and
fraternization between Egyptian demonstrators and the Egyptian military, (2) to make it
more difficult for Egyptian soldiers to use violence against protesters, and (3) to signal to the
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Egyptian military that defectors would be welcomed and accepted by protesters if military
personnel decided to defect from the regime. There are other examples of protesters
winning over the military, especially given the number of times protesters physically
embraced security forces at demonstrations. For instance, there is a YouTube video from
January 28, 2011, that shows dozens of Egyptian protesters approaching a phalanx of CSF
troops in Alexandria. 51 In the video the protesters approach the soldiers and start embracing
and hugging them and there is a particularly powerful image of a young CSF troop weeping
as numerous civilians approach him with hugs and kisses on his cheek. The Egyptian
protesters also won over the military by climbing on top of parked military vehicles and
using the vehicles as a peaceful platform to wave Egyptian flags and embrace soldiers
(Ketchley 2014, 176-179). Tanks were targeted by protesters and were "graffitied” by
demonstrators with slogans such as “the people’s army” and “leave Mubarak” (Ketchley
2014, 172). Lastly, across the country protesters distributed pamphlets with suggestions and
tactics of how to protest smartly and how to “bring individual policemen and soldiers to the
side of the people” (Ketchley 2014, 162). While not all Egyptian protesters fondly embraced
the Egyptian military, since so many Egyptians treated the military favorably, this provides
evidence that demonstrators were trying to win over the military's support. Overall, it
appears these displays won over many within the Egyptian military and made it more
difficult for military forces to fire on civilians.
The sixth and final societal variable present in Egypt was during modern Egyptian
history, the military did not commit egregious human rights violations against the
population. To examine this empirically, the CIRI Human Rights dataset was consulted,
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which is a dataset that examines the level of human rights violations within a country.52 The
CIRI Human Rights Index is a number that ranges from 0 – 8, with 0 indicating a country
has performed poorly (i.e. committed many human rights violations against the population)
and 8 indicating a country has performed well (i.e. committed no human rights violations
against the population). Figure 3 illustrates the CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index of Egypt
from 1981 to 2011.53
Overall, Egypt's CIRI Human Rights Index score during this period is poor and for
fourteen years Egypt scored a "3" or lower. Similar to the Tunisian case in Chapter 4, this
chapter examines U.S. Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices54 and
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Amnesty International Annual Reports55 from all the years Egypt scored a 3 or lower on CIRI
Human Rights Index (1993, 1994, 1996, 1999, and 2002 – 2011). Within these reports there
is little mention of the Egyptian military committing human rights abuses against the
Egyptian population. The reason Egypt receives such low human rights scores during these
years is primarily due to the egregious acts by the internal security forces such as the
Egyptian police and the SSI. Under the Mubarak regime the internal security forces were
responsible for imprisonment, torturing, kidnapping, monitoring, and striking fear and
intimidation into the Egyptian population. It would be naive to assume that the Egyptian
military is entirely innocent of any wrongdoings against the Egyptian public during
Mubarak's regime, but there is no evidence the Egyptian military institutionally and
systematically committed human rights violations against the population. Since internal
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security forces administered the majority of day-to-day state security violence against
Egyptians it was unlikely the Egyptian military was going to start using high levels of
violence against protesters during the Egyptian uprising. Even though the Egyptian military
intervened in 1977 and 1986, there was no historical precedence of utilizing high levels of
violence against anti-regime protesters and the military was unwilling to start this trend
during the monumental size and fervor of the Egyptian uprising.

CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index

Figure 3. Egypt & CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (1981 – 2011)
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It is significant that all six of the societal variables were present in Egypt. It is also
not coincidental that all six societal variables were also present in Tunisia. This suggests
societal variables played a key role in convincing militaries to defect incumbent regimes and
to support mass political protesters. All six societal variables appeared to have a significant
role on Egyptian military defection and increased the legitimacy of the uprising considering
protests were large, broad-based, non-violent, consisted of non-traditional protesters, and
actively won over the military. These findings echo the research from Zunes (1994),
Chenoweth and Stepan (2011), and Nepstad (2013) that states that broad-based coalitions,
non-violence, and large number of protesters can increase the legitimacy of the protests and
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make state repressions more costly and less likely. In addition, since Egypt is the most
populous Arab country, the protests in Tahrir Square received tremendous amount of
international media coverage, which also raised the costs of repression for the Egyptian
military. The protesters' tactics to specifically win over the military during the Egyptian
uprising evoke similar tactics used by demonstrators in the 1986 Philippine uprising
(Boudreau 2004) and during the 1979 Iranian Revolution (Kurzman 2004). Overall, all six of
the societal variables were present in Egypt and appear to have played a significant role in
influencing the Egyptian military to defect from the Mubarak regime and to not use high
levels of violence against the civilian protesters.
International Variables
Of the three international variables one was present in Egypt and the other two were
absent. The one international variable present in Egypt was the high proportion of Egyptian
officers that received training and education from foreign militaries. The Egyptian military
has maintained close relationships with foreign militaries ever since the 1952 Free Officers'
coup. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the pan-Arab ideology of President Nasser linked
Egypt with Syria through the United Arab Republic. From the late 1950s to the mid-1970s
the Egyptian military was closely associated with the Soviet Union. For instance, President
Mubarak received military training in the Soviet Union prior to becoming president while he
was a pilot in the Egyptian Air Force (Holmes 2012, 394). Along with Mubarak, it is believed
approximately 6,250 other Egyptian military personnel were trained and educated by the
Soviets in the USSR during the 1960s and 1970s (Campbell 2009, 104). In the mid-1970s,
President Sadat moved Egyptian military influence away from the Soviet Union and towards
the United States, which resulted in the historic Camp David Accords of 1979. Afterwards,
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the United States became the primary benefactor of the Egyptian military both in terms of
military aid, equipment, training, and education opportunities, and during the 1980s
approximately 400 to 500 Egyptian military personnel per year were trained in the U.S.
(Campbell 2009, 106-107). More recently, the Department of Defense notes that in 2010,
811 Egyptians received military training and education in the U.S., but given the large size of
the Egyptian military this only represents .002 percent of the total Egyptian military.56
However, the small proportion of Egyptian officers that receive training by the United States
does not paint the entire picture of American influence on the Egyptian military. First, many
of the Egyptian military personnel who receive foreign military training and education are
officers and therefore have a more powerful position in the Egyptian military hierarchy and
are better placed to guide the overall direction of the Egyptian military. Second, U.S. foreign
aid to Egypt is nearly unparalleled as recent accounts indicate that from 1949 – 2015 the U.S.
provided Egypt with a total of $76 billion in bilateral foreign aid, including $1.3 billion a year
in military aid from 1987 to 2015 (Sharp 2016, 13). Brownlee (2012, 10) demonstrates that
the U.S.' role in Egypt goes well beyond a traditional bilateral economic agreement since the
U.S. plays an active role in Egyptian affairs by "shaping the calculations, priorities, and
resources of the [Mubarak] regime." Given the tremendous amount of aid the U.S. provides
Egypt, it is only natural to assume the U.S. has some sort of agency or leverage over
Egyptian affairs.
During the Egyptian uprising, on January 29, 2011, several senior officers from the
Egyptian military happened to be in Washington D.C. for bilateral meetings and senior
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officers from the U.S. military met with Egyptian officers and urged them to show restraint
if the military was ordered to confront protesters.57 Overall, the U.S. has had an active
relationship with the Egyptian military for the last thirty years and it appears the effects of
training, education, and military aid had some influence on the Egyptian military to defect
from the Mubarak regime.
The two international variables absent in Egypt was no neighboring military defected
from their incumbent regime, and foreign troops did not invade Egypt with the aim of
overthrowing Mubarak. Egypt is bordered by Libya to the west, Sudan to the south, and
Israel to the east. While factions of the Libyan military defected from Qaddafi during the
Libyan uprising, these defections occurred later in 2011 after the Egyptian uprising already
took place. Thus, the factions of Libyan military personnel that defected from the Libyan
regime could not have impacted the decision-making of the Egyptian military during the
Egyptian uprising.
There is also the issue that no foreign troops invaded Egypt during the uprising.
Even though foreign troops did not invade Egypt or have a direct effect upon Egyptian
military behavior during the uprising, foreign powers, especially the U.S. had an indirect role.
At the outset of the protests the United States was still supportive of the Mubarak regime
and on January 25, 2011, Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton claimed that despite the
protests, “the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the
legitimate needs and interests of the Egyptian people.”58 A few days later, on January 27,
2011, Vice-President Biden appeared on television and echoed Clinton's views and stated
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Mubarak is not a dictator, nor was it time for Mubarak to step down from office.59 However,
as the protests continued, the U.S. government began to reevaluate its support for Mubarak
and on January 30, 2011, the U.S. government first referenced the term “transition” when
discussing the situation in Egypt.60 The Obama administration distanced itself more
noticeably from the Mubarak regime after the February 2 Tahrir Square attacks by stating
that Mubarak needed to speed up his exit from power and leave office as soon as possible. 61
But U.S. foreign policy towards Egypt during this time was not clear or decisive.
Complicating the matter was President Obama's decision to ask former U.S. Ambassador to
Egypt, and close friend of President Mubarak, Frank Wisner, to meet with Mubarak with the
hopes Wisner’s personal touch would be better received by the Egyptian president.62
However, after meeting with Mubarak, Wisner publically announced that he thought
Mubarak should remain in power and thought President Mubarak’s continued leadership was
critical for the stability of Egypt.
The United States’ role during the Egyptian uprising was complicated as the Obama
administration was caught between wanting to support Mubarak, its longtime ally, yet also
recognizing the validity of the mass political protests gripping the country and wanting to
avoid being on the wrong side of history. To further complicate the matter were regional
politics and Washington did not want Egypt to devolve into domestic turmoil in which the
PBS Newshour, “Exclusive Biden: Mubarak is Not a Dictator, But People Have a Right to Protest,” January
27, 2011, accessed on March 1, 2016. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics-jan-june11-biden_01-27/.
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peace arrangement between Egypt and Israel would become jeopardized. Overall, the
variable of foreign troop invasion did not exist in the Egyptian case, however, that does not
mean international factors were unimportant or non-existent. The MENA Military Index
measures the international impact of military behavior through three variables: direct foreign
military intervention, foreign military education and training, and the actions of a contiguous
military. However, the U.S.' role in the Egyptian uprising suggest that additional international
variables can also influence military behavior during mass political protests such as foreign
military aid, bilateral relations, diplomatic relations, and communicative channels between
governments.
Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates that societal and institutional variables best explain why
the Egyptian military defected from the Mubarak regime during the Egyptian uprising. Egypt
contained numerous institutional variables such as the prevalence of internal security forces
and their role as a rival and countermeasure to the Egyptian military, the military's
institutional autonomy to make personnel decisions within the armed forces, the cleavages
that existed between military personnel particularly along generational and socio-economic
lines, and the system of military conscription. In isolation, these institutional variables were
not enough to cause military defection in Egypt since many of these factors have existed in
the country for decades. Rather, the Egyptian military needed an event to trigger defection
from the regime, which took place during the historical mass demonstrations of the
Egyptian uprising. The Egyptian uprising contained specific societal variables that influenced
the Egyptian military to defect from the regime. For instance the Egyptian uprising was
large, it contained a cross-class coalition of protesters, it consisted of non-traditional
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protesters, it was non-violent, and protesters were successful at winning over the Egyptian
military. These characteristics differed from previous protests in Egyptian history such as the
Bread Riots of 1977 and the CSF Riots of 1986, when the military violently intervened
against protesters and protected the regime. The MENA Military Index indicates that Egypt
was the MENA country most likely to defect from its regime during the Arab uprisings and
as this chapter demonstrates, this was indeed the case and the primary reason the Egyptian
military defected from Mubarak was due to existing institutional variables coupled with the
particular societal characteristics of the Egyptian uprising.

CHAPTER 6:
THE BAHRAINI MILITARY DURING THE ARAB UPRISINGS
This chapter examines the Bahraini military during the Arab uprisings. The Bahraini
protests began on February 13, 2011, only two days after President Mubarak resigned as the
Egyptian president in Cairo. A wave of demonstrations engulfed the island country for
approximately a month from mid-February 2011 through mid-March 2011. Since Bahrain is
a small country with only 1.3 million inhabitants, international media did not cover the
protests as much as the uprisings in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. However, the protests in
Bahrain were historic as hundreds-of-thousands of demonstrators took to the streets calling
for regime change and faced-off against state security forces deployed by the government.
The events in Bahrain are critical to examine in this project because the Bahraini military,
unlike the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries examined in Chapters 4 and 5, defended the
ruling regime and willingly used violence against protesters throughout the duration of the
uprising. After a month of demonstrations, several thousand military troops from the GCC
entered Bahrain and protected the ruling regime from anti-government protests. Shortly
afterwards the Bahraini government issued a state of emergency, expanded the control of
state security forces, and razed the "Pearl Monument" in downtown Manama, which served
as the central congregation spot and symbol for anti-government protests.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine why the Bahraini military defended the
ruling regime during the Bahraini uprising. The first section provides a historical overview of
the Bahraini military and discusses the role and development of the Bahraini military from
169

the 1800s until the 2011 uprising. The second section explores the major events during
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the Bahraini uprising and highlights the role the Bahraini military played during the
demonstrations. The third section applies the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index
to Bahrain and identifies the variables that influenced Bahraini military behavior during the
protests. According to the MENA Military Index there were numerous variables present in
Bahrain that influenced the military to defend the ruling regime. A key finding is even
though the Bahraini uprising shared similar characteristics to the protests in Egypt and
Tunisia, the Bahraini military did not possess the necessary institutional variables to induce
military defection. Moreover, there were international variables in Bahrain that encouraged
the Bahraini military to defend the regime, notably, a regional ally, Saudi Arabia, and a global
ally, the United States that preferred the status quo in Bahraini politics and opposed regime
change from taking place in the country.
Background of the Bahraini Military
To better understand the role of the Bahraini military during the Bahraini uprising it
is useful to examine the evolution and role of the Bahraini armed forces in relation to
Bahraini politics. One of the unique factors of Bahrain is since it was a British protectorate
throughout most of the 1800s and 1900s, there was no need for a Bahraini military since the
island was defended and protected by British military forces. As the United Kingdom (UK)
expanded its colonial operations in India and South Asia in the 1800s the British Royal Navy
wanted to ensure British shipping lanes were secure from piracy on the Indian Ocean and
Persian Gulf. As a way to protect British commercial interests and to expand Britain's
diplomatic influence in the region, the UK signed numerous treaties with sheikhdoms
including one with Bahrain in 1820. This treaty legitimized the royal rule of the al-Khalifa
family, gave the British Royal Navy access to Bahraini ports, and in return the British Royal

Navy provided military protection to Bahrain (Lawson 1989, 27-45; Strobl 2011, 24).
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British military protection meant Bahrain did not need to develop military forces throughout
the 1800s and 1900s and the establishment of the Bahraini military only occurred once
British forces left the country and Bahrain was provided with full independence in 1971.
Even though the Bahraini military was not established until 1971, Bahrain developed
and institutionalized a domestic police force in 1932 comprised largely of foreigners. The
British struggled to create a Bahraini police force that amicably and fairly combined Bahraini
Sunnis and Bahraini Shias and after numerous attempts the British decided to recruit foreign
soldiers from nearby India, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Yemen (Khuri 1980, 115). For many
Bahrainis, the fact the country’s police forces consisted of foreigners was a microcosm of the
overall influence foreign actors had over the domestic politics of Bahrain. This included the
economic sector, which was heavily dictated by foreign governments and foreign companies
and despite Bahrain's increased oil production during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s the wealth
from petroleum was distributed to foreign companies and a small domestic elite rather than
to the majority of Bahrainis (Lawson 1989, 47-58). The booming success of the Bahraini
petroleum industry also led to an influx of South Asian workers who migrated to the country
to work for the main petroleum company, the Bahrain Petroleum Company. These factors
created a cauldron of discontent and many Bahrainis were upset with how the country was
heavily dictated by foreign police officers, foreign workers that took domestic jobs, foreign
companies that benefitted from Bahraini oil, and a foreign power, the United Kingdom, that
still controlled the island. Unsurprisingly, a fervent Bahraini national sovereignty movement
gripped the country in the 1950s with mass political protesters taking to the streets and
demanding political change (Lawson 1989, 62).

The Bahraini national movement grew violent in the mid-1950s, which resulted
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in the Bahraini government strengthening the country's internal security forces. Since many
Bahraini police forces were non-Bahrainis it meant these officers were loyal to the regime
and not to Bahraini citizens, and therefore foreign police officers were more willing to use
violence against Bahraini protesters. The sectarian rifts in Bahrain ruptured during the
nationalist movements of the 1950s and pitted majority Shias against minority Sunnis.
Although the Shias outnumbered the Sunnis, the al-Khalifa regime was Sunni-based and
Sunnis enjoyed a privileged status in Bahraini politics. Once Shias began challenging the alKhalifa regime in the 1950s many Bahraini Sunnis enlisted in the country's police forces
giving the Bahraini internal security forces a distinguishable sectarian division between
Sunnis and Shias (Lawson 1989, 66-68).
The primary reason Bahrain gained independence was because the British
government decided by the late 1960s that it was time to leave the island and grant the
country with full sovereignty. The Bahraini independence movement was a top-down, elite
arrangement where the British left the island and transferred formal political power to the
Sunni-based al-Khalifa royal regime. As a result the establishment of the Bahraini military
was an al-Khalifa creation. In the late 1960s, once it was known the British would be
vacating the island, Emir Isa's eldest son, Hamad, was enrolled at Mons Officer Cadet
School in England and after graduating at the age of twenty-one, Hamad returned to Bahrain
and served as the country's first defense minister for the new military force, the Bahrain
Defence Front (BDF) (al-Murshed 2013; Gengler 2013, 64).
After independence, Emir Isa attempted to broaden political participation by
creating a Constitutional Assembly to write the country’s constitution. It took over a year to
write and approve the constitution and once completed it established a unicameral

parliament known as the National Assembly, which was a group of thirty representatives
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who were authorized to give advice and consent to the laws initiated by the emir and his
cabinet. However, the National Assembly only lasted one-year since representatives
challenged the emir’s authority, particularly in regards to internal and national security issues
(Lawson 1989, 87 – 91). Three specific security issues divided the National Assembly and the
emir. First, representatives in the National Assembly challenged the continuation of the 1965
Public Security Law, which provided Bahraini security forces with sweeping powers to arrest
and detain citizens without due judicial process. Second, the emir wanted to expand these
laws and give the Bahraini security forces the right to arrest and imprison any individual
suspected of disturbing national security for up to three years without interrogation or
holding a trial (Khuri 1980, 231). Third, several National Assembly representatives failed to
ratify a state security decree that would have extended the lease of U.S. naval ships using
Bahraini ports as docking facilities (Lawson 1989, 91). After months of stalled negotiations
the emir decided it was easier to dismiss the National Assembly and ended the parliamentary
experiment in Bahraini politics.
After the disbandment of the National Assembly mass protests broke out across the
country. Large segments of the population participated in the demonstrations but some of
the most fervent protests were from workers in March 1972 who demanded the creation of
a national labor union. In response to these mass protests Emir Isa deployed internal
security forces and military soldiers onto the streets to suppress the demonstrations.1 It is
significant to remember at this point the BDF had only been in existence for one year, yet
Emir Isa demonstrated he was willing to order the country's new military force onto the
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For more see Shaul Yanai, The Political Transformation of Gulf Tribal States: Elitism and the Social Contract in Kuwait,
Bahrain, and Dubai, 1918-1970s (Eastbourne, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2014).

streets to confront anti-government protesters. Similarly, the Bahraini military showed it
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was willing to use violence against civilians when ordered to by the regime.
In the upcoming years the Bahraini military became less involved in domestic
security primarily because the royal family enlarged the internal security forces, which were
able to effectively monitor domestic security. The BDF was shielded by the regime from the
general public and as a result the emir employed a strategy to build up the Bahraini military
via relationships with wealthy and powerful foreign countries. In particular, the Bahraini
military expanded its capabilities through the assistance of foreign military aid from the
United States. Similar to the British Royal Navy in the 1800s and early 1900s, in the late
1900s the American Navy wanted to expand its military and diplomatic influence across the
Persian Gulf, and Emir Isa, much like his Bahraini royal predecessors a century prior, was
willing to accommodate to the powerful Western country. The BDF received equipment,
weapons, materiel, and military training in exchange for allowing the American military
access to Bahraini ports and military facilities. In the 1980s, U.S. military assistance increased
to Bahrain especially after the 1979 Iranian revolution. The Shia population in Bahrain has
historically been linked to Iran and after the 1979 Iranian revolution removed the shah from
power and established a Shia Islamist state, many Shias in Bahrain yearned for a similar
outcome to occur in Bahrain. Two years after the Iranian revolution a group called the
Islamic Front of the Liberalization of Bahrain unsuccessfully attempted a coup to overthrow
Emir Isa with the hopes of installing a Shia Islamic state in Bahrain. The coup plotters
planned to attack the country’s government offices, hold government ministers hostage,
seize the country’s telecommunication buildings, and impose an Iranian style revolution.
However, the Bahraini internal security forces detected these plans before they unfolded and
most of the movement’s key figures were arrested and as a result Bahraini state security

forces fiercely cracked down on the country's Shia population.2 The aftermath of the
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failed 1981 coup impacted the sectarian divisions between Shias and Sunnis within the
country and started a process in which Shias were systematically removed from the Bahraini
military.
In the early 1990s many Bahrainis were upset the country still did not reinstate the
parliament the emir dissolved two decades prior. At this time there were mass
demonstrations and even a formal petition calling for the emir to revive the constitution and
parliament.3 At first the emir responded to these demands and created the Consultative
Council, which was comprised of thirty representatives and advised on legislation initiated by
the emir and his cabinet. However, despite this gesture many critics claimed the Consultative
Council was a watered-down political body with no substantive powers. Shias were especially
upset because they believed the Council contained a disproportionate number of Sunnis in
relation to the majority Shia population (Louër 2013, 247). The creation of the Consultative
Council did little to reduce political unrest across the country and demonstrations continued
throughout the 1990s and in many instances the Bahraini internal security forces responded
to these demonstrations with violence, as there are reports state security forces fired tear gas
canisters, rubber bullets, and even live ammunition at protesters. The security situation
became so intense that in 1996 BDF soldiers were briefly deployed onto the streets to quell
demonstrators.4
Even though mass protests gripped Bahrain during the 1990s, this was also a time of
tremendous growth and expansion for the Bahraini military through the utilization of
2
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3 Joe Stork, "Routine Abuse, Routine Denial: Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain," Human Rights
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American military aid. At the beginning of the decade Bahrain cooperated with the
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multilateral military campaign against Iraq in Kuwait, allowed U.S. military personnel to use
the country as a base, and even sent some pilots to lead aerial missions against Saddam
Hussein's troops in Iraq (Katzman 2011, 12). The American-Bahraini relationship blossomed
after the Kuwait War as the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet became permanently headquartered in
Bahrain in 1995 (where it is still stationed today). 5 Also, the Bahraini military expanded its
weaponry and artillery in the late 1990s by purchasing equipment from the U.S. including F16 aircrafts, advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles, and numerous other weapons and
materiel (Katzman 2011, 14). By the turn of the twenty-first century, the Bahraini military
was still small but had built up its weapon capabilities through the assistance of the U.S. and
was a pivotal actor in regional security.
Political changes occurred in Bahrain at the turn of the twenty-first century with the
sudden death of Emir Isa in 1999. Isa's eldest son, Hamad, took over and immediately
ushered in political changes by releasing political prisoners, repealing controversial state
security laws, abolishing the State Security Courts, initiating a national referendum to create a
forty-member parliament, granting women the right to vote, creating an independent
judiciary, and introducing the National Action Charter that called for the creation of a
constitutional monarchy.6 At first it appeared King Hamad was going to usher in a new era
of Bahraini politics that drastically differed from his father's rule, but after the first wave of
political changes, Hamad entrenched his regime and proposed policies that reduced political
access for the opposition. For example, in 2002, King Hamad unilaterally changed the
5
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The 2002 Constitution made Bahrain a constitutional monarchy and as a result Hamad's title changed from
"Emir" to "King." After 2002, Hamad will be referred to as King Hamad. For general information on the
political reforms that took place in Bahrain in 2001-2002 see BICI (2011, 31-32), Coates Ulrichsen (2013, 2),
Kechichian (2004, 40), and Wehrey (2013, 119).

constitution and gave himself unchecked powers, limited the power of the parliament,
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and passed a controversial law, Decree Law No. 55, which gave criminal amnesty to security
officers who were accused of committing crimes under his father's regime.7
Despite King Hamad reneging on several of the political concessions he provided in
2001, he maintained the Bahraini parliament and continued parliamentary elections, which
were held in 2002, 2006, and 2010. However, these parliamentary elections were highly
controversial and created significant ruptures between Shias and the regime. For example, in
2002, one of the most popular Shia opposition parties, al-Wefaq, boycotted the elections
because they felt the composition of available seats was unfair and underrepresented Shias
(Katzman 2011, 2).
Four years later, in 2006, government documents were leaked to the public and
accused the al-Khalifa regime of creating numerous institutional measures to ensure Sunni
dominance in Bahraini politics such as blocking Shias from key political positions, employing
gerrymandering tactics to ensure Shias did not hold a majority of the population in key
districts, and expediting the naturalization of foreign Sunnis to increase the total Sunni
population of the country.8 By the time the Tunisian protests toppled Ben Ali in Tunis and
Egyptian protesters forced Mubarak out of office, there were decades of political turmoil in
Bahrain ready to explode. The royal al-Khalifa family installed a political system many Shias
viewed as unfair and it is unsurprising Bahrain experienced unrest, violence, and mass
demonstrations in the early months of 2011. On February 13, just two days after Mubarak
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resigned as the Egyptian president, the Bahraini uprising began with mass political
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protests, demonstrations, and unrest across the country.
Overall, there are six key factors to better understand the Bahraini military at the
outbreak of the 2011 protests. First, the Bahraini military lacks a strong national identity and
history. Second, the reason the Bahraini military lacks a strong national identity is because
historically there was no need for a Bahraini military since the British military protected the
island for over a century. Third, once the British left Bahrain and granted the country with
independence, the Bahraini military was an elite construction specifically created to protect
the regime. As discussed earlier, the emir's twenty-one year-old son, Hamad, became the
country's first defense minister even though he possessed limited military experience.
Fourth, even though Bahrain’s expansive internal security apparatus efficiently monitored
and controlled domestic security in the country, the BDF was ordered to support internal
security forces during the 1972 labor strikes and the unrest of the mid-1990s. This
demonstrates the Bahraini military was willing to use violence and force against anti-regime
protesters. Fifth, the Bahraini military expanded through assistance from the American
military. The Bahraini military was essentially an appendage of the ruling regime and since
the Bahraini political system blocked political opposition, the ruling regime was able to
shield the Bahraini military from civilian influence and the al-Khalifa regime unilaterally
guided the direction and development of the Bahraini military. The al-Khalifa regime
partnered with the U.S. and in return the Bahraini military was able to build up Bahrain’s
military capabilities. Sixth, due to the unique domestic demographics, the Bahraini military
was primarily comprised of Sunnis. The marginalization of Shias in the armed forces became
more pronounced during the last several decades, but the sectarian and communal divide
had tremendous influence on Bahraini military behavior and motivations. The next section

of this chapter explores the Bahraini uprising in detail and specifically examines the role
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the Bahraini military played during this historic month of protests in Bahraini politics.
The Uprising in Bahrain and the Role of the Military
During the summer of 2009, many Shia Bahrainis paid close attention to the faileduprising in Iran, popularly referred to as the “green movement.” However, it was not until
the outbreak of the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia when Bahrainis truly became galvanized
and determined to demonstrate against the ruling Bahraini government. At Shia mosques in
early February 2011, religious clerics referenced the Egyptian and Tunisian protesters during
sermons and called for Bahrainis to demonstrate and achieve political outcomes similar to
those in Cairo and Tunis (BICI 2011, 66). In Egypt, President Mubarak resigned on
February 11, 2011, and two days later the uprising began in Bahrain. Initially the protests
were small but King Hamad immediately ordered internal security forces onto the streets to
directly confront demonstrators. On the first day of protests Bahraini internal security forces
fired tear gas and rubber bullets at demonstrators.9 Protests intensified the next day as an
estimated 6,000 demonstrators flooded the streets and state security forces violently
responded to the unrest, which led to the first civilian death of the uprising. On the evening
of February 14, 2011, Ali al-Meshaima, a twenty-two year-old male, was shot in the back
from a shotgun by state security forces in the town of Daih, a suburb due west of the
capital.10 The next day al-Meshaima's funeral drew thousands of mourners and the
procession quickly became a protest march that clashed with state security forces still

9
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stationed in the area. Coincidentally, the confrontation between the protesters and the
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state security forces at the funeral wake resulted in another death as a civilian was shot and
killed by a shotgun from a state security soldier.
The events from February 13 to February 15 sparked further demonstrations across
the country and the most significant development was the thousands of protesters who
descended upon the capital city of Manama and centralized around the "Pearl Roundabout,"
a major intersection with a 300-foot pearl monument. By February 16, 2011, nearly 12,000
protesters congregated at the Pearl Roundabout and demonstrations created a carnival-type
atmosphere akin to Tahrir Square during the Egyptian uprising as people set up tents, shared
foods and stories, slept in the roundabout, and gathered in unity.11 On the fourth day of the
uprising, and in the early hours of February 17, 2011, the al-Khalifa government deployed
military soldiers onto the streets to support internal security forces and to confront the
protesters at the Pearl Roundabout. At 3:00 a.m., while thousands of demonstrators were
sleeping, 1,000 state security forces (both internal security forces and military soldiers)
descended upon the Pearl Roundabout and physically dispersed protesters (BICI 2011, 73).
According to the regime, security forces warned protesters over loudspeakers to clear the
square before marching in, but many protesters disagree and claim security forces invaded
the square unannounced and without warning.12 Security personnel were armed with sticks,
shields, sound bombs, tear gas, and shotguns, and it took security forces only thirty minutes
to clear the majority of the square and in the melee three civilians were reported to have
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died.13 After the Pearl Roundabout was cleared the Bahraini military increased its
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presence around the capital as dozens of tanks and armed vehicles were deployed across the
city to set up checkpoints and monitor the general movement around Manama.14 The
following day, February 18, 2011, there were several confrontations between BDF soldiers
and protesters. First, it was reported BDF soldiers were stationed outside the Salmaniya
Medical Complex, a major medical facility in Manama, and blocked civilians’ access to the
hospital, since security forces believed civilians with injuries were protesters who had
instigated violence against the regime.15 Second, approximately two thousand protesters
marched back towards the Pearl Roundabout in an attempt to reclaim the area from security
forces. On their way there demonstrators confronted armed military soldiers and started
chanting anti-military slogans, which escalated into violent clashes and led to the death of
another civilian (BICI 2011, 77-78 and 233-234).
The chaos of the previous six days influenced senior officials from the leading Shia
opposition party, al-Wefaq, to meet with the Crown Prince and request the regime withdraw
military soldiers from the streets and provide some political concessions to the
demonstrators. In an act of goodwill the al-Khalifa regime initiated a formal national
dialogue with opposition leaders, ordered Bahraini military and security forces stationed in
the Pearl Roundabout to step down, and announced the reopening of the Pearl Roundabout
13
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to demonstrators.16 The departure of military and security forces inspired thousands of
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Bahrainis to retake the streets and it appeared as if the Bahraini uprising might accomplish
similar political achievements to the protests in Egypt and Tunisia. Anti-regime protesters
had momentum on their side and by February 22, 2011, an estimated 100,000 demonstrators
descended upon the Pearl Roundabout to commemorate the civilians killed in the protests
during the prior two weeks.17
The size of the February 22 demonstrations was phenomenal especially considering
the population of Bahrain was only 1.3 million meaning approximately 10 percent of the
entire population was at this protest. After security forces reopened the Pearl Roundabout to
protesters there were three noticeable changes to the uprising. One, mass protests became
more focused on anti-regime chants rather than concentrating on policy changes. Two,
demonstrators started staging sit-ins and gatherings in sensitive areas across the city. For
example, on March 3, 2011, an estimated 100,000-450,000 anti-regime protesters
congregated outside of the al-Fateh mosque, which is located only several blocks away from
the American naval base.18 Additionally, nearly 100,000 demonstrators marched in front of
the Council of Ministers and the Prime Ministers' office on March 4 and March 6.19 Three,
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on March 11 protesters aimed their sights directly on the royal family as thousands of
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demonstrators gathered outside of the king's residence.20
These changes had profound effects on the ruling regime’s interpretation of the
uprising. The anti-regime rhetoric, the spread of protests to critical political and economic
areas in the capital, and the royal family’s residence being specifically targeted inspired King
Hamad to call on regional security forces from the GCC to enter Bahrain in order to protect
the regime from anti-government protesters. On Monday March 14, approximately 1,000
GCC troops entered the country and were sent to the southern region of the country to
protect the country's oil refineries and other vital government locations. 21 The presence of
GCC troops was vital to the regime as it allowed Bahraini state security forces the ability to
directly confront demonstrators without fear that key governmental buildings and facilities
were unguarded. On March 15, 2011, King Hamad declared a three-month state of
emergency and initiated martial law, which redeployed the Bahraini military and also gave the
BDF the authority to use force in order to maintain security across the country.22
Thousands of Bahrainis flooded the streets in response to the state of emergency and
the presence of foreign troops in the country. For example, 10,000 demonstrators marched
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to the Saudi Arabian embassy protesting against the Saudi soldiers that invaded the
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country.23 Protesters reported that Saudi military vehicles fired on Bahraini civilians leading
to several deaths, a claim denied by Bahraini and Saudi officials.24 The assistance of GCC
troops and the initiation of Bahraini martial law changed the tone of the uprising and
signaled the regime's willingness to use force and violence to suppress the movement. On
March 16, 2011, BDF soldiers and internal security forces cleared demonstrators from the
Pearl Roundabout for the second time in one month. In addition, the Bahraini security
forces swept through the entire capital and cleared protesters from the Financial Harbor
district, and the Salmaniya Medical Complex.25 Two days later, the uprising effectively ended
as BDF soldiers razed the 300-foot pearl statue that was the centerpiece of the Pearl
Roundabout.26 The government claimed this decision was made to improve traffic flow in
the area, but the razing of the statue was a symbolic blow to the uprising and demonstrated
the regime was willing to physically remove the remnants of the anti-government movement.
During mid-February to mid-March the Bahraini military demonstrated on
numerous occasions it was willing to protect the regime and use violence against antigovernment demonstrators. Moreover, the state of emergency meant the Bahraini military
was stationed across the country for the next three months as unrest continued into the
summer of 2011. Similar to Egypt and Tunisia, Bahrain created a commission to investigate
23
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the events that took place during the uprising and to specifically outline the role of the
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government and the state security forces. The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry
(BICI) produced a 500-page report on the uprising released, which was in November of
2011.27 Overall, the BICI catalogues the events that took place during the uprising and the
specific role internal security forces and the military played during the uprising. Tellingly, the
report indicates that the BDF was active during the uprising, wielded assault rifles and
machine guns, fired on demonstrators, deployed tanks and armored vehicles, incited
violence, blocked access to the Salmaniya Medical Complex, cleared the Pearl Roundabout
on two occasions, fired on protesters, and razed the Pearl Monument. Unlike the Egyptian
and Tunisian militaries the Bahraini military willingly followed regime orders throughout the
duration of the uprising and utilized sustained violence against anti-government protesters.
The key question of this chapter is to examine the variables that influenced the
Bahraini military to defend the al-Khalifa regime during the Bahraini uprising and use
violence against civilians? To answer this question the following section examines the twenty
variables of the MENA Military Index and identifies the variables that best explain why the
Bahraini military defended the al-Khalifa regime.
The MENA Military Index & Bahrain
This section examines the twenty variables of the MENA Military Index and
specifically focuses on the variables that influenced the Bahraini military to defend the
regime and use violence against anti-regime protesters. As discussed in Chapter 3, Bahrain
possesses a MENA Military Index Score of 0.30, which means only six of the twenty
variables influencing military defection were present in the country. Table 13 illustrates the
twenty variables from the MENA Military Index in Bahrain and indicates which variables
27
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were present in the country (labeled as “yes”) and which of the variables were not
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present (labeled as "no").
The fourteen variables that contributed to the Bahraini military's decision to defend
the regime and use high levels of violence against protesters include: (1) the lack of
communal splits within the military between soldiers, (2) the lack of socio-economic rifts
within the military, (3) the absence of a parallel security force that rivals and serves as a
counterbalance to the Bahraini military, (4) the absence of a significant rivalry between the
military and the Bahraini internal security forces, (5) the absence of any rivalries between the
different military branches in the Bahraini armed forces, (6) the absence of significant
rivalries or splits between senior and junior soldiers, (7) the absence of military conscription,
(8) the military's lack of autonomy in making internal appointments within the armed forces,
(9) soldiers’ overall satisfaction with regime benefits, (10) the king individually appointed the
defense minister and the leading generals in the Bahraini military, (11) orders for the military
to confront protesters came directly from the king, (12) the protest movement's inability to
win over Bahraini soldiers, (13) GCC troops invaded the country to support the al-Khalifa
regime, and (14) no neighboring military defected from their regime during the Arab
uprisings. Of these fourteen variables eight are institutional and address characteristics
within the military and the country’s security apparatus, three variables address the
relationship between the military and the regime, one variable is societal and based upon the
characteristics of the Bahraini uprising, and two variables address international dynamics.
In addition to the fourteen variables that influenced the Bahraini military to defend
the al-Khalifa regime, there were five variables that could have influenced military defection
but did not. This includes (1) the monumental size of the uprising and how it represented
well over one percent of the country's total population, (2) the Bahraini uprising included

non-traditional protesters such as women, the elderly, and children, (3) the non-violent
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nature of the protest movements, (4) the Bahraini military did not commit egregious human
rights violations against civilians in the country’s history, and (5) the broad-based nature of
the protests. The final variable (#20) is highlighted because the events in Bahrain contradict
the expected results of the MENA Military Index. The theory behind this variable argues
that if a high percentage officers and soldiers received military training and education from a
foreign country then those military personnel would be more likely to defect from the
regime during the Arab uprisings. Even though a significant number of Bahraini military
personnel received military training and education from the United States, this aspect did not
influence the Bahraini military to defect from the al-Khalifa regime and there is evidence
Bahrain’s relationship with the U.S. had the opposite effect and actually contributed to the
Bahraini military defending the regime.
Chapters 4 and 5 examined the military defection in Tunisia and Egypt and overall
those two militaries defected from the ruling regime for two reasons. First, Tunisia and
Egypt possessed existing institutional variables prior to the breakout of the Arab uprisings
that made military defection more likely. For example, both Egypt and Tunisia had parallel
security forces that rivaled and counter-balanced the country’s military, in both countries
there were significant rivalries between the military and internal security forces at the
outbreak of the uprisings, both countries had a system of military conscription, and both
countries’ militaries had institutional autonomy to make personnel decisions within the
military hierarchy. Second, and equally as important, the protests in Egypt and Tunisia
contained the necessary societal ingredients that provided the opportunity for military
defection. The protests in Egypt and Tunisia were large, non-violent, broad-based, contained
non-traditional protesters, and were successful at winning over the military.

Table 13. Bahrain and the MENA Military Index Variables
Variable
Institutional 1. Communal splits between soldiers?
2. Socio-economic rifts between soldiers?
3. Parallel security forces to military?
4. Rivalry between military and other security
forces?
5. Rivalries between military branches?

Yes/No
Variable
No
11. Did orders to intervene come
from someone other than the ruling
leader?
No
12. Uprising larger than 1% of
population?
No
13. Protesters include women and
children?
No
14. Uprising non-violent in nature?
No

6. Senior vs. Junior splits?
7. Conscription?

No
No

8. Military have autonomy in appointments?

No

Regime 9. Soldiers unsatisfied with regime benefits?

No

10. Someone other than the current leader
appointed the Defense Minister and other
leading generals?

No

15. Military have clean record with
no human rights violations?
16. Were protests broad-based?
17. Did movement win over
soldiers?
18. Did foreign troops intervene to
overthrow leader?
19. Militaries of contiguous
countries defect?
20. Significant portion of soldiers
receive foreign military training?

Yes/No
No
Regime
Yes

Societal

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No

International

No
Yes
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This chapter shifts the focus and explores why the Bahraini military defended the alKhalifa regime and willingly utilized violence against civilian protesters during the country's
uprising. This chapter complements the central findings discovered in Chapters 4 and 5 by
demonstrating that Bahrain did not possess the existing institutional conditions present in
Egypt and Tunisia. Interestingly, the Bahraini uprising contained similar characteristics to the
protests in Egypt and Tunisia considering the Bahraini uprising was also large, generally nonviolent, broad-based, and consisted of non-traditional protesters. However, the Bahraini case
suggests that societal variables alone cannot influence military behavior because even though
these factors were present in the Bahraini uprising, they still were not enough to influence
military defection. This supports the potential significance that existing institutional variables
have upon laying the foundation for possible military defection.
The following subsections explore the institutional, regime, societal, and
international variables in more detail and discuss the role each of these variables had on
Bahraini military response during the uprising. The first subsection explores the eight
institutional variables, the second subsection explores the three regime variables, the third
subsection explores the six societal variables, and the fourth subsection explores the three
international variables. As these subsections reveal, Bahrain did not possess the necessary
existing institutional variables to influence military defection, even though the societal
characteristics of the country’s uprising certainly provided the military with the ingredients
and opportunity to defect. Moreover, in addition to the lack of institutional variables,
Bahrain is uniquely influenced by international factors and the fact Saudi Arabia and the U.S.
were in favor of the regime remaining in power also contributed to the Bahraini military
defending the al-Khalifa regime.
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Institutional Variables
All eight of the institutional variables in the MENA Military Index were not present
in Bahrain and these variables influenced the Bahraini military to defend the al-Khalifa
regime during the country’s uprising. The first two institutional variables are interrelated,
which include the absence of communal splits between military personnel within the
Bahraini armed forces and the absence of military conscription. In Bahrain, the primary
communal rift in the country exists between Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims. There are no
official numbers as to the percentage of Sunnis and Shias in the country, but a recent Pew
Research study suggests there are a total of 400,000-500,000 Shias in Bahrain, which equals
to approximately 60-70 percent of the country's population.28 Despite Shias' majority, the
Sunni minority possesses a disproportionate amount of power over the political and security
institutions of the country. For example, the Sunni-led al-Khalifa regime has implemented
political mechanisms that marginalize the Shia majority such as employing electoral
gerrymandering, specifically weakening Shias' role within the parliament, and inflating the
Sunni population by expediting the naturalization of Sunni foreigners (Gengler 2013, 69;
Neumann 2013, 47; Wehrey 2013, 119).
In addition to the political marginalization of Shias, the al-Khalifa regime has
marginalized Shias from the Bahraini security apparatus. In Bahrain, there is no military
conscription and even though military service is voluntary, Shias are unofficially discouraged
and barred from serving in the military. Louër (2013) argues that the exclusion of Shias in
the national security apparatus has been a tactical coup-proofing strategy utilized by the alKhalifa regime to ensure regime loyalty. The “de-Shiafication” of the Bahraini security
28

Pew Research Center, "Mapping the Global Muslim Population," October 7, 2009, accessed on April 8,
2016. http://www.pewforum.org/2009/10/07/mapping-the-global-muslim-population/.
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apparatus occurred most profoundly in the 1980s and the 1990s after the failed Shia coup
and as Shia opposition groups became more vocal and aggressive towards Emir Isa’s
policies. Louër (2013, 247) notes that in the 1990s a few Shia soldiers remained in the
Bahraini military but as Shia-led protests intensified during the decade, Shia soldiers were
either fired or forced into early retirement. It should be noted that even prior to the 1980s
and 1990s, the role of Shias in the Bahraini military was limited as Shias typically held lower
ranked positions in the military hierarchy.
Recent studies verify the absence of Shias from the Bahraini security apparatus. For
example, Gengler (2013, 69) conducted a small survey in 2009 asking Bahraini males their
profession and in the survey no Shia male claimed to work for the Bahraini security
apparatus, whereas 17 percent of the male Sunni respondents indicated they worked in the
Bahraini security apparatus. Another striking fact of the Bahraini security apparatus is that
foreigners are actively recruited by the al-Khalifa regime, so instead of Bahraini Shias filling
the ranks, Sunni recruits from neighboring countries such as Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, and Yemen serve as Bahraini soldiers or Bahraini police officers (Zunes 2013, 156;
Katzman 2011, 13).
Since Shias are excluded from the Bahraini security apparatus the Bahraini military
and internal security forces are religiously homogenous since officers and soldiers
overwhelmingly identify with Sunni Islam. As a result there are no internal communal splits
within the Bahraini armed forces and the communal bond between Sunni forces strengthens
the loyalty of the Bahraini military to the Sunni-led al-Khalifa regime. On the other hand, the
in-group communal bond of Sunni military personnel drives a wedge between the military
and the country’s Shia majority. The sectarian composition of the Bahraini armed forces is
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one of the stronger indicators explaining why the Bahraini military was willing to defend the
al-Khalifa regime during the Bahrain uprising. In addition, the absence of military
conscription means the entire Bahraini population is not mandated to serve in the Bahraini
armed forces and therefore the Bahraini military is not a “true” reflection of the communal
makeup of Bahraini society.
The third and fourth institutional variables absent in Bahrain and that potentially
influenced the Bahraini military to defend the al-Khalifa regime were no significant socioeconomic or generational splits between military personnel. It should be noted there are no
available data on the income, class, or age of Bahraini military personnel at the individual
level, which is not surprising given the closed nature of the al-Khalifa regime. However,
despite this lack of primary data, secondary information about the Bahraini military suggests
that socio-economic and generational splits between military personnel are not salient issues
that would cause military defection. The shared Sunni identity of Bahraini military personnel
indicates religious affiliation has a stronger role in the military than socio-economic or
generational identities. Also, since Bahrain does not possess military conscription there are
only a handful of Shias serving in the state's security apparatus. This is significant because
many Shias are economically marginalized by the regime and are generally poorer than their
Sunni counterparts.29 Since Shias are economically poorer than Sunnis, and since there are
hardly any Shias in the Bahraini military, that means there is less socio-economic variation
within the Bahraini armed forces. Lastly, the absence of military conscription also deters
generational splits since the Bahraini military is an all-volunteer force. Since Bahrain has an

29 BICI (2011, 24) and Tahiyya Lulu, "The real story of Bahrain's divided society," The Guardian, March 3, 2011,
accessed on April 10, 2016. http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/03/bahrain-sunnis-shiadivided-society.
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all-volunteer military, in theory, all Bahraini military personnel chose to enlist and therefore
this decreases the likelihood of insubordination.
The fifth institutional variable absent in Bahrain is the military does not possess high
levels of institutional autonomy when it comes to making appointments within the lower
ranks of the armed forces. In Bahrain, many of the military decisions are centralized through
the king and the royal family, and the ruling regime ensures military loyalty at the lower ranks
of the Bahraini armed forces by recruiting foreign Sunni soldiers from neighboring countries.
Another way the ruling regime constructs appointments in the armed forces is by not having
military conscription. In the Bahraini case the king and the ruling officers deliberately make
appointments throughout the military hierarchy to ensure loyalty to the regime. During the
Bahraini uprising lower level soldiers willingly followed royal orders and used violence
against protesters partially because the king and the ruling regime created systems that
ensured loyal soldiers occupied the lower levels of Bahrain’s armed forces.
The sixth institutional variable absent in Bahrain is there are no significant splits
within the Bahraini armed forces between separate military branches. The Bahraini military is
formally referred to as the Bahrain Defence Force (BDF) and contains approximately 8,200
soldiers in three separate branches including the army (6,000 soldiers), air force (1,500
soldiers), and navy (700 soldiers).30 Similar to many militaries, the army is the primary branch
in the BDF considering it has the majority of personnel and also garners a larger proportion
of the defense budget, materiel, and equipment. However, despite the larger role of the
Bahraini army, there is little evidence of significant splits between the armed force branches.
In fact, there are reports during the Bahraini uprising that air force planes were deployed to
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provide aerial support as protests culminated in mid-March 2011 (BICI 2011, 143). In
addition, all three military branches are unified and centralized under the al-Khalifa regime as
al-Khalifa family members occupy the top three positions in the BDF including the supreme
commander (King Hamad), commander-in-chief (Field Marshal Shiekh Khalifa Ben Ahmed
al-Khalifa), and the deputy commander-in-chief (Sheikh Salman Ben Hamad al-Khalifa).
This organizational structure deemphasizes the institutional strength of each military branch
and centralizes the three military branches under the auspices and control of the royal family.
Overall, there is no evidence that significant splits exist in the Bahraini armed forces and the
cohesion between the armed force branches actually increased the military’s likelihood of
supporting and protecting the regime.
The seventh and eighth institutional variables absent in Bahrain include the lack of a
significant rivalry between the military and the country’s internal security forces, and the fact
the internal security forces do not serve as a counterweight to the military. Bahrain has a
complex internal security apparatus that includes numerous organizations within the
country’s Ministry of Interior. The majority of internal security forces are referred to as the
Public Security Forces (PSF), which contain the police, Special Forces, counter-terrorism,
and the Coast Guard (BICI 2011, 52). During the uprising the PSF, especially the regular
police and riot police, were arguably the most active and publically visible security force
responding to the protests. The PSF were the frontline of the regime and these forces
frequently confronted civilians with violence during the protests.
Bahrain also has a National Guard and a National Security Agency (NSA) and both
forces straddle the line between internal and external security. The National Guard is an
independent military body comprised of approximately 1,200 soldiers and during the
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uprising National Guard troops protected government buildings, supported security forces
in the clearing of the Pearl Roundabout in March, and arrested citizens through royal decree
(BICI 2011, 55). A final security organization is the NSA, which was created in 2002 and
replaced the controversial General Directorate of State Security, a security body during Emir
Isa’s regime that was criticized for its secretive and strong-armed tactics, especially against
Shias. Initially the NSA was an internal intelligence and counter-espionage agency but shortly
after its creation its powers expanded and by 2011 it had become a formidable security
organization that had the purview to arrest, detain, and interrogate civilians (BICI 2011, 4549 and 53-54).
Bahrain possesses numerous internal security forces that could conceivably challenge,
offset, and serve as a counterweight to the Bahraini security forces. But unlike in Tunisia the
Bahraini internal security forces and the Bahraini military work in tandem with one another
to support the al-Khalifa regime. One of the main reasons for this is the entire Bahraini
national security apparatus is centralized under the direct control of the al-Khalifa royal
family. As explained above, the three most senior commanders in the BDF are all members
of the al-Khalifa family. However a similar configuration exists in the Bahraini internal
security forces as most forces are controlled by members of the al-Khalifa family. The
internal security forces in the Ministry of Interior, such as the PSF and the CID, report to
minister of interior, Rashid Ben Abdullah al-Khalifa, the NSA directly reports to the prime
minister, King Hamad’s uncle, Prince Khalifa Ben Salman al-Khalifa, and the National
Guard reports to the king’s brother, Major-General Mohammed Ben Isa al-Khalifa.31
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There are numerous reports of the Bahraini internal security apparatus and the BDF
working together during the Bahraini uprising. For example, the BICI reports that the BDF,
Ministry of Interior, and NSA forces collaborated on several occasions during the monthlong protest most notably during the two clearings of the Pearl Roundabout.32 There are
other examples of Bahraini military soldiers arresting and detaining suspects and then
handing them over to internal security forces, and during the end of the protests on March
16, 2011, there are reports internal and external security forces jointly cleared protesters
from the Salmaniya Medical Complex (BICI 2011, 144-145). Even prior to the Bahraini
uprising there is little evidence of animosity between the BDF and the internal security
forces and despite internal security forces having more troops than the BDF (11,260 in the
internal security versus 8,200 military soldiers),33 the regime does not perceive the internal
security forces and BDF as rivals. Rather, the ruling al-Khalifa regime perceives the BDF
and the internal security forces unified in supporting the regime and ensuring the political
status quo of the country. Overall, since the BDF and the Bahraini internal security forces
worked in tandem this increased the likelihood the Bahraini military would remain loyal to
the al-Khalifa regime during the uprising.
It is telling all eight institutional variables were absent in Bahrain and increased the
likelihood of military defection. The institutional variables in Bahrain created a security
apparatus that was unlikely to fracture and split. The three institutional variables that appear
to have the most influence on Bahraini military loyalty include the lack of communal
divisions, the lack of counterbalancing security forces to the military, and the absence of a
32
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rivalry between the military and the internal security forces. The communal element had a
significant influence since the ruling al-Khalifa regime and the Bahraini military personnel
were Sunni whereas the majority of the population was Shia. This created a distinct sectarian
difference that explains why the Bahraini military was willing to use high levels of violence
against the civilian population that was seen as the "other" in the eyes of the military. In
addition, the Bahraini security apparatus was centralized through the al-Khalifa ruling family.
The majority of military branches and internal security forces were directly managed or
overseen by al-Khalifa family members. As a result there were no institutional rivalries in the
Bahraini security apparatus and overall, all Bahraini security forces protected and supported
the al-Khalifa regime.
Regime Variables
All three of the regime variables were also absent in Bahrain and potentially
contributed to the Bahraini military defending the al-Khalifa regime. The first regime
variable is that the al-Khalifa regime handpicked ruling generals and commanders in the
BDF and the military did not have full control of making personnel appointment within the
armed forces. As explained in the previous section, a central characteristic of the Bahraini
security apparatus is that most senior military officers are members of the al-Khalifa family.
According to the 2002 Bahraini Constitution, the king appoints all ministers and serves as
the supreme commander of the Bahraini Defence Forces.34 At the outbreak of the Bahraini
uprising the minister of defence affairs was Muhammad Ben Abdallah al-Khalifa, who was
appointed to the position by the king in early 2008 (BBC News 2008). In addition, the
highest ranking security council in the Bahraini government is the Supreme Defence Council
Bahrain’s 2002 Constitution Article 33 D and F. To view an English translation of the 2002 constitution see
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7264. Accessed on April 21, 2016.
34
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(SDC), which includes the king, the commander-in-chief of the BDF (Field Marshal Shiekh
Khalifa Ben Ahmed al-Khalifa), the deputy commander-in-chief of the BDF (Sheikh Salman
Ben Hamad al-Khalifa), the director of the NSA (Sheikh Khalifa Ben Abdulla al-Khalifa),
and numerous ministers such as the minister of foreign affairs (Khalid Ben Ahmad bin
Muhammad al-Khalifa), the minister of defence affairs, the minister of interior (Rashid Ben
Abdallah Ben Ahmad al-Khalifa), and the minister of the national guard (Major-General
Mohammed Ben Isa al-Khalifa).35 The upper echelon of the Bahraini military is comprised
mostly of al-Khalifa family members who are handpicked by the king and this ensured
officers remained loyal to the regime during the uprising.
Another consequence of the familial makeup of the Bahraini armed forces directly
addresses the second regime variable that was absent in Bahrain, which is that Bahraini
officers are satisfied with the regime and the benefits they receive from the regime. One
indicator of military satisfaction with the al-Khalifa regime includes the preferential
treatment many Bahraini officers received in the form of exclusive housing. It is reported
that since the 1970s many senior military officials in the BDF have received luxurious
apartments, typically in the central city of Riffa.36 The BDF has been involved in several
construction projects that provide high-end housing for officers and also commercial
opportunities for civilians such as the Salmabad housing project and the upscale Wadi al-Sali
mall.37 There is limited data on the salaries of Bahraini officers and soldiers salaries but

BICI (2011) and Central Intelligence Agency, “Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign
Governments: A Directory,” February 2011, accessed on April 21, 2016.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/pdfs/2011/February2011ChiefsDirectory.pdf.
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considering how close-knit the security apparatus is with the ruling regime, there is no
evidence the military is systemically unsatisfied with the regime at a level that would have
caused regime defection during the protests.
The third regime variable absent in Bahrain and potentially influenced the Bahraini
military to defend the al-Khalifa regime is the process of how the regime ordered the military
to intervene during the uprising. According to Royal Decree Law No. 32 of 2002, the king
commands the BDF and has the authority to order the Bahraini military to undertake
operations both inside and outside of the kingdom (BICI 2011, 50). This decree provided
the legal authority to order the BDF into the Pearl Roundabout on February 17, 2011,
during the first clearing of the roundabout. As the uprising intensified in mid-March, the
king expanded his control over the BDF by issuing Royal Decree No. 18 on March 15, 2011,
which officially declared a state of emergency and gave the king the authorization to deploy
BDF soldiers onto the streets via written orders given to his commander-in-chief (BICI 2011,
47). Given the structure of the Bahraini security apparatus it is apparent all the orders
originated with the king, which were then filtered through and distributed by his ruling
generals. Since there was a clear line of communication between King Hamad, the senior
officers, junior officers, and soldiers, there was no room for misinterpretation when King
Hamad gave the orders for military soldiers to deploy onto the streets in response to antigovernment protesters. This mechanism increased the likelihood of the BDF defending the
regime because there was no uncertainty or ambiguity of the king’s intentions.
All three of the regime variables were absent in Bahrain and appeared to influence
the military's decision to defend the regime during the Arab uprisings. There are some
interesting differences between the regime variables in Bahrain and those in Egypt and
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Tunisia. First, in Egypt and Tunisia, the ruling leaders appointed the defense ministers but
these executive appointments were unable to ensure military loyalty to the ruling leader
during the uprising. However, in Bahrain, the king appointed the defense ministers and the
senior military officers of the Bahraini Defence Force and these individuals were supportive
of the king and the al-Khalifa regime during the uprising. The key difference is in Bahrain
many of the senior military officers and defense ministers were al-Khalifa family members
and it seems logical that the familial bond between the king and ruling senior military
officers ensure loyalty. In addition, unlike in Egypt and Tunisia, the Bahraini military was
satisfied with the benefits it received from the al-Khalifa regime. This finding addresses the
carrots and sticks argument from Lee (2005) and suggests that carrots were successful at
ensuring the Bahraini military remained loyal to the al-Khalifa regime. This actually counters
Lee's original argument in which he argues that sticks are better mechanisms of ensuring
military obedience in comparison to carrots. Lastly, in the two previous chapters, it was
questionable whether the variable of communicative channels had an effect on military
response, but in Bahrain, the king clearly ordered the military to use violence against
protesters and there was no confusion from the perspective of the Bahraini military as to the
king's intentions.
Societal Variables
Of the six societal variables, one was absent and five were present in Bahrain. The
one societal variable absent in Bahrain was the protest movement did not explicitly attempt
to win over the Bahraini military. As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, in Tunisia and Egypt
significant segments of the protest movements deliberately focused on winning over the
military, which in effect decreased the likelihood military forces were willing to utilize high
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levels of violence against the demonstrators. In Bahrain, there is no evidence protesters
attempted to win over the military. In fact, there is evidence anti-government demonstrators
specifically aimed their chants and discontent towards military forces. For example, the BICI
(2011, 94) reports that on February 27, 2011, mass protests marched across the King Faisal
Highway in Manama, and demonstrators carried a large banner that read "Shocking! The
army kills the citizens." Bahraini protesters did not implement a systematic approach to win
over the military most likely due to the sectarian configuration of the Bahraini armed forces.
Considering the Bahraini military overwhelmingly consist of Sunnis,38 the Shia citizens had
no desire to try to win over the Sunni military forces during the protests. Moreover, the fact
some Bahraini soldiers are foreign also decreased the likelihood Bahraini protesters were
willing to win over the military. The lack of a deliberate strategy to win over the Bahraini
military contributed to BDF soldiers defending the regime, since there was no ‘pull’ from
anti-regime protesters for military personnel to defect and join demonstrators’ cause.
Interestingly, the other five societal variables present in Bahrain should in theory
have influenced the Bahraini military to defect from the al-Khalifa regime. The first societal
variable present in Bahrain was the monumental size of the Bahraini uprising and how it
included well over 1 percent of the country’s total population. In particular, two specific
protests demonstrate the sheer number of Bahrainis that took to the street in opposition to
the al-Khalifa regime. On February 22, 2011, it was estimated that 100,000 demonstrators
occupied the Pearl Roundabout. This protest was significant because it occurred five days
after state security forces physically cleared demonstrators from the roundabout. However,
in an attempt to save face the regime reopened the roundabout to civilian protesters and in
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celebration thousands of protesters congregated at the Pearl Roundabout. The second large
protest occurred several weeks later on March 3, 2011, where it was estimated 100,000450,000 protesters demonstrated outside of the al-Fateh mosque in Manama (BICI 2011,
102-103). Anti-regime protesters and government officials disagree on the precise number of
demonstrators at this protest, but in a country with a population of 1.3 million, even if the
lower estimation of 100,000 is considered, that means nearly 8 percent of the country’s total
population demonstrated.39 The fascinating puzzle is that despite the phenomenal display of
protests in Bahrain, the Bahraini military and internal security forces continued to use
violence against the population and were not deterred by the size of the protest movement.
The Bahraini case clearly disproves the argument that a large protest will induce military
defection since the military displayed violence even despite the monumental number of
protesters.
The second societal variable present in Bahrain was that the Bahraini uprising
consisted of non-traditional protesters such as women, children, and the elderly. Unlike the
Tunisian and Egyptian cases explored in Chapters 4 and 5, there is no data available that
explores demographic information of the Bahraini protests from the individual level.
However, there is enough evidence to suggest that non-traditional protest groups were active
and pivotal during the Bahraini uprising. There are numerous reports of female-led protests
taking place during the Bahraini uprising. This includes a rally on February 24, 2011, in
which approximately 150 female protesters marched from the Dana Mall in Manama to the
Pearl Roundabout while chanting anti-regime slogans, and another report of female
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protesters marching from the capital’s financial harbor to the Pearl Roundabout on the King
Faisal Highway on March 8, 2011 (BICI 2011, 117). In addition to participating in protests
women were also the victims of state security violence. The BICI (2011, 172) indicates that
security forces raided homes in the middle of the night and in the process terrorized women
with verbal threats and threats of sexual assault if they did not cooperate. During these raids
security forces were typically looking for male perpetrators and among the chaos soldiers did
not allow women the opportunity to cover-up from their nightgown dresses, which is highly
inappropriate and indecent for male strangers to invade such private spaces in Bahraini
society.
Children were also a significant factor during the Bahraini uprising. There are
numerous reports of children and teenagers being the victims of state security violence
including the death of fifteen year-old boy, Sayed Ahmed Saeed Shams, who was fatally
struck in the head by a tear gas canister on March 30, 2011, in the town of Sitra. It is
reported that riot police fired tear gas at Sayed from a close range and then kicked and beat
the boy while he was on the ground (BICI 2011, 161). There is another report that a six yearold boy, Mohamed Abdulhusain Farhan, died on April 6, 2011, after state security forces
fired tear gas at Mohamed’s home and the young boy suffocated after inhaling the poisonous
gas (BICI 2011, 256). Children were also arrested by state security forces for protesting
including the episode of three teenagers in the northwestern town of al-Budaiya who were
imprisoned, blindfolded, handcuffed, and beaten for throwing stones at police cars (BICI
2011, 273). Children were also protesters and one notable event took place when mass
demonstrations broke out at an all-girls high school in Saar on March 10, 2011.
Approximately 150 students began anti-regime protests at school, which then led to pro-
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regime protests from other female students. Eventually, parents arrived to the school and
further confrontations broke out between the parents who were divided between pro-regime
and anti-regime factions.40 Third, elderly protesters also played a role during the uprising,
most notably with the death of Isa Abdulhasan Ali Hussain. Isa was demonstrating against
the regime on February 17, 2011, and was killed by a shotgun bullet to the head from less
than one meter away (BICI 2011, 232). Overall, there is evidence that non-traditional
protesters such as women, children, and the elderly were involved during the uprising.
However, unlike in Tunisia and Bahrain, the presence of non-traditional protesters did not
deter violence from the Bahraini military and state security forces continued to confront
demonstrations and support the regime at all costs.
A third societal variable present in Bahrain was the broad-based nature of the
Bahraini uprising. Bahrain is a small country approximately 300 square miles (which is
equivalent in size to Washington D.C. and D.C’s Maryland suburbs). Considering the small
area of Bahrain, there is little regional variation on the island as most citizens live in or
around the capital city of Manama. However, during the uprising, unrest and demonstrations
took place across the whole island. The major protests occurred in the capital, as Manama
was the home to the Pearl Roundabout, the country’s Financial Harbor, major government
buildings, major hospitals, and the country’s major thoroughfares and roads. Protests
occurred elsewhere including in the northeastern town of Muharraq, the Manama suburb of
Sitra, the northwestern towns of Saar and al-Budaiya, the central city of Riffa, the University
of Bahrain, which is located near Zallaq in the central-west portion of the country, and

40 BICI (2011, 119), and Brian Murphy, "Bahrain rifts deepen as protests forge ahead," Washington Post, March
10, 2011, accessed on May 12, 2016. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/03/10/AR2011031003380.html.
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dozens of villages and towns elsewhere across the island.41 From a regional perspective, the
Bahraini uprising was broad-based, however the broad-based question becomes more
complicated when examining the Sunni-Shia split in the country. On one hand there is
evidence numerous clashes and violent confrontations occurred during the uprising that
pitted anti-regime Shia citizens against pro-regime Sunni citizens.42 On the other hand, there
is evidence Sunnis participated in the anti-regime protests as well and that some Shia
protesters specifically attempted to de-emphasize the sectarian nature of the movement. For
example, a prominent Sunni cleric, Mohamed al-Buflasa, was arrested at a rally during the
first week of protests for promoting religious unity between Sunnis and Shias.43
There are also reports of Shia protesters calling for national unity with Sunnis and at
the Pearl Roundabout on March 8, 2011, prominent journalists spoke to the crowds and
urged demonstrators to reach out to the Sunni community and reassure them that the
uprising was not anti-Sunni (BICI 2011, 117). Unfortunately, there are no surveys that
collect data on how many protesters during the Bahraini uprising were Sunni and how many
were Shia, but there is some evidence Sunnis were involved with the anti-regime protests and
some Shia protesters specifically attempted to de-emphasize the sectarian nature of the
conflict. Since the Bahraini uprising included both Shia and Sunni anti-regime protesters, the
overall movement can be considered as broad-based, but it is important to understand the
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Bahraini government and Bahraini security forces did not interpret the uprising as "broadbased."
As explored earlier in this chapter a primary characteristic is that most personnel in
the Bahraini armed forces are Sunni and there are hardly any Shias serving in the country's
security forces. From this perspective it is likely the Bahraini military viewed the uprising as a
Shia threat to the Sunni regime. Gengler (2013) provides an insightful argument that the
regional issues between Bahrain and Iran make the Sunni-Shia relationship in Bahrain a
security issue in which the al-Khalifa regime is sensitive to the Shia threat both domestically
and regionally. Interpreting whether the Bahraini uprising was broad-based or not varies
upon ones' perspective. Even though there is evidence the uprising was broad-based, the
Bahraini government and Bahraini security forces viewed the uprising as a Shia threat to
Sunnis that aimed to destabilize the regime. This interpretation ultimately explains why the
Bahraini military was unaffected by the broad-based nature of the uprising and defended the
al-Khalifa regime.
A fourth societal variable present in Bahrain was the demonstrations were generally
non-violent. At the outbreak of the protests international journalists noted the peaceful
nature of the demonstrations and observed the euphoric and celebratory atmosphere that
surrounded the Pearl Roundabout in February.44 For instance, anti-regime protest leaders,
such as Hassam al-Meshaima, the Secretary General of the opposition Haq Movement,
urged Bahrainis to remain non-violent and to practice peaceful civil disobedience while
demonstrating (BICI 2011, 94). For the most part Bahraini protesters remained non-violent,
however, as the uprising continued there were some instances of protesters displaying
Allan Little, “Day of transformation in Bahrain's 'sacred square." BBC News, February 19, 2011, accessed on
April 27, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12515906.
44
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violence towards state security forces, which arguably happened due to the initial violence
Bahraini security forces displayed towards demonstrators. Despite instances of isolated
violence the uprising in Bahrain was non-violent and did not aim to overthrow the al-Khalifa
regime through physical force or violence. Even though the non-violent nature of the
protesters in Egypt and Tunisia influenced the militaries to defect from the ruling regime, in
Bahrain the peaceful demonstrations did not persuade the BDF to abandon the regime, and
rather, despite the peaceful protests, the military remained loyal to the regime and willingly
used physical force against demonstrators.
The fifth societal variable present in Bahrain was that prior to the Arab uprisings the
Bahraini military did not have a history of committing egregious human rights violations
against the Bahraini population. To examine this empirically the CIRI Human Rights dataset
was consulted, which is a dataset that examines the level of human rights violations within a
country.45 The CIRI Human Rights Index is a number that ranges from 0 – 8, with 0
indicating a country has performed poorly (i.e. committed numerous human rights violations
against the population) and 8 indicating a country has performed well (i.e. committed no
human rights violations against the population). Figure 4 illustrates the CIRI Physical
Integrity Rights Index of Bahrain from 1981 to 2011.46
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For more information on the dataset and its methodology, see David L. Cingranelli, David L. Richards, and
K. Chad Clay. 2014. "The CIRI Human Rights Dataset." Accessed April 25, 2016.
http://www.humanrightsdata.com.
Physical Integrity Rights measures the government’s role in torture, extrajudicial killing, political
imprisonment, and disappearances.
46
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Overall, Bahrain's CIRI Human Rights Index scores have varied ranging from 7 in
2002, 2003, and 2009 to 3 in 1996, 1998, and 2000.47 To examine the types of human rights
violations that occurred in Bahrain in 1996, 1998, and 2000 the U.S. Department of State
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices48 and Amnesty International Annual Reports49 were
examined. Overall, internal security forces, rather than the military, committed human rights
violations during these years. There was only one noted instance in these reports of a BDF
soldier committing a human rights violation against a Bahraini citizen, which occurred
during mass political protests in 1996 when a soldier fired and killed a demonstrator in the
village of Karzakan.50 However, this is only one incident across a thirty year period and there
is no evidence the Bahraini military systemically committed human rights violations against
the civilian population. As discussed earlier in the chapter, the Bahraini military is small and
apart from 1972 and the mid-1990s has traditionally been more focused on external and
regional defense rather than on monitoring internal security. The responsibility of the day47 For comparison, during the same time period (1981 – 2011) Egypt had a CIRI score of 3 or less fourteen
times whereas Tunisia had a CIRI score of 3 or less seven times. This is rather surprising considering in Egypt
and Tunisia the militaries ultimately defected from the regime, whereas in Bahrain the military defended the
regime and used violence against protesters.
48

U.S. Department of State Bahrain Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996, accessed April 25 2016;
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/bahrain.html;
U.S. Department of State Bahrain Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, accessed April 25 2016;
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1998_hrp_report/bahrain.html;
U.S. Department of State Bahrain Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2000, accessed April 25 2016;
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/nea/781.htm.
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Note the Amnesty International annual reports explore events that occurred from the previous year. For
instance, the Amnesty International Annual Report 2011 examines events from 2010. The following Amnesty
International reports were examined in regards to Bahrain’s human right’s record:
Amnesty International Annual Report 1997, accessed April 25 2016, pp. 83-86
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/1997/en/;
Amnesty International Annual Report 1999, accessed April 25 2016, pp. 88-90
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/1999/en/;
Amnesty International Annual Report 2001, accessed April 25 2016, pp. 41-42
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol10/0001/2001/en/.
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U.S. Department of State Bahrain Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996, accessed April 25 2016;
http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/bahrain.html.
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to-day repression of the regime was given to the various internal security forces rather than
the BDF and the armed forces. However, that being said, during the 2011 uprising the
military intervened and willingly defended the regime even though there was no systemic
historical precedence to do so. Coincidentally, the actions of the Bahraini military in 2011
arguably started a precedence that validates BDF intervention in future conflicts, but at the
time the protests broke out in February 2011, there was no strong historical precedence for
the BDF to intervene and use violence against civilians on a large scale. Overall, there is little
evidence the Bahraini military committed human rights violations against the civilian
population prior to the 2011 uprising, which in theory should have decreased the likelihood
of the military intervening during the Arab uprisings.
Figure 4. Bahrain & CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index (1981 – 2011)
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One of the interesting puzzles of this project is that the Bahraini uprising possessed
similar characteristics to the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings since it was large, non-violent,
broad-based, and consisted of non-traditional protesters. However, unlike in Egypt and
Tunisia the Bahraini military defended the ruling regime and used violence against civilian
protesters. As a result, the Bahraini case counters the earlier arguments from Zunes (1994),
Chenoweth and Stepan (2011), and Nepstad (2013) that argue that broad-based coalitions,
non-violent protesters, and large number of protesters can induce military defection. The
Bahraini case suggests societal variables alone cannot influence how a military will respond
to mass political protests as the presence of these variables were unable to influence military
defection.
International Variables
Of the three international variables, two were absent in Bahrain and one was present,
even though this final variable deserves special attention. The first international variable
absent in Bahrain that possibly contributed to the Bahraini military defending the al-Khalifa
regime was foreign troops from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates
invading Bahrain through the auspices of GCC forces to support the Bahraini security forces
and defend the al-Khalifa regime. The MENA Military Index specifically examines this
factor by asking whether foreign troops invaded the country to overthrow the regime. In the
case of Bahrain the answer to this question is no, but unlike in many other MENA countries
during the Arab uprisings, Bahrain was the only country where foreign troops invaded the
country to protect the regime. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Bahraini uprising
intensified during the middle of March and King Hamad decided GCC forces were needed
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to assist Bahraini forces and deter Iranian military forces from invading the country.51 On
the evening of March 14, units from the Saudi Arabian Royal Guard entered the country.
After one week a total of 5,000 GCC troops entered Bahrain including army forces from
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, and naval forces from Kuwait. The GCC provided
critical support to the regime by allowing Bahraini security forces the ability to directly
confront protesters while knowing GCC troops were protecting key government buildings
and facilities. Overall, the invasion of GCC troops is a strong indicator contributing to the
Bahraini military defending the al-Khalifa regime during the uprising.
The second international variable absent in Bahrain was in countries contiguous to
Bahrain there were no occurrences of military defection. Bahrain is an island and therefore
by definition it does not share any contiguous borders with any other countries. However,
despite not sharing a land border, Bahrain is closely associated with Saudi Arabia and the
two countries are physically connected by the sixteen mile King Faud Causeway, which is a
bridge linking the eastern shore of Saudi Arabia to Bahrain. The causeway symbolizes the
close alliance between the two governments and Saudi Arabia has traditionally been an ally
to the Sunni-based al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain. In Saudi Arabia there were minimal protests
in comparison to what occurred during the Bahraini uprising and there was no evidence
large portions of the Saudi military defected from the Saudi regime during the uprising.
Rather, the Saudi military remained loyal to the Saudi regime and were also loyal to the
Bahraini regime. The fact Bahrain’s closest geographic country was as invested in ensuring
the stability and maintenance of the al-Khalifa regime is a primary reason why the military
defended the incumbent government during the country's uprising.
51

BICI (2011, 132), Coates Ulrichsen (2013, 4), Katzman (2011, 7), (Nurruzamann 2013, 363), and Zunes
(2013, 155).
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The final international variable, whether a significant number of military personnel
receive training and education from foreign militaries, deserves special attention because
even though the MENA Military Index theorizes the presence of this variable will increase
military defection, it appears as if the presence of this variable actually increased the Bahraini
military’s resolve to defend the regime and use force and violence against protesters. As
explored earlier in the chapter, the modern Bahraini armed forces have a close relationship
to the U.S. military, especially since the U.S. Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain. U.S.-Bahraini
military relations strengthened after the 1991 Kuwait War since the Bahraini military assisted
with coalition forces that ousted Saddam Hussein's Iraqi forces from Kuwait. After the war,
the U.S. and Bahrain signed a ten-year defense pact that provided the U.S. military with
access to Bahrain’s air bases, expanded exercises and U.S. training of Bahraini forces, and
increased arms transfers to Bahrain including frigates, weapons, aircrafts, coastal radar
systems, air-to-air missiles, and shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles (Katzman 2011, 12).
More recently, the Department of Defense notes that in 2010-2011, 553 Bahraini military
personnel received military training in the U.S. Given the small size of the Bahraini armed
forces this means approximately 6 percent of the Bahraini military received training from the
U.S. during this time period.52 Another aspect that verifies the strong relationship between
Bahrain and the U.S. is the tremendous amount of foreign aid the U.S. provided to Bahrain.
For example, from 2003 to 2012 the U.S. gave Bahrain approximately $300 million in foreign
aid, which is astounding for a country with only 1.3 million inhabitants and a small military
force (Katzman 2011, 19).
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The Military Balance (2012, 318), and the U.S. Government, "Foreign Military Training, Fiscal Years 2010 and
2011, Joint Report to Congress Volume I," accessed April 30, 2016.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/176990.pdf.
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The U.S.-Bahraini relationship demonstrates a weakness with this particular MENA
Military Index variable. For instance, the theory assumed if a significant number of military
personnel received military training and education abroad then the individuals would be
more likely to defect from the ruling regime during the Arab uprisings due to the influence
of the foreign military training, which presumably would have expanded their worldviews to
different philosophies and political systems and make them more reluctant to use violence
against anti-government protesters in their home countries. As Bahrain demonstrates this is
clearly not the case and the exact opposite could be argued. The U.S. had strong strategic
interests to maintain the al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain given Bahrain's vulnerable role
between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Even though there is no explicit evidence the U.S.
encouraged Bahrain to use force against protesters – in fact the opposite is true as the U.S.
condemned Bahraini state violence early-on during the protests53 – the U.S. government was
noticeably less vocal and less critical of the Bahraini government during the Arab uprisings
in contrast to its criticism of the Egyptian and Tunisian governments. Even though this
particular variable was a “no” in the index and should have influenced military defection,
after closer examination the opposite appears to be true and it seems the American military
training and education of Bahraini military personnel did not influence the military to defect
from the regime and this relationship actually encouraged the military to defend and protect
the al-Khalifa regime.
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In particular, the U.S. was critical of the Bahraini government after the first clearing of the Pearl Roundabout
in February. The White House Press Secretary, Jay Carney, urged restraint and many in the U.S. government
were concerned of the use of force the Bahraini security forces displayed against peaceful protesters. See
Michael Slackman and Mark Landler, “Bahrain Turmoil Poses Fresh Test for White House,” New York Times,
February 17, 2011, accessed May 9, 2016.
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/world/middleeast/18bahrain.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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Conclusion
This chapter explored variables that possibly influenced the Bahraini military to
defend the al-Khalifa regime during the Arab uprisings. Even though the Bahraini uprising
shared many characteristics with the successful uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, the Bahraini
military forces were not influenced to defect from the al-Khalifa regime and support the
anti-regime protest movement. The reason the societal variables were unable to influence the
Bahraini military to defect is because Bahrain did not possess the necessary existing
institutional variables to pave the way for military defection. These institutional variables
include no communal, socio-economic, or generational splits among military personnel.
Moreover, there were no rivalries within the military between the armed forces branches, no
significant rivalry between the military and the internal security forces, and no parallel
security forces that deliberately attempted to counterbalance the strength of the Bahraini
military. Lastly, Bahrain did not possess a system of military conscription. The reason these
institutional variables are absent is due to the historical development of the Bahraini armed
forces. As a small country the island was influenced by larger foreign powers and this
explains why the Bahraini military did not even exist until 1971 after the British granted the
country with full independence. The military was an elite configuration deliberately
constructed by the royal family to protect the regime. Since sectarian divisions between
Sunnis and Shias were a major societal composition in Bahraini society, the Sunni-led alKhalifa regime created a security apparatus that informally blocked Shias from serving in the
military and as a result the sectarian nature of the Bahraini military and the Bahraini internal
security forces increased the Sunni communal bonds within the security apparatus and
increased the likelihood of military loyalty. In addition to these institutional conditions, the
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international factors reinforced Bahraini military loyalty to the regime, since both Saudi
Arabia and the U.S. had strategic interests to maintain the political and security status quo of
Bahrain.

CHAPTER 7:
CONCLUSION
This chapter summarizes the central findings of the dissertation, addresses the
theoretical questions, empirical puzzles, and normative issues of the larger project, reexamines the MENA Military Index, and discusses the role of the MENA Military Index
moving forward.
Central Findings
This dissertation explains variation in Arab military responses during the Arab
uprisings. Through the creation of the MENA Military Index and a comparative case study
analysis of Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia, this project examines MENA military responses
during the Arab uprisings through a variety of institutional, regime, societal, and
international variables. This project discovers that MENA militaries defected or fractured
from incumbent regimes during the Arab uprisings as a result of institutional variables within
the country's military and the unique societal characteristics of the demonstration
movements. In Egypt and Tunisia, both countries possessed numerous institutional variables
that paved the way for military defection. For example, in Egypt and Tunisia parallel security
forces counterbalanced the strength of the traditional military, there were significant rivalries
between the traditional military and other state security forces, both militaries had the
autonomy to control personnel decisions in the mid and lower ranks of the armed forces,
and there were systems of military conscription. These institutional variables created a rift
between the militaries and the ruling regimes that increased the likelihood the militaries,
216

217
would defect. In Egypt and Tunisia, both countries also possessed necessary societal
variables as each uprising was large, non-violent, broad-based, consisted of non-traditional
protesters, and demonstrators actively won over soldiers. In contrast to Egypt and Tunisia,
the Bahraini case demonstrates why it was necessary for both institutional and societal
variables to be present for a military to defect, because even though the Bahraini uprising
shared many characteristics with the Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings, Bahrain did not
possess any institutional variables that made military defection or fracturing likely.
In total, there were five MENA countries that experienced either military defection
or military fracturing during the Arab uprisings (Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen)
and all five countries share six identical variables: variable 3 (parallel security forces to
counterbalance the military), variable 9 (soldiers unsatisfied with the regime), variable 12
(large protests), variable 13 (non-traditional protesters), variable 14 (protests originally nonviolent), and variable 16 (protests were broad-based).
As for the first of these variables, parallel security forces that counterbalance the
military causes defection or fracturing because it marginalizes the military at the expense of
other state security forces. As explored in Chapters 4 and 5, President Mubarak in Egypt and
President Ben Ali in Tunisia both oversaw the expansion of parallel security forces at the
expense of the military and these parallel forces were more closely affiliated with the regime,
received preferential treatment, and also procured large budgets and high levels of material
and non-material benefits. Similar arrangements existed in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, where
the ruling leaders created parallel security forces to buttress the regime from domestic
opponents and to also deter the military from initiating a coup against the ruling leader. The
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presence of parallel security forces creates a rift between militaries and regimes that can
rupture under the pressure of mass political protests.
The second shared variable addresses the military's dissatisfaction with the regime. In
all MENA countries that experienced military defection or fracturing during the uprisings,
the militaries were dissatisfied with the material and non-material benefits they received from
the regime. In Chapter 4, it appears the Tunisian military was dissatisfied with the Ben Ali
regime since the armed forces were marginalized by the regime and did not receive
preferential treatment in comparison to the country's internal security forces. In Chapter 5, it
appears the Egyptian military was dissatisfied with the Mubarak regime because of the
expanding political and economic influence of the country's liberal-capitalist elite, which
directly challenged the Egyptian military's unmonitored economic empire.
The four other shared variables in countries where the militaries either defected or
fractured address the characteristics of the country's mass political protests. For example, in
all five countries the protests were large, non-violent, consisted of non-traditional protesters,
and were broad-based. The demonstrations in Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen were
historically large as hundreds of thousands, and in some cases millions, of demonstrators
flooded the streets and demanded regime change. The uprisings were also broad-based as
protesters represented numerous socio-economic, political, and regional backgrounds. For
example, as explored in Chapters 4 and 5, the protests in Egypt and Tunisia included
individuals from all walks of life including the lower class, business professionals, Islamists,
and secularists. In addition, the uprisings consisted of non-traditional protesters such as
women, children, and the elderly, which made it more difficult for some military troops to
use violence against demonstrators. In all five countries the uprisings were originally non-
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violent and peaceful. In the cases of Libya and Syria, this changed as the government
repressed the protests, which emboldened and radicalized civilians and ultimately led to
bloody civil wars. However, the initial demonstrations were mostly non-violent and it was
arguably the violent responses from state security forces that facilitated unrest and
contributed to these movements becoming armed conflicts.
Overall, these six variables were present in all five MENA countries that experienced
either military defection or military fracturing during the Arab uprisings. It is also important
to specify the key difference between military defection and military fracturing. As discussed
in Chapter 3, the primary difference between countries that experienced military defection
and military fracturing was variable 1, which addresses whether there are communal splits
that divide soldiers within the military. In countries that experienced military defection (e.g.
Egypt and Tunisia) there are no significant communal splits that divide soldiers, whereas in
countries that experienced military fracturing (e.g. Libya, Syria, and Yemen) there are
significant communal splits that divide soldiers.
Addressing the Theoretical Questions, Empirical Puzzles, and Normative Issues
Chapter 1 examines the numerous theoretical questions, empirical puzzles, and
normative issues of this dissertation. It is worthwhile to re-examine these larger themes and
situate how the MENA Military Index and the central findings of this dissertation fit into the
broader literature. The first theoretical question addresses how militaries respond when
ordered to confront mass political protests. This project reinforces the notion that militaries
can respond in various ways when facing mass political protests, such as the option to defect
from the regime, defend the regime, or not respond at all due to internal security forces
successfully confronting demonstrators.
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A second question examines the primary role of the military within the country.
Does the military focus solely on external defense, or does the military also intervene and
support internal security functions? To more fully understand this concept, researchers need
to examine other security forces in the country besides the military. For instance, examining
the role of internal security forces, such as the police and paramilitary forces, provides key
insight to fully understanding military behavior since internal security forces are typically the
main security forces that addresses domestic unrest. During the Arab uprisings eight of the
twenty-one MENA countries experienced minimal military responses as a result of internal
security forces successfully repressing the protest movements and making it unnecessary for
the military to intervene. Why are these internal security forces so successful at suppressing
protest movements? Do they possess specific characteristics that differ from other internal
security forces? These two questions go beyond the scope of this specific project but these
questions are natural extensions to this dissertation and can provide useful insight on the
mechanisms and characteristics of internal security forces, which in effect provide a
complementary role to the insight and role of a country's military.
The central empirical puzzle addressed in Chapter 1 indicated that prior to the 2011
uprisings, the MENA region was overwhelmingly resilient to democratic transitions. When
examining the political systems of the MENA region several years after the Arab uprisings,
other than Tunisia there has been limited movement towards democratization. Table 14
provides a list of Polity IV scores, which is a twenty-one-point scale that measures the level
of authoritarianism and democracy within a country, where +10 equates to strongly
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democratic and -10 equates to strongly authoritarian.1 Table 14 lists the twenty-one MENA
countries alphabetically with three columns: the first column lists the Polity IV score of a
country from 2010 (the year when unrest broke out in Tunisia), the second column examines
the Polity IV score from 2014, and the third column measures the numerical change in the
score from 2010 to 2014.
Table 14. MENA Polity IV Scores
Country
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Israel
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Mauritania
Morocco
Oman
Palestine2
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
Turkey
UAE
Yemen

2010 Polity IV Score
2
-5
-3
-7
3
10
-3
-7
6
-7
-2
-6
-8
-10
-10
-7
-4
7
-8
-2

2014 Polity IV Score
2
-10
-4
-7
3
10
-3
-7
6
0
-2
-4
-8
-10
-10
-9
7
9
-8
0

Change
0
-5
-1
0
0
0
0
0
0
+7
0
+2
0
0
0
-2
+11
+2
0
+2

Table 14 demonstrates that the only MENA country to successfully democratize
after the Arab uprisings was Tunisia, which jumped from a Polity IV score of -4 in 2010 to 7
in 2014. In addition to Tunisia, there were four other MENA countries that experienced

1

Polity IV data was collected online from the Systemic Peace website under the section "Polity IV: Regime
Authority Characteristics and Transitions Datasets" and the "Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2013" link.
See http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
2

Polity IV does not measure the scores of Palestine.
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positive changes to their Polity IV scores from 2010 to 2014, including Libya (+7), Morocco
(+2), Turkey (+2), and Yemen (+2). Even though Libya made a seven-point jump, the
country went from very authoritarian (-7) to quasi-authoritarian (0), so it is not as if Libya
experienced full-democratization. Moreover, the positive changes in Morocco and Yemen
were only marginal and despite the increases to the countries Polity IV scores, they remain
authoritarian. Table 14 also notes that twelve MENA countries experienced no change in
their Polity IV scores from 2010 to 2014, and three MENA countries actually experienced
decreases to their Polity IV scores, including, Bahrain, Egypt, and Syria.
Chapter 1 discussed a normative goal of this project, which is for citizens to better
understand the variables that influence militaries to use violence and physical force against
protesters in mass political uprisings. Based upon the MENA Military Index there is both
good news and bad news for civilians. The good news is that civilians matter, especially
considering that military responses are highly impacted by the societal characteristics of mass
political protests. For instance, protests that are non-violent, broad-based, consist of nontraditional protesters, large, and actively aim to win over soldiers are more likely to influence
military defection and military fracturing. These conclusions reinforce those of earlier
scholars such as Sharp (1973) and Chenoweth and Stepan (2011) that strategic protests can
tip the scales in favor of civilians when facing off against resilient authoritarian and state
security institutions. The findings from the MENA Military Index echoes these findings and
suggest that civilians can play an extremely significant role in decreasing the likelihood of
militaries using force against demonstrators by utilize tactics of non-violence, broadening the
appeal of the movement, attracting portions of non-traditional voters, recruit as many
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demonstrators as possible, and deliberately use strategies that try to win over the military and
individual soldiers.
However, despite the good news that civilians can influence military responses to
mass political protests, there is also some less encouraging news. The bad news is that in
addition to societal variables, institutional variables are just as important to shaping military
responses. As discussed during this dissertation, even though the Bahraini uprising
incorporated many of the elements mentioned in the previous paragraph, these efforts were
unable to stop the Bahraini military from using violence against protesters during the
uprising. This is finding is disappointing for civilians because citizens have less control over
the institutional mechanisms of the military, especially in authoritarian regimes. The only
institutional policy that civilians can possibly influence is the creation of military
conscription. The findings from the MENA Military Index suggest that a military that better
mirrors society is a military that is less likely to use violence against society during mass
political protests. Even though civilians could advocate for military conscription, it is
important to not over-emphasize this single policy, especially since the MENA Military
Index demonstrates that even in countries with military conscription, if there were not the
necessary number of other institutional and societal variables, that the military would not
necessarily defect or fracture from the regime.
Mass political protests are seminal events that challenge the resolve of the incumbent
regime, the country's military, and the demonstrators. The characteristics of future protest
movements are impossible to anticipate, but the findings from this dissertation suggest that
for militaries to defect from incumbent regimes or to fracture, there needs to be a

Table 15. MENA Military Index Variables Results (Numerical Order)3
(Reposted, Appears as Table 8 in Chapter 3)
Variable
Type
Variable #
Military Defected
Military Fractured

Military Defended

Military Minimal Role:
Success of Internal
Security Forces

Military Minimal Role:
Low Protests

For the variable name see Table 3.
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3

Country
Egypt
Tunisia
Libya
Syria
Yemen
Bahrain
Iraq
Oman
Algeria
Iran
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Mauritania
Morocco
Saudi
Arabia
Israel
Palestine
Qatar
Turkey
UAE
Totals

Institutional
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combination of both institutional and societal variables to convince the military to not use
violence against civilian protesters.
Re-examining the MENA Military Index
The primary contribution of this dissertation is the MENA Military Index, which examines
twenty civil-military relations variables across twenty-one MENA countries. The main
findings of the index are presented in Chapter 3 and Table 8 denotes whether a variable was
present or absent in each of the twenty-one MENA countries. Table 8 is reposted in this
chapter (as Table 15) to re-examine the overall results of the index and to identify the
specific variables that potentially could influence MENA military responses in the future.
Since institutional and societal variables are most influential on dictating MENA military
responses during the Arab uprisings, it is beneficial to re-examine the distribution of these
variables across the entire region.
For convenience, another table is added, table 16, which lists the number of
institutional variables present in each MENA country. According to table 16, the five
countries that experienced either military defection or military fracturing (Egypt, Libya, Syria,
Tunisia, and Yemen) possess at least three institutional variables. However of these five
countries only Libya possesses three institutional variables, whereas the other four possess
four institutional variables or more.
Libya represents an outlier because it is the only country that possesses variable 18 -a foreign military directly intervening in the country to overthrow the ruling leader. This
occurred in Libya as NATO forces launched aerial attacks in 2011 against Qaddafi forces
and also aided Libyan rebels fighting Qaddafi forces on the ground. The presence of variable
18 in Libya demonstrates two things. First, international variables, especially when a foreign
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military invades a country with the sole purpose of overthrowing the incumbent regime, can
significantly impact military responses to mass political protests and can ultimately trump
domestic variables. Even though this dissertation argues that institutional and societal
variables were the most important variables to explain MENA military responses during the
Arab uprisings, it acknowledges that international variables can also have a profound impact,
particularly when a direct intervention takes place. Second, it is likely that the threshold for
military defection or fracturing is four institutional variables rather than three, and the only
reason Libya experienced military insubordination during the uprisings was not because it
possessed three institutional variables but rather because NATO invaded the country.
Since four institutional variables appear to be a threshold it is necessary to examine
the MENA countries that possess four or more institutional variables but did not experience
military defection or fracturing during the Arab uprisings. This includes three countries: Iran,
Iraq, and Mauritania. The findings of the MENA Military Index suggest that Iran, Iraq, and
Mauritania possessed the necessary institutional variables for military defection or military
fracturing but did not due to the lack of societal characteristics during the Arab uprisings
that induced military insubordination.
The first country to examine is Iran, which possesses four institutional variables
including parallel security forces that counterbalance the military, a rivalry between the
military and other state security forces, military conscription, and the military’s autonomy to
control personnel at the mid and lower levels of the armed forces. These four institutional
variables are coincidentally identical to the institutional variables present in Tunisia (see
Table 14), and it is tempting to assume that if the right social variables were present in Iran,
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then the Iranian military would have defected from the regime. However, a closer
examination of Iran paints a more complicated picture.
Table 16. Number of Institutional Variables per MENA Country
Country

Military Response Type

Egypt
Syria
Yemen
Mauritania
Iraq
Iran
Tunisia
Lebanon
Libya
Oman
Palestine
Saudi Arabia
U.A.E.
Algeria
Morocco
Israel
Qatar
Turkey
Jordan
Kuwait
Bahrain

Defect
Fracture
Fracture
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Defend
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Defect
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Fracture
Defend
Minimal: Low Level of Protests
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Minimal: Low Level of Protests
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Minimal: Low Level of Protests
Minimal: Low Level of Protests
Minimal: Low Level of Protests
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Defend

# Of Institutional
Variables
6
6
6
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
0

After the 1979 Iranian revolution, Iran's military was overhauled and the new
government created two new security forces: the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij. These
two security forces became the primary security forces in the country, counterbalanced the
strength of the traditional military, and became the military's main security rival. LaChappelle
et al. (2012) argue that since the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij were created during the
violence of the 1979 revolution there is an institutional precedence in both of these
organizations towards violence, which is embedded in the core ethos and identity of both
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security forces. For example, troops in the Revolutionary Guard and Basij tend to have
extreme religious ideologies, more passionately support party hard-liners than troops from
other security forces, and since these groups have used violence against opponents for over
three decades they have the “stomachs” for utilizing high levels of physical force against
civilians (LaChappelle et al. 2012, 4).
During the 2011 uprising and the 2009 Green Movement, the Revolutionary Guard
and the Basij willingly used violence against protesters to defend the regime. In both
movements the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij successfully suppressed the
demonstrations making it unnecessary for the Iranian military to intervene and play a larger
role. It is impossible to predict social characteristics of future protest movements, but if the
institutional variables remain constant in Iran, and if a future conflict were to possess the
necessary characteristics, it is conceivable that the Iranian military could defect from the
regime, but, only if the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij were unsuccessful at confronting
the unrest and needed large-scale support from the Iranian military. The findings of the
MENA Military Index suggest that in such a scenario it is possible for the Iranian military to
defect from the regime and refuse to use violence against protesters. However, this is
unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future because the last three decades provide no
indication that either the Revolutionary Guard or the Basij would be unable or unwilling to
utilize the high levels of violence necessary to suppress a civilian uprising.
The second country that possesses four or more institutional variables but did not
experience military defection or fracturing during the Arab uprisings was Iraq. Iraq is an
interesting case since the U.S. reconstructed the Iraqi military after American forces
overthrew Saddam Hussein and disbanded the former Iraqi military. Considering the active
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role the U.S. plays in Iraqi military affairs it is difficult to forecast Iraqi military responses to
future mass political protests since even the domestic variables in Iraq are uniquely shaped
by foreign countries. During the Arab uprisings the protests in Iraq were marginal, yet the
Iraqi military defended the regime and used violence against civilian protesters largely
because the Iraqi military has played an active role in Iraqi internal security. During the last
decade, Iraq has been plagued with constant unrest and instability and as a result the newly
formed Iraqi military acts more like a paramilitary internal security force than a traditional
external security defense force. Iraq possesses four institutional variables from the MENA
Military Index during the Arab uprisings. Two of these variables include communal and
socio-economic cleavages that exist between military soldiers, and the other two variables
refer to the counterbalancing of the military by parallel security forces, and the rivalry that
exists between the military and other state security forces. If a future protest in Iraq
possessed the necessary societal variables it is possible for the Iraqi military to fracture along
sectarian lines where Sunni soldiers and Shia soldiers were split, especially if the future
protests were motivated by sectarian identities.
The third country that possesses four or more institutional variables in the MENA
Military Index but not experience military defection or fracturing was Mauritania. The five
institutional variables present in Mauritania include communal splits, socio-economic splits,
and generational splits between soldiers, the presence of parallel security forces to
counterbalance the military, and the rivalry between the military and other state security
forces. Over the last thirteen years the Mauritanian military has been active in Mauritanian
politics considering there have been two military coups since 2003, including the 2005 coup
that ousted President Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, and the 2008 coup that ousted
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President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdalalhi (Foster 2011). Due to the numerous ethnic cleavages
in Mauritanian society and in the Mauritanian military, it is possible that if a future uprising
contained the necessary societal variables the Mauritanian military would fracture based
upon ethnic affiliation. For example, Mauritania is divided between North African ArabBerbers and the “Black African” communities of the Fulbe, Sooninke, and Wolof ethnicities
(Jourde 2001). Also, considering the active role of the Mauritanian military over the last two
decades it would not be surprising to see another military coup occur in the country
independent of any mass political uprising.
Institutional variables are only half the equation however and the MENA Military
Index demonstrates that societal variables also need to be present in a country for military
defection or military fracturing to occur. Table 17 lists the number of societal variables
present in the twenty-one MENA countries. The five countries that experienced military
defection or military fracturing during the Arab uprisings possess at least four of the six
societal variables. During the Arab uprisings, there were four countries that possessed the
necessary societal variables to trigger military defection or fracturing, but did not possess the
necessary institutional variables. This includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Saudi Arabia.
Bahrain was discussed at length in Chapter 5 and even though the Bahraini uprising
possessed similar characteristics to the uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, Bahrain possessed no
institutional variables that influenced military defection or fracturing and the international
intervention of GCC forces reinforced regime stability and contributed to Bahraini military
loyalty.
In Kuwait, there were four societal variables present, but the Kuwaiti military only
had a minimal role during the uprising because the country's internal security forces were
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successful at confronting the protests. However, even if the Kuwaiti internal security forces
needed assistance from the Kuwaiti military it is likely the Kuwaiti military would have
defended the regime since the country does not possess the necessary institutional variables
to induce military defection or fracturing.
Oman possesses many similar characteristics to Bahrain considering both countries
are monarchies, are ruled by entrenched royal families, have similar colonial legacies with the
U.K., and are members of the GCC. If domestic unrest in Oman reached the same level as
Bahrain, it is possible that fellow-GCC countries would also have physically intervened in
Oman to ensure the stability of the regime. A possible future scenario in Oman is that the
ruler, Sultan al-Said, is in his seventies and it is unclear who will be his successor. There is a
scenario where the Omani military might fracture along tribal lines if there is unrest and
uncertainty in regards to the sultan’s successor in the upcoming years.
As for Saudi Arabia, it is difficult to imagine the Saudi military defecting from the
regime especially considering the close relationship Saudi Arabia has with the United States.
It is unlikely the U.S. would remain idle if mass political protests threatened Saudi Arabia
and given the current state of U.S. – Saudi relations it appears the U.S. would strongly prefer
stability and the status quo in Saudi Arabia, thus decreasing the likelihood of Saudi military
insubordination.
Overall, the MENA Military Index demonstrates that military defection or fracturing
is caused by the presence of institutional variables that pave the way for military
insubordination and unique societal characteristics that provide the military with the
opportunity to either defect of fracture. Specifically, the findings from the MENA Military
Index indicate that a country needs to possess four of the eight institutional variables and
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four of the six societal variables to experience either military defection or military fracturing.
Table 14 demonstrates that there are no countries with four institutional variables and four
societal variables that experienced a military response during the Arab uprisings other than
military defection or military fracturing.
Table 17. Number of Societal Variables per MENA Country
Country
Egypt
Tunisia
Bahrain
Libya
Oman
Yemen
Kuwait
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Morocco
Palestine
Algeria
Israel
Qatar
Iran
Mauritania
Turkey
U.A.E.

Military Response Type
Defect
Defect
Defend
Fracture
Defend
Fracture
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Fracture
Defend
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Minimal: Low Level of Protests
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Minimal: Low Level of Protests
Minimal: Low Level of Protests
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Minimal: Success of Internal Security Forces
Minimal: Low Level of Protests
Minimal: Low Level of Protests

# of Societal Variables
6
6
5
5
5
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2
1
1
1
1

The MENA Military Index Moving Forward
Research on MENA military behavior during the Arab uprisings relies on single case
studies and small-n comparative case studies that only examine a few salient variables that
happen to be present in the observed cases. This project addresses these shortcomings and
more fully explains MENA military responses during the Arab uprisings by employing a
comprehensive analysis that measures numerous variables in a region-wide, comparative
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perspective. The MENA Military Index provides a systematic and quantitative measurement
to a field that has employed minimal, if any, quantitative measures. This dissertation tests
twenty variables of civil-military relations across twenty-one MENA countries and creates an
index score that conveniently measures varying military responses during the Arab uprisings.
The MENA Military Index is an informative measurement that scholars can replicate
and build upon. For instance, the initial findings of the MENA Military Index suggest that
some variables might be unnecessary including whether the ruling leader appoints the
defense minister, rivalries between armed branches, and the communicative channels ruling
leader use when delivering orders for the military to intervene against civilians in mass
political protests. There are also possibilities for expanding the MENA Military Index and
adding additional variables. For example, the Egyptian case demonstrates that the economic
role of the military has a tremendous impact on shaping and forming military behavior and
military interest. Even though variable 9 attempts to capture this effect, there could be value
in specifically examining the economic role of the entire military institution, and the
individual economic salaries and incentives officers and soldiers receive from the regime.
Future examinations building off of the MENA Military Index can also improve
quantitative and empirical data collection. One of the limitations of this project is the
dichotomous variables are unable to detect the intensity of individual variables. For future
research it might be beneficial to examine more nuanced measurements of civil-military
relations, rather than binary variables of whether certain attributes are present or absent
within a country. The unclear nature of civil-military relations in the MENA region makes it
difficult for researchers to collect and gather reliable data, but even basic quantitative
methods like the one utilized in this study provide a promising step for the field. Lastly, even

234
though this project believes the central findings of the MENA Military Index can be broadly
applied to militaries across the world, it is important for other researchers to empirically test
this and determine whether the index is generalizable. Future research can test whether the
MENA Military Index applies to individual cases (e.g. Burma 1988, China 1989, etc.), other
regions (e.g. Latin America, Southeast Asia), or other waves of mass political protests (e.g.
the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
Color Revolutions of the early 2000s). In addition to testing the MENA Military Index to
other cases of mass political protests, it could be insightful to measure how the index relates
to militaries in North America and Western Europe. For example, do the factors of the
MENA Military Index explain civil-military relations and possible military behavior in
historically stable democratic countries such as the U.S., U.K., or France?
The mass political protests that swept across the MENA region during 2010 - 2011
were seminal political events that caught much of the region and world off-guard. Several
years after the demonstrations occurred, it is apparent that MENA militaries and internal
security forces played a crucial role in dictating whether protests were able to overthrow
rulers or whether incumbent regimes were able to ward off opposition movements. This
project discovers that MENA military behavior during the Arab uprisings was influenced
primarily by a combination of both institutional and societal variables. Institutionally, if there
were rivalries between the military and the state's internal security forces, parallel security
forces that counterbalanced the military, if the military had the autonomy to make personnel
appointments within the armed forces, and if there was a system of military conscription,
these variables paved the way for possible defection or fracturing. However, social variables
also had to be present including protests that were large, broad-based, non-violent, consisted
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of non-traditional demonstrators, and specifically aimed to win over the military. In
countries where these institutional and societal variables were present, militaries either
defected or fractured from the regime. In countries where these variables were absent,
militaries either did not intervene during the uprising or defended the regime and used
violence to suppress protesters.

APPENDIX A:
THE MENA MILITARY INDEX QUESTIONNAIRE
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The MENA Military Index Questionnaire
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Military Index is a measurement that aims to
understand civil-military response during the Arab Spring uprisings.
The index consists of one introductory question (the country you will be answering for)
and the subsequent twenty questions of the index. The index is constructed by the
aggregated results of over 60 MENA civil-military experts.
When answering the questions please keep two issues in mind: (1) only answer questions
for the country you selected, and (2) answer all questions at the time of the Arab Spring
uprisings (i.e. 2011 not 2014).
The twenty questions can be answered with either a "yes" or "no" response. Even though
the complexity of MENA civil-military relations go well beyond dichotomous answers, the
index establishes a systematic evaluation of civil-military relations across the region and
serves as an introductory measurement that can detect generalizable trends. You are
encouraged to answer all the questions, and the recommended time to complete the index
is 10-15 minutes.
1. Which country will you be answering questions for?
2. Are there any significant communal (e.g. ethnic, regional, sectarian, tribal) splits that
divide soldiers within the military? (Yes/No)
3. Does the socio-economic background of soldiers create any significant rifts within the
military? (Yes/No)
4. Are there any parallel security forces within the state's security apparatus that
deliberately counterbalance the strength of the military? (Yes/No)
5. Are there any significant rivalries between the military and other security forces (e.g.
police, presidential guard)? (Yes/No)
6. Are there any significant rivalries between the armed force branches (e.g. rivalries
between the Army, Navy, Air Force)? (Yes/No)
7. Are there any significant rifts between senior and junior officers? (Yes/No)
8. Does the military use conscription? (Yes/No)
9. Does the ruling leader grant the military autonomy over selecting officers? (Yes/No)
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10. Are soldiers unsatisfied with the amount of material (e.g. salaries, weaponry) and nonmaterial (e.g. job appointments, preferential access to education, housing, medical)
benefits they receive from the ruling leader? (Yes/No)
11. Did someone other than the current ruling leader (e.g. prior leader, legislature,
judiciary) appoint the Defense Minister and other senior generals? (Yes/No)
12. If the regime ordered the military to violently intervene against protesters, did those
orders come from someone other than the ruling leader? (Yes/No)
13. During the Arab Spring uprisings did more than 1% of the country's population take
part in the demonstrations? (Yes/No)
14. Did the Arab Spring protesters include a significant proportion of demonstrators other
than young men (e.g. women, the elderly, children)? (Yes/No)
15. Was the country's Arab Spring uprising originally non-violent in nature? (Yes/No)
16. Does the military have a clean record without any significant domestic human rights
violations? (Yes/No)
17. Were the Arab Spring protests broad-based in which demonstrations took place in
different regions of the country and where protesters represented diverse backgrounds
and disparate political ideologies? (Yes/No)
18. Was the Arab Spring protest movement successful at winning over a significant
proportion of soldiers? (Yes/No)
19. During the Arab Spring uprisings, did foreign military troops intervene with the
purpose of overthrowing the ruling regime? (Yes/No)
20. In states geographically contiguous to the country, did any of the militaries defect from
their regimes during the Arab Spring uprisings? (Yes/No)
21. Did a significant proportion of officers receive their military education or training in a
foreign country? (Yes/No)

APPENDIX B
NON-MAJORITY RESPONSES FROM THE MENA MILITARY INDEX
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Kuwait

#2. Does the socioeconomic
background of
soldiers create any
significant rifts within
the military?

No

Kuwait

#3. Are there any
parallel security
forces within the
state's security
apparatus that
deliberately counterbalance the strength
of the military?

No

Kuwait

#6. Are there any
significant rifts
between senior and
junior officers?

No

Kuwait

#12. During the
Arab Spring uprisings
did more than 1% of

No

Socio-economic data on Kuwait are difficult to
compile. For instance, in the World Bank Gini
Index, which measures domestic income
distribution, data on Kuwait are not available.
In addition, there is no official data on the
socio-economic affiliation of soldiers within the
military. Kuwait has military conscription and
therefore numerous sectors of Kuwaiti society
are represented in the Kuwaiti armed forces. In
the country there are divisions between Sunnis
and Shias, and between Kuwaiti citizens and
non-Kuwaiti citizens, but overall, there is no
evidence of significant socio-economic rifts
between soldiers and officers in the Kuwaiti
military.
Iraq invaded Kuwait in the early 1990s and ever
since the country's primary security objective
has been to protect the country from external
threats. As a result, Kuwait has not
implemented counter-balancing strategies to
counter the strength of the military. For
instance, in 2011, the Kuwaiti military had
approximately 15,500 soldiers and 7,100
paramilitary forces (The Military Balance 2011,
333). However, the paramilitary forces in
Kuwait consists of the National Guard and the
Coast Guard, which is closely associated to the
Kuwaiti armed forces. Overall, there is no
evidence of a significant parallel security force
in the Kuwaiti security apparatus that
deliberately counterbalances the strength of the
Kuwaiti military.
The only example of a rift occurring between
junior and senior officers in the Kuwaiti
military is during the Iraqi invasion in the early
1990s when it was reported that some senior
commanders abandoned their posts once Iraqi
forces invaded the country (Cordesman 1997,
94). Apart from this example there is no other
evidence of significant rifts existing between
senior and junior officers in the Kuwait
Military, especially during the Arab uprisings.
Jenkins & Herrick (2012) construct a dataset
that examines protests across the Arab world
from 2006 - 2011. The data provide estimates
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the country's
population take part
in the
demonstrations?

to the number of demonstrators at each
protest. For Kuwait, I examined protests
starting on December 21, 2010, (four days after
the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in
Tunisia) and running through 2011. The dataset
provides different estimate ranges for the
number of protesters into one of seven groups
(1 = less than 10; 2 = less than 100; 3 = less
than 1000; 4 = less than 10,000; 5 = less than
100,000; 6 = less than 1,000,000; 7 = over
1,000,000).

Kuwait

#15. Does the
military have a clean
record without any
significant domestic
human rights
violations?

Yes

Kuwait

#20. Did a significant
proportion of
officers receive their
military education or
training in a foreign

Yes

I estimated the number of demonstrators at
each protest by calculating the median. For
example, if a protest was a "3," (which is less
than 1,000 but more than 100) I calculated the
mean between Group 2 and Group 3. Since
Group 2 is less than 100, and Group 3 is less
than 1,000, I calculated that the number of
demonstrators in a Group 3 protest as 550.
Jenkins and Herrick’s dataset contains protest
size estimations for ten demonstrations, and
the sum of the protests equal 11,856
demonstrators. According to the UN's
Economic and Social Commission for Western
Asia (ESCWA), the population of Kuwait in
2011 was approximately 3 million and 11,856
represents .003 of the total population, which is
less than one percent.
To determine whether or not the Kuwaiti
military committed human rights violations
against the Kuwaiti population I consulted the
U.S. State Department Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices and Amnesty International reports
on human rights. I examined reports beginning
in 1996 (when they became more readily
available) through 2011. Overall, there were no
reports of human rights violations committed
by the Kuwaiti military against the Kuwait
population.
At the onset of the Arab uprisings the Kuwaiti
military had approximately 15,500 troops
(Cordesman 2011: 317). According to the U.S.
Department of Defense, 154 Kuwaiti military
personnel received U.S. military or education
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country?

Lebanon

Lebanon

Lebanon

#11. If the regime
ordered the military
to violently intervene
against protesters, did
those orders come
from someone other
than the ruling
leader?
#16. Were the Arab
Spring protests
broad-based in which
demonstrations took
place in different
regions of the
country and where
protesters
represented diverse
backgrounds and
disparate political
ideologies?

No

#17. Was the Arab
Spring protest
movement successful
at winning over a

No

No

training during the 2011-2012 Fiscal Year. (U.S.
Department of Defense and U.S. Department
of State Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years
2011 to 2012 Joint Report to Congress, Volume 1,
Section III-IV Near East: Page 3). In addition,
the U.S. and Kuwait have close military
relations demonstrated by the Defense
Cooperation Agreement (Katzman 2016). This
arrangement provides the U.S. military with
access to Kuwaiti bases and military facilities,
which have been vital for the U.S.’s
involvement in Iraq. In return, Kuwait receives
billions of dollars in military aid and military
weaponry from the U.S. government (Katzman
2016, 9 – 15). Due to the close relationship
between the U.S. and the Kuwaiti military this
variable in considered as a “yes.”
There is no evidence the Lebanese Armed
Forces were ever ordered by the regime to
violently intervene against protesters, so the
question of who delivered the orders cannot be
appropriately evaluated, and this question must
be answered as a "no."
Using the dataset from Jenkins and Herrick
(2012), I went through all protests in Lebanon
from December 21, 2010 - December 31, 2011.
Lebanon is a country divided by sectarian
identities and the protests in 2011 mirrored
these affiliations. Early in 2011, Shias protested
against the United Nations’ indictment of
Hezbollah members in the assassination of
former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (Bassam
2011). Conversely, Sunnis protested once
Hezbollah gained political power in 2011
(Siddiq 2011). Even though factions of both
sectarian groups protested, these do not qualify
as broad-based demonstrations since they were
disparate events that were not cohesively
organized.
The protests in Lebanon during 2011 did not
target military personnel to defect, and
therefore the movement did not win over a
significant proportion of soldiers.
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significant
proportion of
soldiers?
Mauritania #13. Did the Arab
Spring protesters
include a significant
proportion of
demonstrators other
than young men (e.g.
women, the elderly,
children)?
Morocco #11. If the regime
ordered the military
to violently intervene
against protesters, did
those orders come
from someone other
than the ruling
leader?

No

Using the dataset from Jenkins and Herrick
(2012), I went through all instances of protests
in Mauritania from December 21, 2010 December 31, 2011 and found no mention of
non-traditional protesters such as women, the
elderly, children, etc.

No

Even though there were frequent protests in
Morocco in 2011, there is no evidence the
Moroccan military violently intervened against
protesters. Police on the other hand were often
cited as using force against demonstrators. For
more information about the role of the
Moroccan police during the uprising see:
Zakia Abdennebi and Marie-Louise
Gumuchian "Five Dead in Morocco Unrest
After Protests," Reuters. February 21, 2011;
Reuters "Moroccan police break up rally, hurt
dozens-witness," March 13, 2011;
Zakia Abdennebi and Adam Tanner, "Morocco
teachers say beaten by police during rally."
Reuters. March 24, 2011;
Souhail Karam, Matthew Bigg and Christian
Lowe "Moroccan police disperse opposition
protest," Reuters. May 15, 2011;
Adam Tanner and Souhail Karam "Many
wounded as Moroccan police beat protestors,"
Reuters. May 22, 2011;
William Maclean, Zakia Abdennebi, and
Christian Lowe "Morocco police use
truncheons to break up protest," Reuters. May
29, 2011;
Souhail Karam, "Moroccans protest polls,
violence in the capital," Reuters. October 23,
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Oman

#11. If the regime
ordered the military
to violently intervene
against protesters, did
those orders come
from someone other
than the ruling
leader?

No

2011.
There were frequent protests across Oman
during 2011 and the military disrupted
protesters on several occasions. For several
examples see:
Saleh al-Shaibany and Andrew Hammond,
"Oman army clears roadblocks in Sohar pay
protest," Reuters. March 29, 2011;
Saleh al-Shaibany, “Heavy security prevents
protests in Oman city," Reuters. April 8, 2011;
Reuters, “Omani forces clear protest camps,
arrest many," May 14, 2011.
The Omani military's involvement in deterring
protesters is corroborated by the Human
Rights Watch 2012 Report, which claims
Omani soldiers cooperated with Omani police
in using tear gas and batons to disperse
peaceful protesters. (See Human Rights Watch,
"World Report 2012: Oman").
Worrall (2012: 102) broadly states "the
government" ordered the army to disperse the
sit-in in the city of Salalah. However, if the
organizational structure of the Omani Armed
Forces is any guide, it is safe to assume that
most decisions are centralized around the
Sultan himself. In the Omani security structure
the Sultan serves as the center of the Sultanate's
Armed Forces, which includes the traditional
military branches and also the internal Royal
Police. Even if the Sultan did not provide the
orders himself, it is safe to assume that
someone within his inner security circle did.
Moreover, from the perspective of the Omani
soldiers, they most likely interpreted the order
as coming directly from the Sultan or at least
being mandated by the Sultan and the regime.
Given this information, it is logical (although
by no means certain) to deduce that the Sultan
either gave the order for military officials to
intervene or at least mandated the order
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Palestine

Qatar

Syria

Syria

#8. Does the ruling
leader grant the
military autonomy
over selecting
officers?
#14. Was the
country's Arab
Spring uprising
originally non-violent
in nature?
#2. Does the socioeconomic
background of
soldiers create any
significant rifts within
the military?

#13. Did the Arab
Spring protesters
include a significant
proportion of
demonstrators other
than young men (e.g.
women, the elderly,
children)?

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

through one of his inner security personnel.
Therefore the answer to this question should
be "no."
According to the Law of Service of the
Palestinian Security Forces the appointment of
the commander and most mid-level positions
are determined by presidential decree (Khalil
2007: 37).
Using the dataset from Jenkins and Herrick
(2012), there were hardly any instances of
protest in Qatar from December 21, 2010 December 31, 2011. But, of the few protests in
Qatar, they were all non-violent.
The Syrian Armed Forces has a system of
military conscription, which incorporates
individuals from across the country. However,
the Syrian Armed Forces are specifically
constructed so individuals from the same
ethnic group as President Assad, the Alawites,
tend to occupy senior officer positions. In
contrast, the rank-and-file soldiers tend to be
Sunnis. This system creates a socio-economic
division because Alawites are typically better
off financially in comparison to Sunnis. For
more see Heydemann (2013).
The mass uprising in Syria included nontraditional protesters such as women and
children. Even though the majority of antiregime protesters were men there were notable
events of women and children participating in
demonstrations. For examples of Syrian
protests consisting primarily of women, see:
Khaled Yacoub Oweis, "Syrian women protest
at coastal highway: activists," Reuters. April 13,
2011;
Peter Beaumont, "Syria's defiant women risk all
to protest against President Bashar al-Assad,"
The Guardian. May 21, 2011).
Female activists were also targeted and arrested
by security force, for more see:
Khaled Yacoub Oweis, "Wave of unrest shakes
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Syria, crowds torch party HQ," Reuters. March
20, 2011;
Khaled Yacoub Oweis, "Syria arrests women,
opposition figures: rights groups," Reuters. April
30, 2011;

Syria

#16. Were the Arab
Spring protests
broad-based in which
demonstrations took
place in different
regions of the
country and where
protesters
represented diverse
backgrounds and
disparate political
ideologies?

Yes

Syria

#19. In states
geographically
contiguous to the
country, did any of
the militaries defect
from their regimes
during the Arab
Spring uprisings?
#20. Did a significant
proportion of
officers receive their
military education or

No

Syria

Yes

Associated Press, "Syrian regime charges
blogger and fires on mourners, activists say,"
The Guardian. December 11, 2011.
The Arab uprisings engulfed all regions of
Syria. Nearly every region of the country
experienced some form of protest and unrest
during 2011. Looking through the dataset of
Jenkins and Herrick (2012) there were over 250
newspaper articles during 2011 that referenced
Syrian protests and these demonstrations
occurred in approximately thirty villages,
towns, and cities across the country. Here is a
list of some of the protests that took place in
Syria during 2011 divided by geographic region:
the northern regions near Turkey (al-Hasakh,
Aleppo, Bidama, Hamrat, Idleb, Jisr alShuhgour, Maarat al-Numaan, and Qamishli),
the coastal regions of the Mediterranean
(Bayda, Banias, and Lataika), the country's
central region (Hamah, Homs, Houla, Rastan,
and Talkalakh), the eastern regions near Iraq
(Deir Ez-Zur), the southern regions near
Jordan (as-Suwayda, as-Sanamayn, Deraa,
Inkhil, Jassem, Khirbet Ghazaleh, and Tafas),
the capital of Damascus, and its suburbs
(Duma, Saqba, and Zabadani).
Five countries border Syria: Turkey to the
north, Iraq to the east, Jordan and Israel to the
south, and Lebanon to the west. None of these
countries experienced significant military
defection during the Arab uprisings in 2011.

According to the U.S. Department of Defense
and U.S. State Department, there were only
four Syrian military personnel that received
foreign military training from the United States
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training in a foreign
country?

during the 2011-2012 Fiscal Year (U.S.
Department of Defense and U.S. Department
of State Foreign Military Training: Fiscal Years
2011 to 2012 Joint Report to Congress, Volume 1,
Section III-IV Near East: Page 6).

Tunisia

#4. Are there any
significant rivalries
between the military
and other security
forces (e.g. police,
presidential guard)?

Yes

Tunisia

#19. In states
geographically
contiguous to the
country, did any of
the militaries defect
from their regimes
during the Arab
Spring uprisings?
#4. Are there any
significant rifts
between senior and
junior officers?

No

Turkey

No

However, the Syrian military has received
military training and education from the
Russian military. The exact number of Syrian
soldiers trained by the Russians is imprecise but
secondary sources estimate that in 2006 there
were approximately 10,000 Syrian officers that
received training at both Soviet and Russian
military academies (Klußmann 2006). At the
onset of the Syrian uprising, Russia remained
committed to supporting the Syrian military
and was instrumental in ensuring that United
Nations’ intervention did not occur due to
Russia’s veto capabilities on the UN’s Security
Council. Given Russia’s close role with the
Syria military this question is considered as a
“yes.”
Under the leadership of both Bourguiba and
Ben Ali, the Tunisian military was deliberately
marginalized in political strength, whereas the
internal security and police (especially under
Ben Ali) were increased in size, scope, and
jurisdiction (Brooks 2013, 207-208). The
military received a small budget, only 1.4
percent of the country's GDP, whereas the
internal security forces received preferential
treatment from the Ben Ali regime (Brooks
2013, 210).
Two countries border Tunisia: Libya to the east
and Algeria to the west. Even though military
defection occurred in Libya it occurred after the
Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali
regime. The Arab uprisings began in Tunisia
and therefore the country could not be affected
by the contagion effect from other countries.
Even though there is evidence of significant
rifts between junior and senior officers in the
mid-twentieth century (see Michaud-Emin
2007) there is no overwhelming evidence of
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significant rifts between junior and senior
officers in the contemporary period.**

Turkey

#9. Are soldiers
unsatisfied with the
amount of material
(e.g. salaries,
weaponry) and nonmaterial (e.g. job
appointments,
preferential access to
education, housing,
medical) benefits
they receive from the
ruling leader?

Yes

**Note this analysis was conducted prior to the
2016 failed coup in Turkey, in which mid-level
officers attempted a coup against the ruling
Erdogan regime. Given this new information it
appears there were generational (and possibly
ideological) rifts within the Turkish armed
forces but prior to this event it was less clear
this was the case.
During the Prime Ministership of Erdogan
(2003-2014) there were many changes to
Turkey's civil-military relations. Most notably
was the electoral referendum in 2010, which
reduced the military's autonomy and enacted
amendments where coup plotters could be
tried in civilian courts (The Economist 2010).
The new constitutional amendment was put
into action in 2012 during the controversial
Sledgehammer Trial, which convicted 330
military officers of plotting a coup in 2003
(Arsu 2012). The relationship between Erdogan
and the Turkish Armed Forces was hostile, and
from these high profile events, one could
logically surmise that soldiers were unsatisfied
with the non-material treatment of the military.
The military's dissatisfaction also extended to
the lack of material benefits the Turkish
military received. For example, one year before
Erdogan's Prime Ministership, in 2002, the
military budget represented 3.9% of the
country's GDP (SIPRI Military Expenditure
Database). During Erdogan's tenure the
percentage of the military budget dropped, in
2003 it was 3.4% of the country's GDP, and by
2013 it was down to 2.3%.
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Country
Algeria

Algeria

Bahrain

Bahrain
Bahrain

Bahrain

Egypt

Question according to Table 4
#12. During the Arab uprisings
did more than 1% of the country's
population take part in the
demonstrations?
#19. In states geographically
contiguous to the country, did any
of the militaries defect from their
regimes during the Arab uprisings?
#3. Are there any parallel security
forces within the state’s security
apparatus that deliberately
counterbalance the strength of the
military?
#6. Are there any significant rifts
between senior and junior
officers?
#11. If the regime ordered the
military to violently intervene
against protesters, did those orders
come from someone other than
the ruling leader?
#15. Does the military have a
clean record without any
significant domestic human rights
violations?
#2. Does the socio-economic
background of soldiers create any
significant rifts within the military?

Answer
No

Why/Source
According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012),
approximately 0.02 percent (8,500) of the Algerian population
participated in the 2011 demonstrations.

Yes

Algeria is bordered by Tunisia to the east, and the Tunisian military
defected from the Ben Ali regime during the Arab uprisings. For more
see Chapter 4.

No

There is evidence the Bahraini military and internal security forces
worked in tandem in response to the Arab uprisings. Since the entire
Bahraini security apparatus is centralized under the al-Khalifa family the
internal security forces do not serve as a counterweight to the Bahraini
military. For more see Chapter 6, pages 196 - 198.
There is no evidence of significant generational splits within the Bahraini
military. For more see Chapter 6, page 195.

No
No

There is evidence King Hamad directly ordered the military to intervene
during the Arab uprisings. For more see Chapter 6, pages 200 - 201.

Yes

Evidence suggests the Bahraini internal security forces were more
responsible for human rights violations than the Bahraini military. For
more see Chapter 6, pages 209 - 212.

Yes

Chapter 5, page 148, discusses how the salary disparity between rankand-file soldiers and military officers caused resentment and rifts within
the Egyptian military.
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Egypt

#19. In states geographically
contiguous to the country, did any
of the militaries defect from their
regimes during the Arab uprisings?

No

Iraq

#12. During the Arab uprisings
did more than 1% of the country's
population take part in the
demonstrations?
#19. In states geographically
contiguous to the country, did any
of the militaries defect from their
regimes during the Arab uprisings?

Yes

#16. Were the Arab uprising
protests broad-based in which
demonstrations took place in
different regions of the country
and where protesters represented
diverse backgrounds and disparate
political ideologies?
#16. Were the Arab uprising
protests broad-based in which
demonstrations took place in
different regions of the country
and where protesters represented
diverse backgrounds and disparate
political ideologies?
#16. Were the Arab uprising

No

Iraq

Israel

Lebanon

Libya

No

Egypt is bordered by Libya to the west, Sudan to the south, and Israel to
the east. Even though factions of the Libyan armed forces defected from
Qaddafi, the protests and unrest in Libya did not occur until after
Mubarak resigned from office in Egypt. For instance, Mubarak resigned
on February 11, 2011 and unrest began in Libya in late February 2011.
According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012),
approximately 2.16 percent (645,000) of the Iraqi population participated
in demonstrations and protests during 2011.
Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey border Iraq. Even
though segments of soldiers defected from the Syrian military, overall,
the core of the Syrian armed forces remained loyal to the Assad regime,
and thus Syrian military response is not considered as a defection to
influence Iraqi military defection. As a result this answer for Iraq is
considered as a "no."
According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012), the
2011 demonstrations in Israel were minimal and did not consist of a
broad-based movement that represented diverse backgrounds and
disparate political ideologies from across the country.

Yes

According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012), the
2011 demonstrations in Lebanon were broad-based. For example,
protests occurred across the country including the capital Beirut, Tripoli
in the north, and Tyre in the south.

Yes

According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012), the
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Morocco

Saudi
Arabia

Saudi

protests broad-based in which
demonstrations took place in
different regions of the country
and where protesters represented
diverse backgrounds and disparate
political ideologies?
#13. Did the Arab uprising
protesters include a significant
proportion of demonstrators other
than young men (e.g. women, the
elderly, children)?

#13. Did the Arab uprising
protesters include a significant
proportion of demonstrators other
than young men (e.g. women, the
elderly, children)?

#16. Were the Arab uprising

2011 demonstrations in Libya were broad-based. Protests took place
across the country, and represented a cross-clash coalition of anti-regime
elements.

Yes

Yes

Yes

According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012), the
2011 demonstrations in Morocco consisted of non-traditional protesters.
For example, a female protesters set herself on fire in a copycat act
emulating Mohamed Bouazizi from Tunisia (see Souhail Karam,
"Moroccan single mother burns herself in protest," Reuters. February 23,
2011.
http://ca.reuters.com/article/topNews/idCATRE71M4ZF20110223.
Accessed February 6, 2015.)
Also, women were critical in organizing and participating in protests and
were subjected to violence by state security forces. (See Reuters,
"Moroccan police break up rally, hurt dozens-witness," March 24, 2011).
According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012), the
2011 demonstrations in Saudi Arabia consisted of non-traditional
protesters. There are two examples of women participating in the
protests, see:
Reuters, "Saudi women protest, web activists call for reform," February 6,
2011. http://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-women-protest-webactivists-call-for-reform-378931.html. Accessed February 6, 2015
Asma al-Sharif, “Saudi elections - Women seek vote," Reuters. April 26,
2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-electionidUSTRE73P1GZ20110426. Accessed on February 6, 2015.
According to the database provided by Jenkins and Herrick (2012), the
252

Arabia

Tunisia

Tunisia

protests broad-based in which
demonstrations took place in
different regions of the country
and where protesters represented
diverse backgrounds and disparate
political ideologies?
#8. Does the ruling leader grant
the military autonomy over
selecting officers?
#10. Did someone other than the
current ruling leader (e.g. prior
leader, legislature, judiciary)
appoint the Defense Minister and
other senior generals?

2011 demonstrations in Saudi Arabia were broad-based. For example,
protests occurred across the country including the capital, Riyadh,
Jeddah in the west, and the Shiite cities in the east such as the al-Qatif.

Yes

No

Promotions in the Tunisian military are institutionalized and codified
into Tunisian law. Therefore, the ruling leader does not have the legal
authority to micromanage appointments in the middle and lower levels
of the Tunisian military. For more see Chapter 4, pages 102 - 103.
At the start of the protests in December 2010, the Tunisian Defense
Minister was Ridha Grira, who was appointed by President Ben Ali. For
more information on this see Chapter 5.
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